Here, even if a juvenile shooter would not face a criminal conviction, the finding of delinquency would be based on an admittedly criminal act. See A.R.S. § 8-201(12) ; JV-502820 v. Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 243, 245, 889 P.2d 36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). As such, the Court is convinced that regardless of whether the Shooter would face criminal charges, the criminal nature of the act triggers the PLCAA's preemption.
Notably, a dependency adjudication is different from one based on incorrigibility. See JV-502820 v. Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 243, 245 (App. 1995); compare A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(i), with § 8-201(19). And, because this appeal arises solely from the juvenile court's dependency adjudication, we limit our decision to that ruling.
Thus, the issue is not moot. Alternatively, since pretrial detention is necessarily brief, Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 23(C), (H), 25(B)(1), 28(B)(1), and 29(B)(1), this issue is likely to recur without the possibility of appellate review. JV-502820 v. Super. Ct., 181 Ariz. 243, 246, 889 P.2d 36, 39 (App. 1995). Moreover, whether the courts detained Petitioners in excess of their authority is a question of public importance.