Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. GIC873011 Randa Trapp, Judge.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
Dennis Michael Juneau appeals a judgment denying his petition for writ of administrative mandate brought against the County of San Diego Department of Animal Services (Animal Services), in which he challenged Animal Services' decision to abate his dog, Marty, by destruction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) Juneau claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying Juneau his fundamental right to a fair hearing. He also argues there was no substantial evidence supporting the administrative findings by Animal Services that Marty was dangerous.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
Juneau also filed two motions in this court challenging the contents of the appellate record. Based on our resolution of those motions and our review of the record, Juneau has not made an adequate showing of an abuse of discretion. Substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court's denial of the petition. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The basic facts gleaned from the entire record are as follows:
Marty is a mixed-breed basset hound, registered to Juneau, who lives at 925 South Second Street in El Cajon. Within a 24-month period from 1999 to 2001, Marty bit two different neighbors on two separate occasions. On May 9, 2001, Animal Services issued to Juneau a notice of intent to declare dog dangerous, regarding Marty. Animal Services also informed Juneau that he could request a hearing to determine whether grounds existed for the dangerous dog declaration.
A. Administrative Proceedings 2001
At the conclusion of the June 7, 2001 hearing requested by Juneau, Animal Services found Marty was a "dangerous dog" under San Diego County Code (SDCC) section 62.601, subdivision (l). This decision was based, in part, on the finding that Marty had attacked and/or bitten two people on two separate occasions. As a result, Animal Services imposed specific conditions and restrictions for the maintenance of Marty under SDCC section 62.674. Juneau was personally served a notice of conditions and restrictions (Notice), which included the following provision:
SDCC section 62.601, subdivision (l)(1) provides: " 'Dangerous Dog' means a dog which has twice within a 48-month period attacked, bitten, or otherwise caused injury to a person engaged in lawful activity."
SDCC section 62.674, subdivision (a)(6) provides in relevant part: "The Department is hereby authorized and empowered to impound and/or abate any 'Dangerous Dog' independently of any criminal prosecution or the results thereof by any means reasonably necessary to ensure the health, safety and welfare of the public including, but not limited to, the destruction of the dog or by the imposition upon the owner and/or custodian specific reasonable restrictions and conditions for the maintenance of the dog."
"Any violation or failure to comply with any provision of San Diego County Code section 62.674 or 62.682 or any condition or restriction imposed pursuant thereto, is a misdemeanor and may result in the impoundment and/or destruction of the animal(s)."
The release of Marty to Juneau's possession and his continued possession of Marty was conditioned on his compliance with all of the abatement terms listed on the Notice.
During the approximately five years following the hearing in which Marty was declared a dangerous dog, Juneau failed to comply with the conditions and restrictions imposed by Animal Services. Juneau allowed Marty to run loose on numerous occasions, and failed to muzzle Marty and restrain him by a leash. Juneau failed to post "Beware of Dog" signs at his address and did not ensure Marty was wearing a "dangerous dog" tag. On May 28, 2005, while Marty was running loose, he chased and pinned against a car the two children of a neighbor.
On May 23, 2006, after numerous complaints from the public, Animal Services impounded Marty and sent Juneau a written notice informing him of its intent to abate the dog by destruction and of Juneau's right to request a hearing. Such a hearing was requested the next day.
B. Administrative Proceedings 2006
A three-day administrative hearing commenced on July 6, 2006. This hearing was tape recorded and testimony was presented by several witnesses and investigating officers.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer for Animal Services found Juneau had repeatedly failed to comply with the conditions and restrictions imposed on June 7, 2001. Proceeding under SDCC section 62.684, the hearing officer considered a variety of factors, including the history of the dog interfering with public interests, the nature and extent of injuries, and whether the owner had made a good faith effort to comply with legal requirements and to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm. Animal Services concluded that Juneau "violated the trust of the Department and by doing so . . . placed the health, safety, and welfare of the community at risk." As a result, Animal Services decided there was no alternative but to abate Marty by destruction under SDCC section 62.674.
Juneau challenged this decision and requested an administrative review of the hearing. The administrative review, conducted by an Animal Services director, resulted in a determination that Animal Services had proceeded within its authority, there was a fair hearing, and there was no prejudicial abuse of discretion. The review upheld the decision to abate Marty by destruction.
SDCC section 62.684, subdivision (d) states in relevant part: "If a departmental administrative review is requested, the review of the record shall extend to the questions whether the Department has proceeded without, or in excess of its authority; whether there was a fair hearing; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the Department has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record."
C. Superior Court Proceedings
Juneau filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the decision made at the three-day administrative hearing. (§ 1094.5.) Due to technical problems with transcribing the audiotape recordings of the administrative hearing (the audiotapes), the trial court allowed a continuance from September 26, 2006 to October 24, 2006, and again to November 21, 2006, to January 18, 2007, to February 8, 2007 and to February 22, 2007.
At the hearing on February 22, 2007, Juneau again brought a motion to continue the hearing, which the court denied. Then Juneau requested that the court play the audiotapes of the administrative hearing, because he had been unable to transcribe the recordings. The court sustained Animal Services' objection and denied Juneau's motion to play the audiotapes. The court had before it the administrative record, which had been lodged by Animal Services. After reviewing the written record and hearing argument, the court denied Juneau's petition for the writ.
D. Appeal and Motions
On appeal, after Juneau filed his opening brief, Animal Services filed its respondent's brief and lodged with it the administrative record. After full briefing, Juneau filed a motion to strike respondent's notice of lodgment of exhibits and a written objection to respondent's "defective" brief. Juneau also moved to augment the record on appeal and requested judicial notice of certain documents. This court ordered the two motions be considered concurrently with the appeal.
We will provide details of the record preparation problems in the discussion portion of this opinion.
DISCUSSION
Juneau contends he was deprived of a fair court hearing mainly because he was denied the right to present evidence to the court in the form of the audiotapes. He also contends there is no substantial evidence that Marty is a dangerous dog. In addition to these claims on appeal, Juneau's two motions challenge the adequacy of the record. We will first resolve the motions, and then address Juneau's substantive claims.
I
MOTIONS REGARDING RECORD ON APPEAL
Appellate courts have no independent knowledge of the cases brought before them for review. As such, a record of the lower court proceedings, which consists of copies of documents filed or lodged in superior court and a transcript of oral proceedings, must be prepared in order to facilitate the court's review. It is the responsibility of the party appealing to provide an adequate record on appeal. (Kashmiri v. Regents of University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, 849.)
The record in this appeal is sparse. Based on the designation of record, the clerk's transcript includes only the minutes/order from the hearing in superior court, Juneau's notice designating the record on appeal, his notice of appeal, and an estimate for the cost of the reporter's transcript. The reporter's transcript includes only the oral proceedings in the trial court on February 22, 2007. The only copy provided of Juneau's petition for writ of mandamus is in our miscellaneous file.
At the time of filing of its respondent's brief, counsel for Animal Services lodged with this court the administrative record that was before the trial court, which had been returned to counsel by the superior court clerk, and had not been previously provided to this court by appellant. This 132-page administrative record includes the written and photographic exhibits presented at the August 10, 2006 dangerous dog hearing, and the administrative decision issued after that three-day hearing, as well as the Superior Court's ex parte order staying Animal Services' administrative decision, filed on September 26, 2006. We now address the motions in which Juneau attacks the method of transmission and the sufficiency of this record.
Juneau first moves to strike this lodged material, contending that Animal Service's notice of lodgment of administrative record violated many rules of appellate procedure for the proper designation of the appellate record. The gist of these objections appears to be that the administrative record should not be considered to be equivalent to "exhibits," and in any case, the trial court was required to have the whole record before it under section 1094.5, subdivision (c), and without a transcript of the audiotapes, there was no such "whole record" available. Juneau therefore seeks to have the portions of the respondent's brief which rely upon material in the administrative record stricken as well. Opposition and reply papers were filed.
In his related motion, Juneau seeks (among other things) to have us augment the record on appeal with a document that shows that at one point in the proceedings, Animal Services brought an ex parte application for an order directing that the hearing would proceed based on the audiotape record of proceedings (exhibit 1). This is intended to show that the parties had difficulty in preparing a transcript of the audiotapes of the administrative hearing, and they took different positions about whether such a transcript was necessary. We will discuss that application in part IB, post. First, we address the various procedural objections Juneau has brought against the lodged materials.
A. Motion to Strike Respondent's Notice of Lodgment of Exhibits and Written Objection Regarding Defective Brief
Between October of 2007, when Animal Services lodged the administrative record in this court in connection with filing its respondent's brief, and the present time, some of the California Rules of Court upon which Juneau relies in his motion have been amended. New versions of certain rules regarding the method for lodging administrative records went into effect January 2008. (See especially the 2008 version of rule 8.122(a)(3), (b)(4), relating to preparation of the clerk's transcript; and rule 8.224, "transmitting exhibits.") However, for purposes of our discussion of the authority for a respondent's lodging of an administrative record, such as occurred here, both sets of rules provide ample support for including this material in the appellate record. In any case, rules and statutory provisions governing appellate procedure may be retroactively applied. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 4, pp. 64-65.)
All rule references are to the California Rules of Court unless otherwise noted.
At the hearing before the trial court, the administrative record was admitted into evidence, and the trial court stated at the hearing that all the administrative records were produced for review. None of the rules of court cited by Juneau prevented this administrative record from being treated as a set of exhibits that was before the trial court, and transmitted, and in fact, the record was a set of exhibits and was transmitted as such. Under the former version (2007) of rule 8.120(a)(5), "all exhibits admitted into evidence, refused, or lodged are deemed part of the record . . . ." The same is true in the 2008 rules, in rule 8.122(a)(3). Under current rule 8.120(a)(2), an administrative record must be included in the record on appeal if issues are raised about it, as here.
Next, the two sets of versions of the rules regarding designation of the record and transmission of exhibits so designated are also similar. In 2007, respondent was allowed to do so under former rule 8.224(a) and (b). In 2008, rule 8.123 provides a special procedure for designation and transmission of an administrative record to the reviewing court. Under either rule, Juneau's own failure to designate the administrative record did not prevent the respondent from providing it to the court in a reasonably timely manner. (Rule 8.121(b)(2).) Also, there was nothing in the 2007 rules that required any special procedure for the administrative record that was not followed here. In this case, the superior court clerk had returned the exhibits to Animal Services after the hearing, so it did not make sense for Animal Services to designate the exhibits be transmitted to the court because Animal Services was already in possession of the exhibits. Moreover, Juneau is not justified in claiming that this material somehow instead amounted to attachments to briefs that were overlong. (Rule 8.204(d).) Instead, the administrative record was properly provided to this court as part of the appellate record.
We now turn to his backup position that the "whole" record was not made available for review. Juneau mainly relies upon section 1094.5, subdivision (a) for the proposition that the "administrative record means the oral proceedings for hearing on the matter." He claims that without a transcript of those oral proceedings, the exhibits and therefore Animal Services' factual assertions set forth in its brief are not supported by citation to the record and lack any evidentiary basis. Juneau further claims that because the written exhibits do not constitute the entire administrative record, there is no administrative record at all for the court to review on a substantial evidence basis. We will address those claims further in our discussion of the superior court's ruling allowing the writ hearing to go forward without a record containing a reporter's transcript of the administrative hearing. For purposes of ruling upon his motion to strike the administrative record, as well as his claims of a defective brief, we now conclude that none of his procedural arguments has merit. Moreover, the evidentiary objections he is newly arguing on appeal were not brought to the trial court's attention, and should properly be considered to be waived on that basis.
Section 1094.5, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: "All or part of the record of the proceedings before the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer may be filed with the petition, may be filed with respondent's points and authorities, or may be ordered to be filed by the court."
B. Motion to Augment Record on Appeal and Request for Judicial Notice
Next, Juneau moves to augment the record on appeal with two documents: (1) Animal Services' ex parte application for an order directing that the hearing should proceed based on the audiotape record of proceedings (exhibit 1), which includes a declaration of the deputy county counsel and related correspondence about obtaining a transcript, dated November 20, 2006; and (2) respondent's answer to petition for writ of mandate (exhibit 2). Juneau contends these documents are material to assertions made by him in reply to factual issues raised by Animal Services in their brief. Mainly, these documents display the extensive problems the parties encountered in attempting to transcribe the audiotapes of the administrative hearing in order to create a written transcript, which never was completed. The audiotapes were poor quality and transcription was more difficult and expensive than originally anticipated.
Under rule 8.155(a)(1), at any time, on motion of a party or its own motion, the reviewing court may order the record augmented to include any document filed or lodged in the case in superior court. Augmentation of the record is not a matter of right and lies within the appellate court's discretion. (Russi v. Bank of America (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 100, 102.)
It is not disputed here that there is no reporter's transcript of the audiotapes, nor that the parties unsuccessfully attempted over a period of time to have one prepared. The record shows the trial court granted a continuance following the filing of the ex parte application (exhibit 1) to allow supplemental briefing based on information from the tapes. This document, of which augmentation is sought, explains this sequence of events and was filed with the trial court. For this reason it is a proper subject and the motion is granted as to exhibit 1 only. (Rule 8.155, subd. (a)(1).)
However, we deny the motion to augment as to exhibit 2, Animal Services' answer to petition for writ of mandate. This document does not add anything relevant to the issues before us and is not necessary in our consideration of the questions raised on appeal. Moreover, it was filed with the superior court on May 3, 2007, which was after the trial court's ruling denying Juneau's petition. Therefore, Juneau's motion to augment the record with this material is denied.
Next, Juneau seeks to have this court take judicial notice of three documents that do not bear file stamps: (1) County Counsel correspondence, dated October 25, 2006; (2) a copy of Juneau's check in the amount of $900 made payable to the County of San Diego; and (3) County Counsel correspondence, dated February 9, 2007 and a copy of a County of San Diego refund check in the amount of $900 payable to Juneau.
Appellate courts have the option to take judicial notice of any matter subject to discretionary judicial notice by the trial court under Evidence Code section 452. (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a).) However, " 'a court cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations as being true, just because they are part of the court record or file. A court may take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, but can only take judicial notice of the truth of the facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments.' " (Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.) In other words, judicial notice of filed documents does not establish the truth of matters stated therein. Also, these documents were not file-stamped. The court will not take judicial notice of matters irrelevant to the dispositive point on appeal. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1089, fn. 4.)
Here, the dispositive issues on appeal are (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion, under all the relevant circumstances, when it denied Juneau the opportunity to play audiotapes of the administrative hearing in court, and (2) whether Animal Services' decision to abate the dangerous dog is supported by substantial evidence. All parties agree there were many problems in record preparation. The documents for which Juneau requests judicial notice would establish as a factual matter there was correspondence between the parties regarding the preparation of the transcript of the administrative hearing, Juneau provided Animal Services a check in the amount of the estimated cost of preparing the transcript, and Animal Services returned the check amount to Juneau. However, we cannot judicially notice the truth of whether Animal Services refused or failed to transcribe the administrative hearing, or why. Moreover, the correspondence and checks were not shown to be before the trial court. The documents do nothing to further our analysis of the issues on appeal, and go into facts beyond the record. The judicial notice request is denied.
Having dealt with the motions, we now address the merits of this case.
II
SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying Juneau's Request to Play Audiotapes
As a matter of procedural fairness, Juneau claims the court abused its discretion, or showed bias against him, by denying his request to play the audiotapes of the administrative hearing in court. He argues that this effectively violated his due process right to a fair hearing because without the audiotapes, only the documentary part of the administrative record was before the trial court.
Under the applicable abuse of discretion standard of review, the discretion is that of the trial court, and the reviewing court will only interfere with its ruling if it finds that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's action, no judge reasonably could have reached the challenged result. (In re Estate of Billings (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 426, 430.) The trial court abuses its discretion when it has " 'exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.' [Citation.]" (Mendoza v. Club Car, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 287, 301.) The burden rests on the complaining party to demonstrate from the record that such an abuse has occurred. (Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 985.)
We review de novo the trial court's interpretation of section 1094.5, subdivision (a). A partial record of an administrative proceeding is sufficient for the purposes of section 1094.5, subdivision (a) if it provides the reviewing court an adequate basis for the affirmance or reversal of the decision, and establishes where in the administrative proceedings the agency allegedly proceeded in excess of its jurisdiction, denied a fair hearing or abused its discretion.
Section 1094.5, subdivision (a) authorizes the parties to offer in evidence "all or part of the record of the proceedings," but in practice, the entire administrative record is generally offered. The petitioner has the burden of producing a sufficient administrative record to demonstrate there was error by the agency. He must in all cases take the steps required to request and pay for the inclusion of the transcript of the administrative hearing in the record. (See Lees v. Bay Area Air Pollution Control District (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 850, 854.) Without producing a copy of the administrative hearing transcript, a petitioner cannot usually rebut the presumption that the agency performed its official duty, and that presumption will prevail. (Ward v. County of Riverside (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 353, 358.)
A tape recording of the administrative proceedings may provide an adequate means to review those proceedings. (Darley v. Ward (1980) 28 Cal.3d 257, 261 (Darley).) However, this does not necessarily mean the court is compelled to accept the tape recordings in that form. (Ibid.) A court may require written transcriptions where it is necessary to facilitate review. (Ibid.) In Darley, supra, 28 Cal.3d at page 261, the plaintiff, an indigent, contended the trial court abused its discretion by refusing either to accept the certified tape recordings of the administrative hearings or to grant a continuance to permit him to transcribe them. The audiotapes involved six hours of sometimes unintelligible recording, and provided no means by which particular passages could be cited and located quickly. (Ibid.) Review was possible only by the "unacceptable process of winding and rewinding" the tapes to find relevant material. (Ibid.) The trial court understandably needed something in writing. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court found that a continuance for the purpose of allowing plaintiff to prepare an adequate record should not be denied "unless the court is satisfied the request is dilatory, abusive, or prejudicial to the rights of the opposing party." (Id. at p. 262.) There, the plaintiff had tried and failed to have a written transcript prepared by the county, and his own efforts to transcribe the tapes would have involved considerable time and expense. (Id. at p. 261.) The court found the plaintiff's offer of the audiotapes constituted a good faith effort to provide a record and satisfied his initial burden to do so. (Ibid.) At minimum, a trial court is required to either accept the audiotapes or to grant a reasonable continuance for preparation of a written transcript. (Id. at p. 263.) In Darley, the court abused its discretion when it rejected both alternatives. (Ibid.)
Here, it is clear from the existing record, and the augmentation material, that Animal Services attempted to transcribe the tape recordings, but was unable to do so when additional information showed that transcription would cost at least $5,000. The burden to produce the record shifted back to Juneau when he agreed to undertake efforts to transcribe the tape recordings himself. There were continuing problems with transcribing the tape recordings, which were approximately 13 hours long. The record does not support Juneau's contention that the tape recordings were defective and could not be transcribed, but shows, rather, that the recordings were of poor quality, and it would be time-consuming and expensive to prepare written transcripts. Unlike the plaintiff in Darley, supra, 28 Cal.3d 257, Juneau has not been shown to be indigent. More importantly, the court did allow several continuances over many weeks to give Juneau the opportunity to transcribe the tape recordings. Therefore, it was a reasonable exercise of discretion for the court to deny Juneau's motion for yet another continuance, because unlike the plaintiff in Darley, Juneau had been given ample time to prepare the transcript.
Further, the trial court properly denied Juneau's request to play the tape recordings in court, in lieu of providing a transcript, when Animal Services objected that it had no prior notice that this would be requested at the hearing. The trial court was within its discretion to rule that listening to the tapes or having a transcript of the administrative hearing was not necessary under section 1094.5, subdivision (a). Section 1094.5, subdivision (a) does not define the administrative record as mandating a record of the "oral proceedings," as Juneau argues. It also does not require the filing of all of the record, but uses permissive language (see fn. 5, ante). The court ruled that all the administrative record, with the exception of the transcript that Juneau had failed to produce, was before the court for review. We agree with the trial court's statutory interpretation of section 1094.5, subdivision (a) regarding the record. The court noted Juneau was permitted to provide the court with all of the record, but was not required to do so. Juneau has no justification for his serious allegations on appeal of judicial bias.
In any case, the transcript of the administrative hearing was not essential for the court to make its determination on the petition. As will be discussed below, there is substantial evidence in the administrative record, even without the tape recordings, to support Animal Services' determination that Marty is a dangerous dog and Juneau had committed numerous violations of the conditions and restrictions imposed on him, leading to recent attacks on neighbors. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying Juneau's request to play the tape recordings of the administrative hearing in court.
We believe the better course of action is to review the administrative record that was before the trial court and reach the merits of the claims on appeal. Otherwise, if Juneau failed to provide an adequate record for review, Juneau's appeal would be subject to dismissal on procedural grounds, which is not a desirable result.
B. The Trial Court's Decision Upholding the Agency's Findings was Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Section 1094.5 specifies the scope of the trial court's review of administrative agency actions. The trial court's inquiry extends to the question of whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion by the administrative agency. (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) An abuse of discretion is established if the agency "has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence." (§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) If the trial court applied the substantial evidence test, the appellate court's function is identical to that of the trial court: it will review the administrative record to determine whether the agency's findings were supported by substantial evidence. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 217-220.) In making its determination, the appellate court examines all relevant evidence in the administrative record, viewing it in the light most favorable to the judgment, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all inferences in support of the judgment. (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 225.) The burden is on the appellant to prove there was an abuse of discretion through the issuance of a decision that was unsupported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
Juneau also contends in his opening brief, but not in his reply brief, that no notice was provided before Marty was impounded. However, when immediate impoundment is necessary for the preservation of public safety, the notification of the right to a pre-impoundment hearing is waived under SDCC section 62.674, subdivisions (b) and (c).
Juneau contends the trial court erred in determining Animal Services' finding that Marty is a dangerous dog was supported by substantial evidence. Juneau argues action was taken by Animal Services solely based on complaints by neighbors demonstrating dislike for him due to personal neighborhood disputes. However, that does not controvert the evidence of Marty's dangerous activities that was relied on by the trial court in rendering its ruling. There is ample testimony and evidence in the record, as properly lodged with the courts, supporting Animal Services' finding that Marty is a dangerous dog. Following two incidents during 1999-2001 in which Marty bit two different people, Animal Services issued a notice of intent to declare the dog dangerous under SDCC section 62.601, subdivision (l), which provides that a "dangerous dog" is a dog that has attacked, bitten, or otherwise caused injury to a person engaged in lawful activity, within a 48-month period. At the June 7, 2001 hearing, Jean Whitford-Paul testified regarding an incident which occurred on December 6, 1999. She sustained two puncture wounds to her hip after Marty bit her when she stepped outside her residence to ask Juneau to leave her property. Daniel Zorich testified regarding an incident that occurred on April 27, 2001 during which he was attacked and bitten by Marty. At the end of the hearing in 2001, Animal Services found Marty to be a dangerous dog, and imposed on Juneau specific conditions and restrictions for the maintenance of Marty in order to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of the public under SDCC section 62.674.
At the hearing on July 7, 2006, Ed Ceiplis, a neighbor, testified that he had observed Marty running loose on numerous occasions within the five years after the conditions and restrictions were imposed on Juneau. Whitford-Paul testified she observed Marty unrestrained by a leash and running off Juneau's property six to 10 times after 2001. Tim Mattison testified Marty chased and attacked his two children in May 2005. Animal Control Lieutenant Tiffany Sheilds testified she conducted a property inspection in 2003 and found there were no "Beware of Dog" signs posted and Marty was not wearing a "dangerous dog" tag. Photographs taken in May 2006 and submitted as exhibits 32 through 36 show Marty at large and not wearing a muzzle. We agree with the trial court that the record contains substantial evidence supporting Animal Services' finding that Marty is a dangerous dog.
Once we determine the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the next question is whether those findings support the agency's ultimate decision. (Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514-515.) If the administrative record reveals the basis upon which the agency arrived at its ultimate finding and decision, that decision should be upheld as long as the agency found those facts that as a matter of law are essential to sustain its decision. (Craik v. County of Santa Cruz (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 880, 884-885.) The reviewing court resolves reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative findings and decisions. (Topanga Association, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 514.)
Under SDCC section 62.674, Animal Services properly commenced proceedings in 2001 to determine whether Marty was a dangerous dog. The hearing resulted in a declaration that Marty was a dangerous dog based on evidence that Marty attacked and bit two people on separate occasions within a 48-month period. Under SDCC section 62.674, subdivision (a)(6), Animal Services has authority to abate the dangerous dog by any means reasonably necessary including the destruction of the dog and/or imposing conditions and restrictions upon the owner. In 2001, Animal Services imposed conditions and restrictions upon Juneau.
However, by 2006, the evidence showed and Animal Services found the imposition of conditions and restrictions did not have a constructive effect on Juneau. After weighing a variety of factors and looking at all the evidence, Animal Services determined it had no alternative but to abate Marty by destruction in order to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of the public. Juneau was afforded an administrative review of the hearing, and the prior decision was upheld.
After resolving the record issues and reviewing the administrative record before us, we find Animal Services properly proceeded in the manner required by law. The findings and ultimate decision made by Animal Services are clearly supported by the evidence. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in upholding Animal Services' decision.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each party is to bear its own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: NARES, J., IRION, J.