Opinion
No. H026186.
10-16-2003
JULIE V., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent, SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDRENS SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Julie V., the mother of the three children at issue here, files this petition for extraordinary writ challenging the findings and orders of the juvenile court in setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (§366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 39.1B.) Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her reunification services at the contested 12-month review hearing. Since we find no error or abuse of discretion by the juvenile court, we will deny the petition.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Julie V. is the mother of the children David G. (born 1990), Stephanie G. (born 1992), Tiffany G. (born 1994), Jimmy V. (born 1996) and Dominique V. (born 1999). Although all five children are the subject of ongoing juvenile dependency proceedings, only the youngest three children, Tiffany, Jimmy, and Dominique, are the subjects of the instant writ proceeding.
In November 2001, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Childrens Services (the Department) filed separate petitions as the children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) [failure to protect], (d) [sexual abuse], and (j) [abuse of sibling]. The petitions alleged that Tiffany, Jimmy, and Dominique were placed into protective custody after it was learned that Stephanie and Tiffany were the victims of ongoing substantial sexual abuse by their stepfather, Joseph V., while they were in mothers care in Arizona. Mother also allowed Joseph V. to continue to have contact with the children after he was released on bail, and mother brought the children to San Jose before Arizona officials could place the children into protective custody. While in San Jose, mother resided with Joseph V.s parents for two to three days, and Joseph V. had access to Tiffany, Dominique, and Jimmy during this time. Stephanie also was sexually molested by her brother David and a cousin. The petitions as to Jimmy and Dominique, as subsequently amended, also alleged that a medical examination of Dominique raised suspicions that she was sexually abused as well. Mother also had a history of being a victim of domestic violence and was a victim of sexual molestation as a child. In addition, Tiffany, Stephanie, and David had been dependent children of the court in the past.
Joseph V. is the father of Jimmy and Dominique.
In the social workers jurisdictional/dispositional report (prepared December 2001), the social worker confirmed the allegations of the petitions. The social worker also reported that mother denied that her husband Joseph V. molested Stephanie and Tiffany, and she called the children liars and intended to remain with Joseph V. The social worker was concerned with mothers inability to empathize with her children and the severe abuse that they experienced as well as with mothers ability to protect them. Although mother reported to police that there had been domestic violence in her relationship with Joseph V., she denied that there was any domestic violence in the relationship. The social worker recommended that Tiffany, Jimmy, and Dominique remain in foster care and that David and Stephanie remain in the care of their father, Francisco G., under a family maintenance plan, with mother receiving reunification services as to all five children. The social worker also recommended that mother have supervised visitation with the children.
On January 2, 2002, the juvenile court found the allegations of the petitions true and declared the children dependents of the court. With respect to Tiffany, Jimmy, and Dominique, the juvenile court ordered out-of-home placement with reunification services for mother with supervised visitation twice a week for one hour. Under the reunification service plan, mother was to participate in and successfully complete an intense parenting without violence class, an intense program of counseling or psychotherapy, a psychological evaluation, and a domestic violence evaluation.
In an interim review report, dated February 15, 2002, the social worker reported that Peter J. Berman, Ph.D., had conducted a psychological evaluation of mother. Dr. Berman diagnosed mother as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from her childhood sexual abuse as well as a personality disorder not otherwise specified with dependent personality features. Dr. Berman also reported that mother adamantly denied that her second husband, Joseph V., sexually abused the children, was unable to even consider whether he abused the children, and accused an uncle of being the molester. Dr. Berman also reported that mother appeared unable to empathize with her children and the severe sexual abuse that they experienced, and she had difficulty accepting responsibility for her own behavior. Dr. Berman believed that mother had the cognitive ability to participate and benefit from services, but it was unknown whether she was motivated to make changes. Dr. Berman also reported that mother should be in intensive individual counseling in order to resolve her own issues of childhood sexual abuse so that she could be in a better position to protect her own children. Mother needed to learn how to recognize the signs and symptoms of sexual abuse that her children experienced, and she needed to understand how it impacted their lives. Dr. Berman also recommended that mother take part in a domestic violence support group, parenting classes, and family counseling.
In an interim review report prepared in April 2002, the social worker reported that mother had started attending parenting classes but had not begun therapy. Mother also had completed the domestic violence assessment, with the resulting recommendation that she address these issues in individual counseling.
The matter was set for a six-month review hearing in June 2002. In her status review report prepared for the hearing, the social worker recommended that mother continue receiving family reunification services as to all five children. Meanwhile, mother was participating in services and expressed her relatively new acceptance of her husbands guilt regarding the sexual molestation of her children after Joseph V. pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The social worker also reported that mother continued to visit with Dominique, Tiffany, and Jimmy two times per week for one hour, but David and Stephanie continued to refuse to visit with her. The social worker believed that therapy was the most important aspect of mothers case plan, and she was concerned that mother did not get involved in therapy until May 2002. Although mother was participating in therapy, the social worker was concerned with her ability to address all issues in the time provided. The social worker also characterized mothers progress as "poor." At the conclusion of the six-month review hearing in June 2002, the juvenile court adopted the social workers recommended findings and orders and continued the matter for a 12-month review in December 2002.
Mother appealed the juvenile courts six-month review order, but her appeal was dismissed as abandoned (this courts case No. H024760). Mother also filed a related petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the "no forced visitation" provision of the visitation order and by failing to challenge the reasonable services finding in light of the lack of visitation, which resulted in this courts issuance of an order to show cause returnable in the juvenile court (this courts case No. H025136). As requested by the parties, we have taken judicial notice of this courts records in both matters. Since the juvenile court subsequently deleted the "no forced visitation" provision as to Tiffany, Jimmy, and Dominique and since these three children have visited mother regularly throughout the dependency proceedings, the concerns that necessitated the issuance of the order to show cause are not at issue here.
The 12-month review hearing was continued several times between December 2002 and May 2003. In the meantime, mother filed a substitution of attorney in October 2002 and was represented by new retained counsel from December 2002 through April 2003, but she chose to represent herself at the contested 12-month review hearing.
In her 12-month review report, prepared in December 2002, the social worker recommended termination of mothers reunification services. The social worker reported that mother had completed a parenting without violence class and was continuing to participate in weekly individual therapy sessions, which were being paid for by the maternal grandmother. The social worker also reported that mother had complied with her case plan, but she appeared to lack motivation to establish a stable living environment and appeared willing to let her relatives take on the primary responsibility of providing a home for her children. The social worker believed that mother was not ready to be responsible for providing a safe and protective home environment for the children and that she was struggling to reestablish her life and become independent.
In an addendum report for the 12-month review hearing, prepared in April 2003, the social worker reported that mother seemed overly obsessed with Dominique and Jimmys clothes and hygiene during supervised visits and that mother blamed the Department for traumatizing and emotionally damaging the children by changing placements. The social worker believed that mother needed to work on her own issues of domestic violence, sexual abuse of her children, and her own failure to protect the children before the children would be safe in her care. The social worker continued to recommend termination of reunification services.
The juvenile court conducted the contested 12-month review hearing over several days in May and June 2003.
At the contested hearing, social worker Kathleen Fleming testified that she was assigned to the case from August 2002 until mid-March 2003 and that she wrote the December 2002 report recommending termination of mothers reunification services. Ms. Fleming testified that mother was already engaged in services when she was assigned to the case and that she believed the case plan and the services were appropriate. In making the recommendation, Ms. Fleming took into consideration mothers progress in therapy, her living situation, and her financial situation. Ms. Fleming also spoke with mothers therapist and agreed with the therapist that mother would not be able to provide a safe home for her children without a lot of resources and services. Ms. Fleming also testified that, as far as she knew, mother continued with therapy the entire time that she was assigned the case.
Ms. Fleming also testified that she had a tremendous amount of contact with the family on a daily basis. She also testified that she had practically daily contact with mother about her concerns. Ms. Fleming assisted mother in obtaining vocational training, assisted mother in applying for funding for her therapy, and provided mother with housing referrals.
Ms. Fleming recommended terminating mothers reunification services because she was concerned with mothers unstable living situation and because mother needed to continue her therapy in order to process the sexual abuse of her children and to protect the children from inappropriate behavior. Ms. Fleming believed that mother needed more work in therapy and that she had not satisfied the therapy component of her case plan.
The current social worker assigned to the case, Deirdre Dougherty, also testified at the contested hearing. Ms. Dougherty testified as an expert in the placement of dependent children and the provision of reunification services. Ms. Dougherty was the first social worker assigned to the case after the January 2002 disposition. She supervised the case for approximately seven months after disposition, and she was reassigned to the case in mid-April 2003.
Ms. Dougherty testified that the first issue that the case plan addressed was mothers inability to protect her children from sexual abuse by her husband and her ability to protect them in the future. The case plan also addressed mothers parenting skills and how her personal life experiences may have affected her inability to recognize that her children had been abused. Mother needed to learn some of the signs and symptoms of sexual abuse and how it impacted the childrens lives. Mother also needed to learn the different developmental needs of her children, deal with the issues of being a victim of sexual abuse herself, and address the issue of being involved in domestic violence relationships and the impact on the children from witnessing domestic violence.
Ms. Dougherty also testified that in order to address the issues in the case plan, mother received referrals for a psychological evaluation, a domestic violence assessment, intense individual therapy, and a parenting without violence class. Ms. Dougherty also testified that mother was very resistant to working with the social worker and that it took mother approximately three months to actually start therapy. Ms. Dougherty believed that the original service plan would have been sufficient to address the problems that led to the removal of the children if mother had internalized what she was learning from the different services and if she had completed those services to the social workers satisfaction.
Ms. Dougherty had spoken recently to mothers therapist and was told that mother had completed 24 sessions and had made moderate progress in therapy, but mother still needed to be in therapy and reportedly stopped therapy because of funding issues. The therapist also advised Ms. Dougherty that she could not comment on whether the children could be returned to mothers care since she had never met the children or seen mother interact with them. Ms. Dougherty believed that mother would benefit from additional therapy and from being in a support group, but she had not had an opportunity to work on encouraging mother to get alternative services since she returned to the case. She also testified that mother was not always appropriate during visits with the children.
Ms. Dougherty also agreed with the recommendation made by Ms. Fleming. Ms. Dougherty believed that the children would not be safe with mother, with her biggest concern being mothers refusal to take any responsibility for the part she played in not protecting the children from sexual abuse and from domestic violence. Mother also had not reached the point in her case plan of starting joint family therapy and addressing the childrens mistrust of her for not having protected them. Ms. Dougherty was not convinced that mother would keep her children safe from other men who might abuse them or keep them from contact with Joseph V. Although Ms. Dougherty was aware that mother had completed several of the services that were offered to her, she did not believe that mother had completed the therapy component of her case plan.
Mother also testified at the contested hearing. Mother testified that she discussed her case plan with her social worker and that she received referrals for her therapist. Her therapist told her that she had made good progress but never told her that her goals had been reached or that she no longer needed therapy. No social worker told mother that the goals of her therapy had been completed. Mother went to 12 sessions that were paid for by the Department, and she continued going to therapy because she believed it was beneficial. She went to a total of 24 sessions between May 8 and December 20, 2002. However, mother stopped going to therapy due to financial considerations. Mother also testified that she did not fail to protect her children, that she was not responsible for the abuse committed by her husband Joseph V., that she was not responsible for the children being in protective custody, and that she had not done anything wrong.
At the conclusion of the contested hearing, the juvenile court submitted the matter and subsequently issued an oral decision in July 2003. The juvenile court noted that, despite all of the time the case had been before the court and all of the time the social workers had been working with her, mother never clearly acknowledged the very serious sexual abuse of the children or acknowledged that she allowed the perpetrator to have continued contact with the children, as the court previously found. The juvenile court adopted the findings and recommendations of the Department, terminated reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing for October 29, 2003.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the Department failed to provide reasonable reunification services. In response, the Department asserts that substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts finding that reasonable reunification services were provided to mother. We agree with the Department.
"Only where there is clear and convincing evidence the [Department] has provided or offered reasonable services may the [juvenile] court order a section 366.26 hearing. (§ 366.21, subds. (g)(1) and (g)(3).)" (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1165.) A reunification service plan must be tailored to fit the specific circumstances of each family and must be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings. (In re Dino E . (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) " `[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult (such as helping to provide transportation and offering more intensive rehabilitation services where others have failed). [Citation.]" (Robin V., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165, original italics; see also In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006-1007.)
The fact that additional services might have been possible does not render the services inadequate. "In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
We review the juvenile courts determination that reasonable services were provided to mother under the substantial evidence test. "In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible. Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the appellate court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact." (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.)
Initially, we note that mother continues to claim that the allegations of the petitions were unfounded. However, the juvenile court found these allegations true at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing in January 2002. The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are long since final. Hence, mother has waived the opportunity to complain that the jurisdictional findings and original dispositional order were erroneous. (See, Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811.)
In challenging the adequacy of the services provided, mother claims that she only had limited contact with the social worker, that she was unaware of the social workers concerns, that she was not informed prior to the hearing that she needed more therapy, and that she completed the case plan as given to her.
Mother also filed a request to augment the record after the matter was submitted in this court. The request to augment the record is denied as untimely. The request also is unnecessary to the extent mother seeks to augment the record with evidence that is already contained in the record and is unnecessary with respect to records that this court has judicially noticed.
However, the record contains ample evidence to the contrary. Specifically, the social worker who supervised mothers case from August 2002 through March 2003 and who prepared the 12-month review report, Ms. Fleming, testified that she maintained almost daily contact with mother. Mothers need for intensive therapy was expressly set forth in her case plan and was identified as a key component of the plan in social worker reports. Both social workers also testified that mother did not complete the therapy component of her case plan, and mother herself testified that neither her therapist nor any social worker told her that her goals in therapy had been reached. Rather, it appears that mother decided to quit therapy on her own. Under the circumstances, mother is in no position to claim that she was unaware that her case plan required her to be actively engaged in therapy or that she was unaware that she needed more therapy.
Furthermore, the record reveals that the Department provided mother with extensive services, including numerous referrals for a psychological evaluation, a domestic violence assessment, intense individual therapy, a parenting without violence class, and housing, as well as assisted mother in obtaining vocational training and in applying for funding for her therapy.
Based on this record, substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts determination that the Department provided or offered reasonable reunification services to mother.
Respondent argues in its brief that the juvenile courts visitation and placement orders were a sound exercise of the courts discretion. We find that petitioner has not adequately raised these additional issues. Therefore, we decline to address them. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
WE CONCUR: Elia, Acting P.J. and Mihara, J.