Opinion
D041831.
7-10-2003
JUDY J., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.
Judy J. seeks review of juvenile court orders at the 12-month review hearing terminating her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing for her six children. She contends the court erred by finding she was provided reasonable services and there was not a substantial probability the children would be returned to her custody by the 18-month hearing date. We conclude substantial evidence supports the courts reasonable services and no substantial probability of return findings and deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
Judy is the mother of six children, ages seven through 16 at the time of the 12-month status review hearing. The children have an extensive history with the dependency system dating from 1989 and were dependants of the juvenile court from 1993 through 1998 because of child abandonment and severe neglect. Judy has a history of leaving the children for extended periods of time without arrangements for care or sufficient food. She again abandoned her children in January 2002. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed petitions for five of the children who were initially detained with Judy. Eleven days later she left the children alone overnight telling them to stay inside because Agency would be watching. When she returned, she beat two of the older girls, biting one on the face.
The court removed the children from Judys custody. The children were eventually placed with their maternal aunt. A separate petition was filed on behalf of the sixth child who was initially placed with the aunt but was later placed in a group home. At the time of the 12-month status review hearing, the sixth child asked the court to return her to "aunties" home as soon as possible. The court gave the social worker discretion to reunite the child with the other children in the aunts home.
Judys reunification plan required her to participate in or complete general counseling, a parenting education program, a psychiatric/psychological evaluation, an outpatient substance abuse program and substance abuse testing. Supervised visits with the children were ordered for Judy. The six-month review report stated Judy had been out of contact with Agency until July 2002 and she had not made contact with her children. During a July telephone call, Judy requested telephone numbers for her SARMS worker, her attorney and a parenting course. Later in July, Judy reported to juvenile court and SARMS. On August 24, 2002, Judy entered the Crossroads Foundation residential recovery program.
The social worker reported in the six-month review report that none of the children wanted to see Judy or to return to her care. The social worker noted this was the fourth time the children had been in the system under similar circumstances and they had been extremely traumatized by Judys behavior. Agency recommended visitation be supervised and only when determined to be appropriate by the childrens therapists. At the six-month status review hearing, the court gave the social worker discretion to begin visitation between Judy and the children with the concurrence of the childrens therapists and counsel.
In October 2002 the court set a special hearing to address Judys visitation with the children. The social worker reported she had spoken with the therapists on a weekly basis and the therapists were not recommending visitation. All the children had stated unequivocally that they did not want to return to Judys care or to see her. The therapists considered the children to be damaged and traumatized and would move "very slowly" in recommending contact between Judy and the children. Agency recommended the current visitation order continue. Judy requested the matter be set for trial, which was held on January 7, 2003. The social worker, Judy and two therapists (who were seeing four of the children) testified. Both therapists opposed visitation between the children and Judy at that time. The court ordered the social worker to facilitate the therapists speaking with each other about starting conjoint therapy and set a special hearing to address progress of conjoint therapy.
Judys therapist and two of the childrens therapists, who were seeing four of the children, met on January 16. Judy was present for part of the meeting. The therapists agreed Judy and the children should not visit for six weeks. They further agreed Judy and the children could immediately write letters to each other, which would be exchanged through the therapists and shared in their therapy sessions.
Agency recommended in the 12-month status review report and addendum report that Judys reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. Agency reported Judy was participating in SARMS and was receiving good progress reports. She had been in individual therapy since September 23, 2002, and had completed parenting and anger management classes. Visitation with the children had not been discussed because she had not written letters to any of them.
The contested 12-month status review hearing was held on March 19, 2003. The attorneys had participated in a conference call with all but one of the childrens therapists. The parties stipulated that if called as witnesses, the therapists with whom they had spoken would testify that none of the children were ready to return to Judys care and only two of the children may be ready for conjoint therapy with her. The parties further stipulated that if called as a witness Judy would testify she had been employed since January 2003 and would have visited the children if allowed.
The court found reasonable reunification services had been offered, Judy had made substantive progress with her case plan, and there was no substantial probability the children would be returned to her care by the 18-month hearing date. It terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Judy seeks review of the courts findings and orders by filing a petition for extraordinary relief. ( § 366.26, subd. (l ); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 39.1B.) This court issued an order to show cause and Agency responded. The parties declined oral argument. We now review the merits of Judys contentions.
DISCUSSION
No Substantial Probability of Return Finding
The court may continue a case until the 18-month hearing date if it finds there is a substantial probability the children will be returned to the physical custody of their parent and safely maintained in the home within the extended period. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) To support a finding that there is a substantial probability of return by the 18-month hearing date, a parent must show that he or she has: 1) consistently contacted and visited with the children, 2) made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the childrens removal from the home, and 3) demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of the treatment plan and to provide for the childrens safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs. ( § 366.21, subds. (g)(1)(A)-(g)(1)(C).) Judy contends she demonstrated all three of the required criteria and the court erred by not extending services to the 18-month hearing date.
Judy demonstrated she had made significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the childrens removal. The court specifically found that she had made substantive progress with the provisions of her case plan but concluded her progress was insufficient to demonstrate there was any likelihood the children would be returned to her care by the 18-month hearing date. The court emphasized the need for the children to have stability and recognized that under the statutory scheme a decision normally should be made at the 12-month hearing so the uncertainty of the childrens future would not continue. The court recognized the children all wanted the stability of a permanent placement and were worried they were once again going to be returned to Judy. To help them stabilize and feel more secure, they needed to hear from the court that they were not going to be returned to Judy.
Judy did not consistently and regularly contact and visit her children. She contends she attempted to maintain contact by requesting visitation in October 2002 and consistently seeking visitation through the various court hearings that followed. She implies that her persistence in attempting to gain visitation should meet her requirement of consistent contact with her children.
Judy had subjected her children to long-term, severe neglect and abuse. She had repeatedly abandoned them. The children were severely traumatized by her behavior. One of the children had to be hospitalized twice and that child and another repeatedly suffered decompensation requiring de-escalation to cope with their emotional trauma. During the proceedings, the children stated they feared Judy and did not want to have contact with her although some of the children later in the proceedings stated they might be willing to meet with her in a safe environment. The therapists generally recommended against visitation and opined that the children needed extensive individual therapy to deal with the emotional problems that Judy had created before they would be able to confront her even in a therapeutic or supervised setting. When Judy had contact with some of her children in violation of the courts orders, the contacts had generally upset and disrupted the children.
Judys intermittent contact with the children in violation of court orders did not meet the requirement of consistent visitation or contact. Moreover, Judy created the situation that prevented the children from having the emotional stability and strength to have regular contact with her. Visitation did not occur because it would have been detrimental to the children. She, not the court or Agency, is responsible for the lack of visitation and contact. Under these circumstances, attempts to secure visitation do not excuse Judy from meeting the requirement that she have regularly visited or contacted her children.
Judy contends she demonstrated her ability to complete the objectives of her treatment plan and provide for the childrens safety and emotional well-being because she participated in her reunification plan and her therapist and the social worker noted her considerable progress. She additionally refers to her own comments demonstrating her progress; she understood how her children would not want to meet with her if she was the same person she was before she completed classes and underwent therapy.
Judy had made progress. However, she had considerably more progress to make before she could reunify with her children. Her own therapist did not recommend visitation at this time, let alone that the children be returned to her. More important, for years she had caused the children extreme trauma and emotional distress. The children needed stability. As stated by the court, to help them to stabilize and feel secure they needed to know they were not going home to their mother. Completion of reunification services does not require the childs return to the parents care. A court must consider the effect that return will have on the child. (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 894.) The emotional trauma the children suffered as a result of their mothers long-term abuse and neglect made it not only detrimental to return the children to Judys care at the 12-month review hearing, but highly unlikely they would be emotionally ready to return to her care at the 18-month hearing date. Most of the children were unable to participate in conjoint therapy and were not amenable to visitation.
Substantial evidence supports the courts no substantial probability of return finding.
Reasonable Services Finding
The reasonableness of services is judged according to the circumstances of each case. (Armando L. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 549, 554.) The Agency is required to make a good faith effort to address the parents problems through services, to maintain reasonable contact with the parent during the course of the plan, and to make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult. (Id. at pp. 554-555.) We determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the courts finding that reasonable services were offered or provided by reviewing the evidence "in a light most favorable to" the prevailing party and indulging "in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the [courts ruling]." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) The parent bears the burden of showing there is insufficient evidence to support the ruling. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal. App. 3d 412, 420, 159 Cal. Rptr. 460.)
Judy contends she was not provided reasonable services because the social worker did not inform one of the childrens therapists that the goal was reunification and did not keep any of the childrens therapists current on her progress with her reunification plan, resulting in long delays before the children were able to begin conjoint therapy with her.
Agency acknowledges all therapists should have been told reunification was a goal if it could be achieved safely and efforts should have been made as early as reasonably possible to have the various therapists, including Judys therapist, communicate with each other. One therapist did not learn that reunification was a goal until January 7, 2003, and the therapists did not begin exchanging information on Judys progress and its impact on possible visitation and/or reunification until January 16, 2003. However, any deficiencies on Agencys part did not result in visitation delays. To the contrary, in January when the therapists were fully aware reunification was a goal and fully informed about Judys progress, they still recommended against visitation because it was not in the childrens best interest. It was not until the March 19 hearing that one therapist recommended that two of the children might be ready for conjoint therapy.
Agency provided a multitude of services including a drug treatment program, drug testing, individual therapy and a parenting program. The children came into the dependency system on this occasion in January 2002. Judy did not inform Agency of her whereabouts until July 2002. She did not begin participating in services until around that time. Because of the severe emotional problems the children had suffered in Judys care, the children feared her and did not want to visit with her. Their therapists recommended against visitation before the children and Judy had undergone extensive therapy and the children had resolved individual emotional and psychological issues. Visitation therefore could not commence when Judy decided to participate in services. Moreover, during the two months when Judy was allowed to contact her children through letters, she did not write to them thereby inflicting additional trauma on them, especially to the child who wrote to her and received no response. By not participating in services for several months, Judy was responsible for delays in visitation. Agencys actions or omissions did not prejudice her.
Substantial evidence supports the courts reasonable services finding.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
WE CONCUR: NARES, Acting P. J., and OROURKE, J. --------------- Notes: All statutory references are to the California Welfare and Institutions Code.