Opinion
E034080.
10-23-2003
JUDY N., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Respondent; RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Law Offices of Michael J. La Cilento and Michael J. La Cilento for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. William Katzenstein, County Counsel, and Julie A. Koons, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Under California Rules of Court, rule 39.1B, petitioner (hereafter mother) seeks review of the juvenile courts order terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to establish a permanent plan for her nine-year-old daughter, Brittany. We deny mothers petition on its merits.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2001, mother was in the Riverside County jail and the Riverside County Department of Social Services (hereafter department) filed petitions under section 300, subdivisions (b) failure to protect, (g) no provision for support, and (j) abuse of sibling, on behalf of Matthew N. and Brittany N. Matthew was 16 years old and Brittany was 8 years old at the time. Matthew and Brittany were placed in the custody of the department, but Matthew is 18 years old now and is not a party to this proceeding. Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the allegations were found true and mothers reunification plan was accepted.
Matthew was born in January 1985 and Brittany was born in April 1993.
At the contested six-month review hearing held on September 16, 2002, both mother and the social worker testified. Also, they stipulated that Brittany would testify she is not afraid of her mother, there is no history of mother physically abusing her, and "she wants return with the caveat that she wants to return with her brother." The social worker testified mother was referred to Dr. Ryan, a psychologist for evaluation, and he recommended a referral to a psychiatrist. Mother was referred to two different psychiatrists, Dr. Michelson and Dr. Safai. Both psychiatrists stated that counseling and medication would be required. Mother was offered psychiatric counseling with Dr. Michelson and Dr. Safai. Mother testified she never had a problem with her daughter. She met with Dr. Safai, the psychiatrist, but he never recommended any medicine. He said she had anxiety and stress because of her son and if she continued to repeat herself others would think she had "bipolar." Although he told her to take medication, she did not take it. She had never taken medication before, but she would if it meant that her daughter could come home.
Medical reports submitted to the juvenile court included reports from Dr. Edward J. Ryan and from Dr. Hoseyn Safai.
Dr. Edward J. Ryan, clinical psychologist, evaluated mother on February 7 and 21, 2002. She was late for her appointments and had not allotted sufficient time for the evaluation because she said she needed to be at work. She made it known that she did not want to go through this process and did not know why it was necessary because it was her son who had the problem. Although the record reflected that she was on summary probation, she denied that she was on probation. Throughout the evaluation process, it was difficult to get her to focus on any one area at a time and to get her to provide an accurate history. Her behavior showed all of the classic symptoms of ADHD, but she appeared to be totally unaware that her behavior was inappropriate. She manipulated the evaluation process in a passive-aggressive manner. Her symptoms met all basic criteria for "Ring of Fire ADD," "a bi-polar equivalent . . . characterized by being easily distracted, having too many thoughts, being very hyper and hyper-verbal, with oppositional and aggressive behavior patterns." Dr. Ryan recommended "a strict regimen of treatment" before reunification.
Dr. Hoseyn Safai reported mother has bipolar disorder and it would be very beneficial for her to take medication and continue her individual therapy. However, she said she would not return to see him or take medication because she feels she is not ill.
The juvenile court observed that mother had sabotaged the case because of her anger by participating in her case plan without cooperating. While cautioning mother to participate fully and be cooperative, the court noted that she was leaving the courtroom. After finding mother was provided with reasonable services, the court continued reunification, ordered counseling with a licensed psychologist, and set the matter for another review hearing.
At the review hearing held on July 15, 2003, Dr. Lee Madigan, psychologist, testified that mother attended 15 sessions from October 7, 2002, until February 26, 2003. She suffered from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. She said she was not taking her medication because she had taken it a couple of times and did not need it. She made no improvement during her therapy before she was terminated for missing three appointments, on February 19, March 5 and 12, 2003. She demonstrated a persistent pattern of inattention and impulsiveness with an inability to stay focused on one theme or to follow through on sustained goals. She said she did not need help, she was "just fine," "something was wrong with her son, something was wrong with [the social worker]. And she was going to sue them for her situation."
Mothers social worker testified that for a period of time it appeared mother was taking her medication and was participating in her service. Dr. Ryan reported mother was diagnosed with ADHD, ring of fire. Mother was referred to medical doctors, Dr. Robinson and Dr. Safai, for her medication. After Dr. Madigan terminated mothers therapy because she missed appointments, mother missed her appointment for a referral. In January 2003, on the basis of the number of pills left, it became apparent that mother was not taking her medication. Also, she did not follow up with the appointment to get the prescription refilled.
Mother testified she took her medication but it made no difference. She saw Dr. Madigan once a week and they "just talked about relationships, nothing to do with [her] daughter." Dr. Madigan told her there was no reason why her daughter could not be returned. She missed two appointments with Dr. Madigan. Dr. Madigan never told her that she was being discharged and she was shocked. Dr. Madigan was not a good doctor, she was not helping either mother or her daughter. Mother wanted her own counselor, not a county counselor. She had a visit with her daughter scheduled for the same date she had an appointment with Dr. Safai on January 16, 2003, so she just forgot Dr. Safais appointment. She has received so many letters that she did not remember whether she received a letter from the social worker asking her to contact Dr. Prakash. She did not file a form with the court asking the court and the social worker to send all her correspondence to her attorney. She did not contact Dr. Kwan for counseling or Dr. Prakash for psychiatric referral prescription renewal. She "cant remember everything that the Department asked [her] to do because theres so much time thats gone by. You know, its not a priority." She did not schedule an appointment for medication. She did not believe she benefited from counseling by Dr. Madigan. She completed her parenting classes. She did not remember that she was ordered to attend additional parenting and anger management classes, but she had been attending a parenting class. She is "not an angry person. [She is] a very peaceful, loving mother." She had a certificate of participation for 32 weeks of parenting and anger management classes.
Notwithstanding the courts caution against leaving the courtroom during argument, mother walked out and reentered. Mother apologized to the court, saying "Im sorry, your Honor, but this is the way theyre treating me. Its like a dog."
Stating it had read and considered the reports and the trial briefs and had heard the testimony, the court found that while mother "cares very deeply about her daughter [and] followed her service plan, [she] has deviated from that plan." Observing that mother had left the courtroom again, the court found reasonable services had been provided, mother had failed to make substantive progress and/or complete her case plan, and return of the child to the mother would pose a substantial risk of detriment to the child. The court ordered termination of services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
DISCUSSION
Mother seeks a review of the juvenile courts order, arguing the court erred because the department did not provide reasonable services that were narrowly tailored for her mental health issues. She claims the treatment services were woefully inadequate and she should have been referred to a psychiatrist who specializes in ADHD "Ring of Fire" as well as bipolar disorders. The record does not support her claim.
We review the correctness of an order pursuant to section 366.21 to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Shaundra L. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 303, 316.) That standard requires us to determine whether there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could make the findings challenged. (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.)
In reviewing the reasonableness of the reunification services, we recognize that in most cases more services might have been provided and the services provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) A court-ordered reunification plan must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each family and designed to eliminate the conditions that led to the juvenile courts jurisdictional finding. (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.)
The record in this case, set out above, reveals the services offered were reasonable — they were tailored to fit the circumstances and to eliminate the conditions that led to the juvenile courts jurisdictional finding — and mother consented to them. Brittany was taken into protective custody because mother had failed to provide and care for her. Mother was provided reunification services that included parenting classes and anger management programs as well as mental health counseling and medication. While mother completed some of her parenting and anger management classes, she failed to continue with the additional classes ordered by the court after the six-month review hearing. Also, mother missed appointments with Dr. Madigan and refused to take the medication prescribed by Dr. Safai and Dr. Robinson because she insisted she did not have a problem. After Dr. Madigan terminated mother, mother did not respond to the social workers attempts to reassign her to Dr. Kwan or to Dr. Prakash. Mothers refusal to acknowledge and resolve her problems is also demonstrated by her behavior in the courtroom. In these circumstances, we agree with the juvenile court that the services offered were reasonably geared to overcoming the problems that caused the dependency and were appropriate under the circumstances. (See In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 424-425; In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 417.) The problem is not that inadequate services were offered, but that mother failed to take advantage of them although she had agreed to the plan and the social worker had reviewed the plan with her.
Mothers reliance on In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774 and In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, is misplaced. In Elizabeth R., the mother had substantially complied with the terms of her reunification plan, but "the juvenile court believed compassion had been statutorily proscribed" and failed to recognize its discretion to continue the matter to accommodate her special needs. (In re Elizabeth R., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1798.) In Victoria M., the mother was given no assistance in finding the housing required, the parenting skills counseling she received did not address her specific deficiencies, and she was not referred to a regional center that would have successfully addressed her problems. (In re Victoria M., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1327-1330.) In the case before us, mother consistently failed to take advantage of the services that were offered to her, to take her medication or to respond to the social workers attempts to provide additional services.
Furthermore, by consenting and failing to object to the reunification service plan ordered by the juvenile court and implemented by the social worker, mother waived her claims regarding any inadequacy in the reunification services offered. (In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1476; In re Christina L., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.)
On the record before us, we conclude, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding the reunification services offered mother were reasonable.
Nor did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in terminating the services. Section 366.21, subdivision (e), requires the juvenile court to return a dependent child to parental custody at the six-month review hearing "unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." The statute also provides that the "failure of the parent . . . to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental." Here, the court expressly found mother had failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress and the record supports the findings. The record reveals mother was terminated by Dr. Madigan for failing to keep her scheduled appointments, she refused to take the medication prescribed by Dr. Safai and Dr. Robinson because she insisted she did not have a problem, she did not respond to the social workers attempts to reassign her to Dr. Kwan or to Dr. Praskash, and she failed to attend the additional parenting and anger management classes.
The foregoing record establishes that mother failed to eliminate the conditions leading to Brittanys placement out of home. Thus, the record contains substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts detriment finding.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
We concur: McKINSTER J., and RICHLI J.