There it was held that testimony of an extrajudicial identification was admissible where the identification was such as to preclude any suspicion of unfairness or unreliability. Evidence of this nature was, at first, admitted as corroborative of a judicial identification, but it was later held to be admissible, under some circumstances, as substantive evidence. See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29 (1958). . . . * * * * * *

State v. Simmons, 385 P.2d 389 (Wash. 1963). We note that the Simmons case cited Judy v. State, [ 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29 (1958)], for the proposition that the first identification is usually the best identification. For other cases that have admitted evidence of extrajudicial identifications even where no positive courtroom identifications was made, see People v. Gould, 354 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1960) and State v. Wilson, 231 P.2d 288 (Wash. 1951), cert. den. 342 U.S. 855 (1951) and 343 U.S. 950 (1952).

The evidence under attack (assuming that the identification was made under proper circumstances) was admissible at least for the purpose of corroborating Martin's testimony with regard to his tentative identification of Proctor at the Casualty Hospital and his identification of Proctor at the trial. Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643, 119 A.2d 917; Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29; Bulluck v. State, 219 Md. 67, 148 A.2d 433.

At the trial he was represented by an experienced trial lawyer of his own selection. He was convicted and received a 20-year sentence. This conviction was affirmed on appeal. Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29. Subsequently, Judy filed a petition under Maryland's Post Conviction Procedure Act, Code 1957, art. 27, § 645A et seq., with the Criminal Court of Baltimore. Counsel was appointed to represent him and a full hearing was held, after which a detailed opinion was filed stating the Court's reasons for denial of the petition.

As it derives its value not solely from the credit given to the witness reporting it, but to the perception, veracity, and competency of the declarant, hearsay evidence is generally not admissible as affirmative proof of guilt. See Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 290-291, 206 A.2d 138 (1965); Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174-175, 146 A.2d 29 (1958). Hearsay is admissible if offered for impeachment, i.e., to show that witnesses on prior occasions had uttered statements inconsistent with their present testimony.

Mulcahy, 221 Md. at 427-428, 158 A.2d 80. In Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29 (1958), we included as corroborative evidence the "words of the defendant himself." Judy, 218 Md. at 176, 146 A.2d 29.

The extrajudicial identification tends to connect the defendant with the crime, and the principal danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present since the witness is available at the trial for cross-examination. (See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174-175 [ 146 A.2d 29, 32-33]; McCormick, Evidence, § 39, p. 74; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 177, 192-193; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 1018, pp. 687-688. See also State v. Wilson, 38 Wn.2d 593, 617-618 [ 231 P.2d 288, 300-301]; People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 201-202 [ 101 N.E.2d 457, 460461].).

The extrajudicial identification tends to connect the defendant with the crime, and the principal danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present since the witness is available at the trial for cross-examination. (See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 174-175 [ 146 A.2d 29, 32-33]; McCormick, Evidence, § 39, p. 74; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 177, 192-193; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 1018, pp. 687-688. See also State v. Wilson, 38 Wn.2d 593, 617-618 [ 231 P.2d 288, 300-301]; People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 201-202 [ 101 N.E.2d 457, 460-461].

The State acknowledges that the corroborative evidence in this case is not as strong as might be desired, but insists that it was legally sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury. We have said many times, as we said in Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 176, 146 A.2d 29 (1958), that "[i]t is not necessary for corroborating testimony to be sufficient in itself to convict" and that "it need only support some of the material points of the accomplice's testimony." This is not, of course, the first time we have been required to decide — on a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Maryland Rule 738 — whether the evidence of an accomplice has been sufficiently corroborated to sustain the conviction of the accused, but it is a case in which it appears we should take a closer look at the rule of law which has been recognized and applied in this State for many years and, particularly, what is meant by that part of the rule which states in effect that the corroborative evidence should support the accomplice in at least some of the material points involved tending to show the guilt of the accused.

In each case we gave full weight to the findings of the triers of the facts. We find nothing to the contrary in Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168. It may well be that in the instant case Harold's mere presence would not be sufficient to make him a participant in the killing. The trial court stated that they were not satisfied that he participated in the actual killing, or that he knew a killing was to take place.