Inquiry as to whether the claim is “not insubstantial” is “properly considered under the entitlement prong of the fee analysis, not the eligibility prong.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 878 F.Supp.2d 225, 233 (D.D.C.2012) (citing Brayton, 641 F.3d at 526 ). If the plaintiff has “substantially prevailed and thus may receive fees ... the court proceeds to the entitlement prong and considers a variety of factors to determine whether the plaintiff should receive fees.”
Id. Essentially, a court is empowered to exercise its discretion in "making this equitable judgment," id., but should take into account a plaintiff's overall success on the merits when making its determination. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 878 F.Supp.2d 225, 239 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Judicial Watch v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 470 F.3d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ). Accordingly, "where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained, excluding nonproductive time or ... time expended on issues on which [the] plaintiff ultimately did not prevail[.
” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 878 F.Supp.2d 225, 232 (D.D.C. 2012). “If . . . an unavoidable delay accompanied by due diligence in the administrative process was the actual reason for the agency's failure to respond to a request
In that sense, counsel's time spent preparing for mediation contributed to its “overall success on the merits.” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 878 F.Supp.2d 225, 239 (D.D.C. 2012). That said, the time devoted to the mediation appears excessive.
SeeJud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 878 F.Supp.2d 225, 238 (D.D.C. 2012). Under D.C. Circuit precedent, the “usual method of calculating reasonable attorney's fees is to multiply the hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly fee, producing the ‘lodestar' amount.”
C. Reasonable Fee Award Although the plaintiff is eligible for and entitled to some award of fees, that award must be reasonable. SeeJudicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 878 F.Supp.2d 225, 238 (D.D.C. 2012) ("The FOIA permits an award of ‘reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs’ to a plaintiff that demonstrates its eligibility for and entitlement to such an award." (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) ) (emphasis in original)).
Because this court never considered the merits of this case or entered an order directing DOJ to process or release documents, EPIC's position is that it has substantially prevailed under this second provision, involving a voluntary or unilateral change in position by DOJ. The D.C. Circuit refers to this as the "'catalyst theory' of fee eligibility, under which 'FOIA plaintiffs [are] eligible for a fee award if the lawsuit substantially caused the agency to release the requested records,' regardless of whether the plaintiff obtained any court-ordered relief." Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 878 F. Supp. 2d 225, 231 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Davis v. DOJ, 610 F.3d 750, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). The plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that "the lawsuit was reasonably necessary and the litigation substantially caused the requested records to be released."
Thus, once a plaintiff successfully surmounts the eligibility hurdle, the fee inquiry becomes highly case specific. See, e.g. , Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ , 878 F.Supp.2d 225, 238–39 (D.D.C.2012) (examining whether the fees that were incurred were reasonable, even after the plaintiff had demonstrated eligibility and entitlement).III. DISCUSSION
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof to demonstrate the reasonability of its requested fees. Judicial Watch v. DOJ, 878 F.Supp.2d 225, 238 (D.D.C. 2012).
Such a release is pursuant to prong II for fee eligibility, the so-called “catalyst theory.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 878 F.Supp.2d 225, 231 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that eligibility for fees under the catalyst theory requires the “