Opinion
Argued October 6, 1975
November 12, 1975.
Equity — Preliminary injunction — Appeal — Act of 1879, June 12, P.L. 177 — Final order — Exceptions — Necessity for findings of fact — Remand — Scope of appellate review — Reasonable grounds for action.
1. An order of a court of equity denying a requested preliminary injuction is not final and appealable under the Act of 1879, June 12, P.L. 177 when exceptions to the order remain undisposed of by the lower court. [582-3]
2. In the absence of findings of fact supporting the conclusions of law and the order of a lower court, review by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is not possible, and the matter must be remanded. [583]
3. Where a court of equity had reasonable grounds for its action in refusing a preliminary injunction, such determination will not be disturbed on appeal. [583]
Argued October 6, 1975, before President Judge BOWMAN and Judges CRUMLISH, JR., KRAMER, WILKINSON, JR., MENCER, ROGERS and BLATT.
Appeal, No. 344 C.D. 1975, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County in case of Marilyn Judge, John McIntyre, Fran Drake, Mary Ann Sinclair, Patricia Stanavitch, Althea Stanavitch, Evelyn Fornaszewski and Lawrence Sykes v. Edward Pocius, Eugene Donahue, Donald B. Cahoon, Wallace J. Cullen, Walter Gantz, Dorothy Kairis, Mary McGurrin, Alfred M. Sporer, and Scranton School District, No. 11 January Term, 1975.
Complaint in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County seeking to enjoin school board from holding meetings or implementing action taken at a meeting. Preliminary objections filed by defendants. Preliminary injunction denied. ROBINSON, P.J., for the court en banc. Exceptions filed. Plaintiffs appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Order affirmed. Case remanded.
Joseph Paul Coviello, with him Dunn, Byrne and Coviello, for appellants. James A. Kelly, Solicitor, with him Paul T. Burke, for appellees.
Barnett Satinsky, Deputy Attorney General, with him Vincent X. Yakowicz, Solicitor General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for amicus curiae, Commonwealth.
The significant issue sought to be raised by the parties to this appeal concerning what actions of public officials constitute "setting of any official policy" proscribed by the Act of July 19, 1974, P. L. 486, 65 P. S. § 261 et seq. ("Sunshine Law"), unless the prescribed public notice and public meeting criteria of the statute have been met, is misdirected, as the only possible issue that can be raised by this appeal is the propriety of the lower court order denying appellants' application for a preliminary injunction.
The order of the lower court from which this appeal was taken was entered on February 24, 1975, following a hearing on appellants' application for preliminary injunction. It denied appellants' prayer for preliminary relief "and other relief" and allowed exceptions thereto to be filed by appellants. Prior to this order being issued, appellees had filed preliminary objections, which remain undisposed of unless the aforesaid order in denying "other relief" was intended to dispose of such objections. After entry of the aforesaid order, exceptions were filed by appellants, which remain undisposed of. The order itself, while making essential conclusions of law, does not, in narrative form or otherwise, make critical findings of fact to support the conclusions of law.
Having reviewed the transcript of the hearing on appellants' application for preliminary injunction, the only substantive order entered by the lower court in this case, and the record of this proceedings, the only possible avenue of appeal is from the lower court's refusal to grant the preliminary injunction as allowed by the Act of June 12, 1879, P. L. 177, 12 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102. With exceptions to the order in question undisposed of by the lower court, the order is not final and not appealable. Sessa v. Melnick, 420 Pa. 257, 216 A.2d 56 (1966).
Furthermore, assuming the finality of the order from which this appeal was taken, our scope of review could not be properly applied for want of critical findings of fact having been made by the lower court in support of the conclusions of law it reached in its order. In itself, this deficiency would require a remand and further proceedings in the court below.
Considering the only issue before us in this appeal, we cannot conclude from our review of the record and the novelty of the underlying substantive legal issue that the lower court was without apparently reasonable grounds in refusing appellants' application for preliminary injunction. Community Sports, Inc. v. Denver Ringsby Rockets, Inc., 429 Pa. 565, 240 A.2d 832 (1968); Armstrong School District v. Armstrong Education Association, 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 291 A.2d 120 (1972).
The order of the lower court denying plaintiffs-appellants' application for preliminary injunction is affirmed. The case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County for further proceedings.