Opinion
24A-JV-465
08-14-2024
J.T., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT STEVEN E. RIPSTRA RIPSTRA LAW OFFICE JASPER, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA CATHERINE BRIZZI DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Martin Circuit Court The Honorable Isha E. Wright-Ryan, Judge The Honorable Larry R. Blanton, Judge Pro Tempore Trial Court Cause No. 51C01-2311-JD-34
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT STEVEN E. RIPSTRA RIPSTRA LAW OFFICE JASPER, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA CATHERINE BRIZZI DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Tavitas, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] J.T., a juvenile, admitted to committing an act that would be intimidation, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult. The juvenile court found J.T. to be a delinquent child and ordered J.T. to serve a determinate sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") until his eighteenth birthday. The juvenile court denied J.T.'s subsequent motion to correct error.
[¶2] J.T. appeals and argues that: (1) his constitutional due process rights were violated because the juvenile court failed to comply with Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1 ("the Juvenile Waiver Statute"); and (2) the juvenile court erred in imposing sanctions against J.T. The State concedes that the juvenile court failed to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute and that the juvenile court erred in sanctioning J.T. We agree with the parties on the first issue and, accordingly, reverse and remand.
Issue
[¶3] J.T. presents two issues, one of which we find dispositive: whether the juvenile court violated J.T.'s due process rights by failing to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute.
Facts
[¶4] On September 26, 2023, the State filed a petition alleging that J.T. was a delinquent child for committing acts that would be intimidation, a Level 6 felony, and battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor, if committed by an adult. These charges stemmed from an incident at a mental health facility where J.T. was being housed in which J.T. was alleged to have battered several staff members and threatened to kill another staff member.
The case was initially filed in the Juvenile Division of the Vanderburgh Superior Court but was later transferred to the Martin Circuit Court.
[¶5] On October 9, 2023, J.T., represented by counsel, admitted to the allegation of intimidation. The record, however, contains no indication that the juvenile court obtained a valid waiver of J.T.'s constitutional and statutory rights pursuant to the Juvenile Waiver Statute when accepting J.T.'s admission. The juvenile court then found J.T. to be a delinquent child for having committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would be intimidation, a Level 6 felony. The State then moved to dismiss the allegation regarding battery, and the juvenile court granted this motion.
[¶6] A dispositional hearing was held on November 16, 2023. The probation officer testified that, based on J.T.'s past and current behavior, there were no placement options for him other than the DOC. In fact, one detention center had placed J.T. on a "Do [N]ot Accept Back" list because he had caused thousands of dollars of damage to the facility while housed there. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 55. At the time of the dispositional hearing, J.T. was on lockdown status at the Youth Care Center as a result of his battery of staff and other residents. The probation officer testified that, based on the Indiana Youth Assessment System Dispositional Tool, J.T. was at a very high risk to reoffend, and the probation officer described J.T.'s results as "the highest score that [she had] seen in the past year." Tr. Vol. II p. 20.
[¶7] J.T.'s father was incarcerated at the time of the dispositional hearing, and the probation officer did not believe that J.T.'s mother or grandmother would be receptive to him being placed in their homes because he had been violent toward them in the past and had run away from home. Accordingly, the juvenile court ordered J.T. to be placed in the DOC for 390 days-until his eighteenth birthday. J.T. filed a motion to correct error on December 13, 2023-regarding issues other than the one before us-which the juvenile court denied on January 29, 2023. J.T. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] J.T. argues that the juvenile court failed to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute, which denied J.T.'s constitutional due process rights. As explained by our Supreme Court in T.D. v. State:
When children admit to delinquency allegations in lieu of proceeding to fact-finding, they give up several constitutional and statutory rights associated with trial. Though the same is true
for adults who plead guilty, admissions and confessions by juveniles require special caution. And so, to ensure a child knowingly and voluntarily waives their rights before entering an admission, our Legislature has codified safeguards that require strict compliance.219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Our Supreme Court has explained:
A juvenile charged with delinquency is entitled to have the court apply those common law jurisprudential principles which experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial. Without question, these include the right to adequate notice of the charges, appointment of counsel, the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination, and the right to confront opposing witnesses.In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2005) (citations omitted). The Court in K.G. held that a juvenile alleged to be delinquent also has "the constitutional right to have her competency determined before she is subjected to delinquency proceedings." Id.
[¶9] Specifically, the Juvenile Waiver Statute provides:
Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only:
(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child if the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver;
(2) by the child's custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem if:
(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;
(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;
(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child; and
(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver; or
(3) by the child, without the presence of a custodial parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, if:
(A) the child knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver; and
(B) the child has been emancipated under IC 31-34-20-6 or IC 31-37-19-27, by virtue of having married, or in accordance with the laws of another state or jurisdiction.I.C. § 31-32-5-1. Thus, the rights conferred on a child through state or federal law can be waived only in the three ways listed in the Juvenile Waiver Statute. T.D., 219 N.E.3d at 725. "By permitting a court to find waiver in only these limited circumstances, 'the statute affords juveniles with greater rights than the Constitution requires.'" Id. (quoting R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1043 (Ind. 2018)). "Accordingly, our [juvenile] courts must take particular care to ensure a valid waiver of rights before accepting a juvenile's admission." Id. (citation omitted).
[¶10] J.T. argues that the juvenile court failed to follow the strict requirements of the Juvenile Waiver Statute and, thus, his admission to committing the act that would be intimidation was therefore invalid. The State agrees with J.T. and concedes the error. See Appellee's Br. p. 7 ("The record does not demonstrate that the juvenile court properly complied with the Juvenile Waiver Statute."). Our review of the record confirms that there is no indication that the juvenile court either advised J.T of his various statutory and constitutional rights or obtained a waiver of J.T.'s rights by any of the three ways listed in the Juvenile Waiver Statute. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 3-9.
[¶11] This would seem to be an easy case. But although the State concedes the error with regard to the Juvenile Waiver Statute, it also notes that claims regarding a juvenile court's failure to follow the Juvenile Waiver Statute must be presented in a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) and not on direct appeal.
[¶12] In J.W. v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1207-08 (Ind. 2019), our Supreme Court held that Trial Rule 60(B) is the "appropriate avenue through which a juvenile must raise any and all claims premised on the illegality of an agreed delinquency adjudication." When presented with such a claim under Trial Rule 60(B), "'the [juvenile] court shall hear any pertinent evidence, allow new parties to be served with summons, allow discovery, [and] grant relief."" Id. (quoting T.R. 60(D)). In a Trial Rule 60(B) motion, the burden is on the juvenile to establish grounds for relief. T.D., 219 N.E.3d at 725. "And after the [juvenile] court has ruled, a party aggrieved by the post-judgment ruling can then appeal." J.W., 113 N.E.3d at 1208 (citing T.R. 60(C)). The Court in J.W. referred to this rule as a "bright-line rule," and stated that "[a] juvenile's claim that his agreed delinquency adjudication is unlawful, along with any claim premised on the agreement's illegality, cannot be raised on direct appeal. Such claims must first be brought in the juvenile court in a post-judgment motion under [Trial] Rule 60." 113 N.E.3d at 1208.
The bright-line rule announced in J.W. is similar to the "Tumulty rule" in criminal cases. In Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1999), our Supreme Court held that an adult criminal defendant cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal and must instead pursue post-conviction relief and raise any claims concerning his plea in the post-convictions proceeding. In noting this similarity, the J.W. Court also held that:
in the interest of judicial economy, if a juvenile's direct appeal includes any claim subject to our extended Tumulty rule, the entire appeal shall be dismissed without prejudice so the so-called "Tumulty claims" can receive a full airing in the juvenile court. Only after the juvenile court has resolved the Tumulty claims in a post-judgment proceeding can the juvenile proceed on appeal with all his claims."Id.
[¶13] The J.W. Court recognized that, although its announced rule had the virtue of "simplicity" and "ease of application," its "one-size-fits-all approach may be overinclusive . . . in that its sweeping scope may include claims for which the factual record is already sufficiently developed." Id. The Court, nevertheless, concluded that "the rule's likely benefits in simplicity and overall judicial economy outweigh its costs." Id.
[¶14] Blind adherence to the J.W. rule would seem to compel us to hold that J.T.'s claims regarding the Juvenile Waiver Statute are not properly before us. This would require us to dismiss J.T.'s claims, and require J.T., on remand, to file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion and require the juvenile court to hold a hearing on this motion, at which J.T. would have the burden of proving his claim that the juvenile court failed to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute. Here, however, the State concedes J.T.'s claim of error regarding the juvenile court's failure to follow the Juvenile Waiver Statute. It would seem pointless, and a true waste of judicial resources, for us to require J.T. to present this claim of error in a Trial Rule 60(B) motion when the State has already conceded the error.
[¶15] Accordingly, we conclude that the bright-line rule in J.W. is inapplicable here because of the State's concession of error. Instead, we conclude that, in the interest of judicial resources, the better practice is for us to accept the State's concession, reverse the juvenile court's judgment, and remand for further proceedings. We also agree with the State that, because we reverse based on the juvenile court's failure to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute, we need not address J.T.'s claims regarding the juvenile court's dispositional order.
We, nevertheless, note that the State also agrees that the juvenile court improperly entered an adjudication on the dismissed allegation of battery and that the juvenile court could not properly impose a determinate sentence in the DOC. The State, however, disagrees with J.T.'s claim that the juvenile court erred by not finding him to be a dual status child. Because we reverse and remand due to the failure to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute, we express no opinion on these issues.
Conclusion
[¶16] Because the State admits that the juvenile court failed to comply with the requirements of the Juvenile Waiver Statute, the bright-line rule that such claims be brought in a Trial Rule 60(B) motion is inapplicable. We, therefore, reverse the juvenile court's judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶17] Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.