Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Super. Ct. No. SWJ003195
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petitions for extraordinary writ. Bradley O. Snell, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Petitions denied.
Elizabeth A. Wingate, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner D.S.
Charles A. Casey, Attorney at Law, for Petitioner J.S.
No appearance for Respondent.
Pamela J. Walls, Interim County Counsel, and Prabhath D. Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.
Petitioners D.S. (mother) and J.S. (father) filed separate petitions for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services as to their child, S.S. (the child) and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Mother and father (the parents) argue that: 1) they were not provided with reasonable reunification services; and 2) the court erred in finding it detrimental to return the child to their care. Mother additionally contends that the court erred in admitting her psychological evaluations into evidence since the evaluations did not specify how it would be detrimental to place the child in her care. We deny the writ petitions.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 25, 2006, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) filed a petition on behalf of the child, who was two months old at the time. The petition alleged the child came within section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The petition included the following allegations: Mother had been diagnosed with borderline intellectual functioning and depression and had a history of mental health hospitalizations; she displayed a limited ability to care for herself and limited problem-solving skills; father had been diagnosed with borderline intellectual functioning and serious impairment in parental and social functioning; the parents had displayed “inappropriate and destructive parenting” by not meeting the child’s basic needs; their home was cluttered and infested with fleas; they were unable to provide a safe and stable living environment in that they had a history of being transient and were recently evicted from their home; they had a substantial history with the Riverside County Child Protective Services (CPS) in that the child’s half sibling, J.S., was removed from their care as a result of general neglect; they failed to reunify with him, and their parental rights were terminated; the parents were currently on probation for child endangerment/abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a); and they displayed a lack of insight and poor judgment in that the child was conceived as a result of their incestuous relationship. (Both parents denied they were siblings, even though previous CPS referrals stated that they were siblings and that they engaged in sexual intercourse in front of their 10-year-old sister.)
The detention hearing was held on September 13, 2006. The court made a prima facie finding that the child was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), removed the child from the parents’ custody, and placed her in a foster home.
Jurisdiction/disposition
In the jurisdiction/disposition report dated September 27, 2006, the social worker reported that the parents were previously found guilty of child abuse/endangering a child (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)) with regard to their other child, J.S. The parents failed to reunify with him after one year of services, and their parental rights were terminated on March 26, 2006. The social worker in the current case spoke with the social worker in J.S.’s case, and the latter stated the parents were brother and sister, were developmentally delayed, and were transient most of the time. The social worker recommended that the trial court deny the parents reunification services based on their failure to reunify with J.S.
The department later amended the petition and struck the allegations regarding the parents’ home being cluttered and infested with fleas, the parents being on probation, and the parents’ incestuous relationship.
On November 7, 2006, at a pretrial hearing on the first amended petition, the parties stipulated to advance the jurisdiction hearing to that very day. The court found that the child came within section 300 and adjudged her a dependent of the court. The court placed the child in a foster home, ordered reunification services for both parents, and ordered psychological evaluations for both parents. The parents’ case plans included the requirements that they participate in individual counseling, complete a parenting education program, and comply with substance abuse testing.
Six-month Status Review Report and Hearing
The social worker filed a six-month review report recommending that the court terminate services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The social worker reported that the parents resided in a one-bedroom apartment they shared with two other people. The condition of the apartment was “deplorable.” Mother was unemployed and had never worked in her life. She was on Prozac® and BuSpar® for depression, and she was pregnant again. Father was employed as a stock clerk at a bookstore.
The social worker stated that appropriate services had been provided over the past six months and the parents had been actively involved in their case plans. However, the social worker was concerned about the parents’ abilities to understand and process the information presented to them. For example, instead of calling the drug-testing center as instructed, they went to the test site every day to see if they needed to test. The parents missed a few test days due to their confusion. The instructor for their parenting education class questioned their understanding of the class.
The social worker further reported that Dr. David E. Libert conducted a recent psychological evaluation of both parents, recommended that the child remain a ward of the court, and that further services to the parents were “unlikely to bring a better result than ha[d] been achieved to date.” Dr. Libert opined it was unlikely that father had made any real progress in correcting the problems that led to removal of both of his children, as evidenced by his defensiveness and unwillingness to acknowledge minor failings. Dr. Libert found that father’s life reflected instability and poor decision making. Dr. Libert concluded that, given the child’s special needs, it was unlikely father would be able to provide the necessary guidance and support the child needed.
Dr. Libert further reported that mother had a mood disorder and limited cognitive ability, which interfered with her ability to make good choices regarding her own care, as well as her children’s care. An earlier psychological evaluation (by Dr. Edward J. Ryan with regard to J.S.’s dependency) stated that mother was not capable of meeting her own needs or benefitting from services, and that she would never be capable of parenting a child. Dr. Libert stated that nothing had changed since the earlier psychological evaluation.
The social worker further mentioned that the parents appeared delusional about the return of J.S. to their care. They continued to believe their current case plan services were implemented so they could receive both of their children back.
As to the child, the social worker reported she was regarded as “having significant developmental delay as evident by her slow growth development, body tone and limited response to certain stimuli.” The social worker opined that the child would be placed at high risk if returned to the parents because they “do not have a consistent ability to abstractly reason or use logic, which is necessary to provide for the needs of this child.” The child currently resided in a foster home where her brother, J.S., also resided. J.S. was in a plan of adoption.
At the six-month review hearing on June 6, 2007, the court continued the out-of-home placement and visitation. The court found that the parents’ progress in alleviating the causes necessitating placement of the child had been adequate but incomplete, and it ordered reunification services to be continued. The court approved an updated case plan for both parents, which required them to participate in general counseling, a “Teaching and Demo Homemakers” class, and “Family Preservation Services” at Regional Center Services.
Twelve-Month Status Review Report and Hearing
The social worker filed a 12-month status review report on October 29, 2007, and recommended that reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. The social worker reported the parents moved into another apartment that was much better than where they had been living. However, they were both unemployed. Mother had been prescribed psychotropic medication for depression. Mother gave birth to another baby in July 2007, but the baby passed away due to medical complications.
The social worker further reported the parents had actively participated in their respective case plan services, yet she was still concerned about their ability to understand the information they were being given. The parents were referred to the Inland Regional Center (IRC) to be assessed for services, but father said he did not need their services. Mother contacted the intake staff at IRC, but “it was determined that she did not meet for services (sic) based on an assessment that they had conducted on her three years ago.” The parents did complete a parenting education class. However, the social worker reported that after the class sessions they would ask questions indicating their lack of understanding of the topics presented. The parents attended counseling, and their counselor said they were cooperative but had not completed all of their sessions. They stopped attending counseling on May 31, 2007, and were apparently terminated for nonattendance. The parents were also involved in the MedTox Random Testing Program. They missed a few tests and said it was “due to having their colors confused.”
The social worker opined that returning the child to the parents would be detrimental to the child because she had a lot of medical needs that required specialized care and attention. The social worker still believed the child would be at high risk in the parents’ care because of the developmental delays of the parents, their history of transiency, and current probation for child endangerment, as well as mother’s mental health history.
At the 12-month hearing on February 28, 2008, the court stated that return of the child to the parents’ custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection or well-being of the child, and thus maintained the child in her foster home. The court found that the extent of progress made by the parents toward alleviating the causes necessitating placement was incomplete. The court further found and ordered that exceptional circumstances existed to extend services to the parents to an 18-month hearing.
On March 12, 2008, the court approved a case plan, which included the requirement that the parents complete an in-home parenting education class.
18-month Status Review Report and Hearing
The social worker filed a report on May 28, 2008, recommending that services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. Mother was five months pregnant and acknowledged she was told by her doctor that this pregnancy was going to be high risk. The social worker reported that the parents continued to demonstrate their inability to provide a safe and stable home environment for the child. The parents were recently evicted from their apartment and needed a place to live.
The parents were referred to the Child Abuse Prevention Center for in-home parenting education classes, which they completed on May 13, 2008. While they showed improvement in assessing and responding to the child’s needs (determining whether she was hungry or thirsty, or needed a diaper change), the instructor was unsure if the parents would continue these tasks without supervision or prompting.
The social worker further reported that the child still resided in the same foster home where her brother, J.S., lived. The foster parents had adopted J.S. and were interested in adopting the child also. The child was now 20 months old and was assessed to be mentally retarded. She was six to 10 months behind developmentally. She needed constant supervision to meet her basic needs and to keep her safe. The child also had physical handicaps which could require leg braces and surgery, and there were concerns that she could be deaf in one ear. The social worker stated the child would need lifelong special care. However, the parents had limited intellectual functioning and were thus unable to comprehend the medical necessities the child required.
The social worker concluded the parents had participated in the same services over and over again, such as counseling and parenting education classes, but they did not have the cognitive ability to gain insight into the problems which led to the dependency. Moreover, the parents were not able to incorporate or maintain the skills taught to them.
An 18-month review hearing was held on July 23, 2008. Mother testified that she and father were married in 2004. She also said she did not know the identity of her biological father. The court continued the hearing and ordered the parents to undergo DNA testing to determine the exact nature of their relationship.
The social worker later reported that DNA testing indicated only a 71.4 percent “certainty” that mother and father were half siblings; thus, the finding was considered inconclusive. Doctors said they could get more accurate results if they tested mother’s mother. The maternal grandmother was contacted, but she never called the social worker back.
The continued hearing was held on October 6, 2008, and mother testified again. She stated that she had learned in her hands-on parenting class about what kind of food to give the child and how to prevent choking. Mother also learned about the child’s leg problems. The matter was trailed to October 30, 2008.
The social worker filed an addendum report on October 27, 2008, and reported that during the visits she attended with the parents, she always kept them informed as to the child’s medical conditions at every meeting. The social worker stated that she met with the parents in 2008 on July 7, 14, 21, and August 11 and 25, and they discussed how the child was benefitting from physical therapy. Furthermore, on May 28, 2008, the status review report was filed with the current information as to the child’s medical diagnosis and treatment, and a copy of the report was mailed to the parents. The parents were also given copies of the report in court on June 12, 2008. On October 6, 2008, the foster mother gave the social worker a letter from the child’s doctor indicating the child was diagnosed with failure to thrive. The letter stated the child was being treated for mild anemia, that a chromosomal test was pending, and that the child would be evaluated for a speech delay. The letter also noted that the child would be evaluated for a probable leg-length discrepancy. The social worker attempted to reach mother by telephone on October 24, 2008, to update mother on the child’s progress, and the social worker left a message for mother to call her. The parents continued to lack permanent housing.
The continued 18-month review hearing was held on October 30, 2008. The social worker testified that she had talked to the parents about the child’s medical conditions. The social worker also testified that mother recently gave birth to a baby girl who also had medical problems, including a heart murmur and undeveloped lungs.
After considering all the evidence, the court noted that all of the parents’ children had some kind of physiological defect, which heightened the suspicion that mother and father were siblings. The court believed the parents’ decision to continue bringing new children into the world showed a character flaw. It considered the multiple psychological evaluations, which concluded that the parents had limitations in their parenting abilities. The court particularly noted that the recent psychological evaluations concluded there was no change from the previous ones. It found that the return of the child to the custody of the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety and well-being. The court further found that reasonable services had been provided and noted that, while the parents had done most of the things their plan asked them to do, the parents had not benefitted sufficiently to provide the care the child needed. The court terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing for February 26, 2009.
ANALYSIS
I. There Was Substantial Evidence to Support the Court’s Finding that Reasonable Services Were Provided to the Parents
Mother and father complain that the department did not provide them with reasonable services. They specifically contend they were not given an in-home parenting class until the 18-month review period, which limited the time to demonstrate they had learned and were applying what they had been taught. The parents also complain they were never given the opportunity to attend any of the child’s medical appointments and were not given services to address their ability to attend to the child’s special needs. They assert they were never given any services to address their lack of adequate housing or the concern that they may be half siblings. We conclude that the services provided were reasonable.
A. Standard of Review
“[W]ith regard to the sufficiency of reunification services, our sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided or offered. [Citations.]” (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) “We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the department and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the order. [Citation.]” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010 (Mark N.).) “The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the department’s efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the particular case. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1011.)
B. There Was Substantial Evidence to Support the Court’s Finding
We have reviewed the record and find the parents’ argument unavailing. The record reveals that appropriate services were provided to the parents and they were actively involved in their case plans. Their case plans required them to participate in individual counseling, complete a parenting education program, comply with substance abuse testing, participate in a “Teaching and Demo Homemakers” class, and participate in “Family Preservation Services” at Regional Center Services. They participated in drug testing, completed an initial parenting education class, and attended counseling. They were referred to IRC to be assessed for services, but father said he did not need their services.
On March 12, 2008, the court approved a case plan which included the requirement that mother complete an in-home parenting education class. The parents were referred to the Child Abuse Prevention Center and completed the in-home parenting education classes on May 13, 2008.
The parents complain they were not given an in-home parenting class until the 18-month review period, which limited the time to demonstrate they had learned. However, even if the in-home services had been offered earlier, the problem was that the parents apparently did not understand the information given to them. Their parenting instructor was concerned the parents would not continue to respond to the child’s basic needs as they were taught to do, without supervision or prompting. Similarly, the social worker concluded the parents had participated in the same services over and over again, such as counseling and parenting education classes, but they did not have the cognitive ability to gain insight into the problems that led to the dependency. The social worker reported that, after the parenting class sessions, the parents would ask questions indicating their lack of understanding of the topics presented. Significantly, the parents were not able to incorporate or maintain the skills taught to them.
The parents also complain they were never given the opportunity to attend any of the child’s medical appointments and were not given services to address their ability to attend to the child’s special needs. However, the social worker testified that she informed the parents about the child’s medical conditions, and they were provided with two parenting classes. The parents assert they were never given any services to address their lack of adequate housing or the concern that they may be half siblings. While the social worker was concerned about the parents’ lack of housing and the fact that they could be related, the court did not order the department to provide services to address these issues. Moreover, the main concern was the parent’s ability to care for the child. The record clearly reflects that the parents suffered from severe developmental delays and limited intellectual functioning and were thus unable to comprehend the medical necessities the child required.
In any event, “[a]t the critical juncture of the 18-month hearing, the authority of the juvenile court to set a section 366.26 hearing is not conditioned on a reasonable services finding.” (Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1511.) “Section 366.22, subdivision (a), does not give the juvenile court the option to continue reunification services nor does it specifically prohibit the court from ordering a section 366.26 hearing even if it finds reasonable reunification services have not been provided to a parent. [Citations.]” (Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1015-1016, italics added.)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the department, as we must, we conclude that the department provided the parents with reasonable services and that the court properly set a section 366.26 hearing.
II. The Court Properly Concluded Return of the Child to the Parents Would Create a Substantial Risk of Detriment to the Child
The parents argue that the court erred in finding it would be detrimental to return the child to their care. They assert that they completed their case plans and learned how to safely parent the child. We find no error.
The statute governing the 18-month review hearing is section 366.22. At the 18-month hearing, “[t]he court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a), italics added.) “In making its determination, the court shall review and consider the social worker’s report and recommendations and . . . shall consider the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent or legal guardian . . . .” (Ibid.)
Here, the court properly considered the social worker’s recommendations and concluded that, although the parents had completed most of their case plans, they did not benefit sufficiently from the services to be able to care for the child’s needs. Throughout the dependency, the parents had difficulty understanding and processing the information presented to them, due to their developmental delays. Even during the in-home parenting class, which occurred late in the reunification process after the parents had already taken a previous parenting education class, the parents still had to be prompted to meet the child’s basic needs. The instructors from both parenting classes stated their concerns about the parents’ ability to care for the child.
Furthermore, the court properly considered the psychological evaluations, which concluded there were limitations that interfered with the parents’ ability to take care of themselves and the child. The court noted that the recent psychological evaluation concluded there had been no change since the previous evaluations.
Given the child’s special needs, as well as the parents’ own developmental delays and inability to meet even the child’s basic needs, despite participating in a variety of services, we conclude the court properly found that return of the child to the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment.
III. The Court Properly Admitted Evidence of Mother’s Psychological Evaluations
Mother additionally argues that the court erred in admitting the three psychological evaluations by Drs. William Jones, Edward Ryan, and David Libert, because the reports were “outdated” and failed to state specifically how it would be detrimental for the child to be returned to mother’s care. We find no error.
Evidence Code section 1100 permits “‘. . . evidence in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, and evidence of specific instances of such person’s conduct . . .’ when the parent’s character is the central issue. Established law has recognized that the character of a parent is at issue in child’s custody actions. [Citations.]” (In re Dorothy I. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1158-1159.) “This type of character evidence is essential, when available, to aid the court in dependency actions, which are concerned with the future well-being of a minor.” (Id. at p. 1159.)
The court properly admitted the psychological evaluations into evidence. Contrary to mother’s claim, the evaluations essentially explained how it would be detrimental to return the child to her. Dr. Jones, who evaluated mother in 2004, stated that mother was at the low end of intellectual functioning, she was “disabled in regards to employment,” and that her ability to provide emotionally for the child was “limited by a very significant depression, anxiety and very traumatic history,” which included physical and sexual abuse and child abandonment. Dr. Jones concluded that mother did not appear to be able to provide effective parenting without significant support.
Dr. Ryan, who also evaluated mother in 2004, similarly stated that mother was functioning “in the low end of the borderline range of intelligence,” that mother was not able to support herself financially without outside assistance, and “the prospect of that changing [was] remote at best.” Dr. Ryan further asserted that mother’s extensive history of physical and sexual abuse impacted every aspect of mother’s life. He found that mother was incapable of raising a child herself and did not have a support system to help her. Dr. Ryan concluded that “at the present time, and for the foreseeable future, [mother] is not only not capable of meeting her own needs, she is not capable of benefitting from services, and is not, nor ever will be, capable of parenting a child, and protecting/nurturing a child.”
Dr. Libert evaluated mother in 2007 and opined that mother’s significant lack of attention, love, and support “resulted in her failure to learn appropriate parenting techniques,” and that her mood disorder and limited cognitive ability “interfere with her ability to make good choices regarding her own care as well as her children’s care.” Dr. Libert concluded that “nothing has changed since the earlier psychological evaluations” and asserted that “[f]urther services [were] unlikely to bring a better result than has been achieved to date.”
In sum, all three of these evaluations stated that mother’s low intellectual functioning, intense past, lack of employment and ability to support herself financially, and inability to be a parent would detrimentally affect the child if returned to her. Moreover, in light of the similarities in the evaluations, it is clear that Dr. Ryan was correct in stating that mother had not changed since the earlier evaluations. Thus, mother’s claim that the reports were “outdated” is meritless.
We conclude the court properly admitted and considered the psychological evaluations.
DISPOSITION
The writ petitions are denied.
We concur: MCKINSTER, J., RICHLI, J.