J.R.W. v. State

42 Citing cases

  1. Matter of T.D.H

    971 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. App. 1998)   Cited 17 times

    We review the trial court's decision made pursuant to 54.11 under an abuse of discretion standard. K.L.M. v. State, 881 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ); J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ). In deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion, we review the entire record to determine if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principals.

  2. In re A.C.

    No. 05-11-01469-CV (Tex. App. Nov. 7, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    "We review the trial judge's decision to transfer a juvenile from the TYC to the TDCJ under an abuse of discretion standard." In re J.L.C., 160 S.W.3d 312, 313 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing In re T.D.H., 971 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.); J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ)). "In deciding whether the trial judge abused his discretion, we review the entire record to determine if the judge acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles."

  3. In re A.L.

    No. 05-20-00676-CV (Tex. App. May. 11, 2021)

    In his sole issue on appeal, A.L. contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his transfer to TDCJ. "We review the trial judge's decision to transfer a juvenile from the TYC to the TDCJ under an abuse of discretion standard." In re J.L.C., 160 S.W.3d 312, 313 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing In re T.D.H., 971 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.); J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no writ)). "In deciding whether the trial judge abused his discretion, we review the entire record to determine if the judge acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles."

  4. In Matter of R.A.

    No. 07-09-0386-CV (Tex. App. Nov. 3, 2010)

    An abuse of discretion does not exist if the trial court bases its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports the trial court's decision. J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ). We may not, however, reverse a trial court's decision simply because we disagree.

  5. In Matter of J.B.C

    No. 02-07-431-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 9, 2008)

    Texas courts have also held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in transferring a juvenile to TDCJ even when evidence suggests that the possibility of more specialized treatment would be obtained by a juvenile's return to TYC. See In re J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) (upholding trial court's transfer of juvenile to TDCJ even though a state psychologist recommended that he be sent back to TYC for participation in a specialized program); In re C.D.R., 827 S.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (rejecting juvenile's claim that he should have been returned to a TYC specialized sex offender program). Furthermore, a trial court does not abuse its discretion if it considers that a juvenile who has committed a violent offense, if sent back to TYC, would be released from TYC and placed on parole once the juvenile turns twenty-one.

  6. In Matter of J.P.

    No. 13-06-176-CV (Tex. App. Feb. 22, 2007)

    The State contends that rule 21.8(b) does not apply to juvenile cases because juvenile cases are civil in nature and are therefore governed by the rules of civil procedure. See J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ). Although we agree that juvenile cases are properly classified as civil proceedings, they are nonetheless quasi-criminal in nature.

  7. In re J.D.P

    149 S.W.3d 790 (Tex. App. 2004)   Cited 15 times
    Discussing extensive psychiatric services the juvenile received at TYC

    Cucolo stated that, based on his review of Appellant's records from the psychologists, social workers, and others who had worked with and treated Appellant at GSS, Appellant's mental illness was not what prevented him from completing the programs offered at GSS. From this evidence, the court could have determined that — despite the group and individual treatment Appellant received while at GSS and the second chances given to him, because of the opportunity and inability or unwillingness of Appellant to participate in CSVOTP, and his continued lack of improvement — further specialized treatment would not have been beneficial to Appellant, even though Dr. Martin had initially recommended such. See J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) (upholding trial court's transfer of juvenile to TDCJ even though a state psychologist recommended that he be sent back to TYC for participation in the SECOR program); C.D.R. v. State, 827 S.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (rejecting juvenile's claim that he should have been returned to a TYC specialized sex offender program). In this case, Appellant caused the death of ten-year-old child and was given the maximum determinate sentence for a second-degree felony.

  8. In the Matter of A.R.D

    100 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App. 2003)   Cited 5 times
    Referring to similar language in section 54.05

    The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner. In re J.R.W., 879 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ). We review the entire record to determine if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles.

  9. In Matter of K.H.

    No. 12-01-00342-CV (Tex. App. Mar. 5, 2003)   Cited 1 times

    We review the trial court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ). We reverse the trial court only if it has acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner.

  10. Price v. Short

    931 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 60 times
    Holding affirmative defense of self-defense must be timely pled in response to civil battery claim

    Because appellant did not object on this ground at trial, any error is waived. See TEX.R.APP.P. 52(a); J.R.W. v. State, 879 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1994, no writ) (equal-protection argument waived by failure to assert at trial); Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 825 S.W.2d 135, 147 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1992) ("A party may not enlarge a ground of error on appeal to include an objection not asserted at trial."), vacated on other grounds, 843 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1993).