Opinion
11-28-2017
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Ching J. LU also known as Ching Jung Lu, Defendant–Appellant, Longjun Xie, Defendant, 408 West 57th Owners Corp., Defendant–Respondent.
Kevin Kerveng Tung, P.C., Flushing (Kevin K. Tung of Counsel), for appellant. Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLC, New York (Scott W. Parker of Counsel), for JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, respondent. Borah, Goldstein, Altschuler, Nahins & Goidel, P.C., New York (Paul N. Gruber of Counsel), for 408 West 57th Owners Corp., respondent.
Kevin Kerveng Tung, P.C., Flushing (Kevin K. Tung of Counsel), for appellant. Parker Ibrahim & Berg LLC, New York (Scott W. Parker of Counsel), for JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, respondent.
Borah, Goldstein, Altschuler, Nahins & Goidel, P.C., New York (Paul N. Gruber of Counsel), for 408 West 57th Owners Corp., respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered on or about September 21, 2016, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendant Ching J. Lu's motion, under CPLR 5015 (a), to vacate a default judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The trial court's determination that defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default was within the court's sound discretion (see Gecaj v. Gjonaj Realty & Mgt. Corp., 149 A.D.3d 600, 602, 51 N.Y.S.3d 74 [1st Dept.2017] ). To the extent defendant denies service of the summons and complaint, her general denials are insufficient to rebut the presumption of service created by the detailed, validly executed affidavits of service (see Slimani v. Citibank, N.A., 47 A.D.3d 489, 849 N.Y.S.2d 541 [1st Dept.2008] ). Defendant's argument that she relied on assurance from defendant cooperative corporation (the co-op) that her property would be protected and that she need not answer the complaint, is unsupported by any proof and accordingly insufficient (see Buro Happold Consulting Engrs., PC. v. RMJM, 107 A.D.3d 602, 968 N.Y.S.2d 61 [1st Dept.2013] ). Moreover, defendant, who acknowledged she did not pay much attention to papers she received by mail, further fails to explain why the co-op would have so assured her. The record before us shows that defendant knew she had defaulted on a loan secured by the property, and that she had received multiple notices from plaintiff of her default, and of its intent to collect the debt, and to foreclose and sell the property at a public auction, if necessary. Under the circumstances, defendant fails to show how her reliance on any alleged assurances from the co-op could have been reasonable (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dysinger, 149 A.D.3d 1551, 52 N.Y.S.3d 788 [4th Dept.2017] ; Di Gangi v. Schiffgens, 90 A.D.2d 805, 455 N.Y.S.2d 670 [2d Dept.1982] ).
Given the lack of a reasonable excuse for her default, it is not necessary for us to consider whether defendant demonstrated the existence of a meritorious defense (see Gecaj, 149 A.D.3d at 607, 51 N.Y.S.3d 74).
RICHTER, J.P., KAPNICK, WEBBER, OING, SINGH, JJ.