Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Matthew Perantoni No. RIJ119971, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Anastasia Georggin for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST Acting P.J.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner J.P. (father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services as to his children, E.C., R.C., J.P., and A.P. (the children), and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. On June 30, 2011, this court stayed the section 366.26 hearing, pending further order. We lift the stay.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
At the six-month hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services as to A.P., who was under three years of age. Finding that the three other children were part of a sibling group with A.P., and that this sibling group should be kept together, the juvenile court terminated reunification services as to the older children as well. Father now contends that the juvenile court erred in declaring the children to be a sibling set, and in concluding that he failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in his case plan. We grant the petition in part and deny it in part.
While the parties and the juvenile court used the term “sibling set” throughout the proceedings, sections 361.5 and 366.21 use the term “sibling group.”
The Riverside County Department of Social Services (the department), real party in interest, filed a letter dated May 19, 2011, notifying this court of its intent not to file a response to this writ petition. Subsequently, this court, on its own motion, ordered the department to file a response on the sibling set issue. The department complied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 24, 2010, the department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the children. At the time, E.C. and R.C. were six-year-old twins, J.P. was three years old, and A.P. was two years old. The petition listed A.V. (mother) as the mother of all the children, Ro.C. as the father of the twins, and father as the father of J.P. and A.P. The petition stated that Ro.C. was deceased. The petition alleged that the children came within section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). With regard to father, the petition included the allegations that he abused controlled substances while supervising the children, had a history of arrests on drug-related charges, engaged in acts of domestic violence with mother in the presence of the children, and neglected the medical and dental needs of the children.
Mother is not a party to this writ. Mother filed a separate notice of intent to file a writ petition. However, her case was dismissed for failure to timely file a petition.
In the detention report, the social worker stated that the department received a general neglect referral, which stated that mother dropped off E.C. and R.C. at the maternal aunt’s house, without a change of clothes. Mother told the maternal aunt she would return in about one week, but she never came back. The maternal aunt told the social worker that the other two children, J.P. and A.P., lived with the paternal grandmother. The maternal aunt said mother left those children because she was not able to care for them, since she was homeless. The social worker attempted to contact the paternal grandmother, and the paternal aunt answered the phone. The paternal aunt confirmed that mother left J.P. and A.P. with the paternal grandmother over one month ago. The social worker went to the paternal grandmother’s house, and mother and father were there. The paternal grandmother stated that the following people lived in her home: herself, her daughter, her son, J.P., A.P., and father. The paternal grandmother said mother did not live there, and added that both parents used drugs regularly. The social worker discovered that father was recently released from jail for drug charges and domestic violence. The social worker also discovered that both the paternal aunt and uncle had recently been arrested for various offenses. It was determined that J.P. and A.P. would have to be placed with another relative.
The record states that the paternal grandmother said, her son, J.M., lived there, but she appeared to be referring to father, whose name is J.P.
At the detention hearing on June 25, 2010, the juvenile court found father to be the presumed father of all the children. The juvenile court detained the children. J.P. and A.P. were placed with a maternal cousin, and E.C. and R.C. were placed in the care of the maternal aunt.
Jurisdiction/disposition
The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on July 22, 2010, recommending that the children be considered a sibling set since the youngest child was under the age of three. The social worker also recommended that mother and father be provided with reunification services.
The social worker interviewed father, who said he was unemployed and lived with his mother. He confirmed his history of substance abuse and disclosed that he had been arrested and sentenced to jail for spousal battery in September 2009. The social worker also interviewed the maternal aunt, who said that E.C. and R.C. were living in a hotel and then a car, prior to living with her.
The social worker interviewed the children, as well. R.C. said he wished his parents and siblings could live together. E.C. said she enjoyed living in her current placement with the maternal aunt. J.P. said he wished he could live with his brother, R.C. A.P. said she wanted to stay with her brother, J.P., with whom she was “extremely bonded.” The social worker stated that the children all appeared to be bonded with the maternal relatives they were living with, and they seemed happy and well cared for. The children visited each other weekly.
At a jurisdiction/disposition hearing on August 9, 2010, the juvenile court found that the children came within section 300, subdivision (b), and adjudged them dependents of the court. The juvenile court also advised the parents that, at the six-month hearing, it would determine whether or not the children were a sibling set and, thereby, decide whether to limit reunification services to six months for all the children. The juvenile court enumerated the factors it would consider. The juvenile court ordered reunification services for father. His case plan included the requirements that he participate in general counseling, complete a domestic violence program, complete a parenting education program, submit to random drug testing, complete an outpatient substance abuse treatment program, and, if it was determined to be necessary, participate in an inpatient substance abuse treatment program.
Six-month Status Review
The social worker filed a six-month status review report on January 26, 2011, recommending that the juvenile court offer six more months of reunification services. The social worker reported that father was referred to counseling services through Catholic Charities on July 27, 2010. He said he did not participate in those services due to a conflict with the bus schedule. He did not bring this situation to the social worker’s attention until November 30, 2010. He also expressed that he felt overwhelmed with his work schedule and having to participate in other programs, so his counseling “was placed on hold.” He was given another referral close to the time of the filing of the report.
The social worker reported that father had an initial intake assessment for a substance abuse program on October 26, 2010. As of January 3, 2011, he had attended six sessions with his counselor. It was reported that he had a good attitude and appeared interested in learning new skills to live a drug-free lifestyle.
As to his random drug testing requirement, father was referred to start on July 19, 2010, and again on November 9, 2010. However, he said he did not start testing until after November 30, 2010, because he did not know he had to drug test. Even after father supposedly knew about the requirement, he still missed one test date. Father failed to appear for a total of eight test dates. He tested negative on November 30 and December 1, 2010, but tested positive for alcohol on January 7, 2011.
On July 27, 2010, father was referred to participate in a parenting education program through Catholic Charities, but did not follow through. However, he did complete a 14-week parenting class with Community Access Network, and his instructor commented that he actively participated in the class.
On July 27, 2010, father was also approved to participate in a 16-week domestic violence/anger management program. However, he did not start the program until October 21, 2010. The social worker confirmed that father had been attending his sessions regularly. However, as of January 25, 2011, no progress report had been received by the social worker.
The social worker opined that father’s overall progress in services had been minimal. Although he showed the desire to be fully compliant, he was sidetracked by dealing with his family relationships and financial instability. Father had yet to complete his domestic violence program, substance abuse program, and individual counseling program, and he had yet to secure a stable living arrangement.
The social worker further noted that father and mother were currently visiting the children weekly, but had not been consistent since the start of the case. The six-month review hearing was continued from February 9 to March 8, 2011.
On January 5, 2011, the maternal aunt filed a request with the juvenile court for de facto parent status regarding E.C. and R.C. She was requesting de facto parent status to gain legal standing because she wanted to pursue legal guardianship of E.C. and R.C.
The social worker filed an addendum report on March 3, 2011, changing its recommendation to the termination of reunification services and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing. On February 2, 2011, the facilitator for the anger management program reported that father was only meeting the minimum standards, since he tended to be too reserved and seldom participated in group discussions. Thus, it was difficult to tell if he was benefitting from the program. He was also in danger of failing, since he missed three classes. In addition, the social worker noted her concern that father had missed so many random drug tests, despite having been repeatedly advised from the start of the case that his participation and progress were crucial. The social worker further reported that father had provided mother with drugs as recently as February 7, 2011. The social worker also noted that father had been compliant with his substance abuse program and individual counseling requirements. On March 1, 2011, his therapist reported that he had participated in five sessions and did not need further counseling. Overall, the social worker believed that father had not taken seriously his commitment to fully participate in his case plan, as he tended to make poor decisions and was easily distracted. The department did not foresee either parent being able to reunify with the children in the next six months.
The social worker added that the children were considered to be a sibling set, noting that one of them was under three years old at the time of removal. The social worker stated that it continued to be appropriate for the children to maintain a relationship. The children were placed in different homes, since that arrangement best met their needs, but they regularly visited each other and “appear[ed] to be connected and interested in one another.” The social worker stated that because the children were in relative care, they would be able to continue to develop their relationships with an established permanent plan.
At the six-month review hearing on March 8, 2011, the department argued that the juvenile court should consider the children a sibling set, for purposes of keeping them together. The department essentially asserted that, although they were not placed in the same home, the children had maintained their sibling bond through weekly visits. Thus, the department argued that the juvenile court should terminate reunification services as to all the children. Counsel for father and mother argued against a finding that the children were a sibling set. The juvenile court considered the relevant factors and concluded that the children were a sibling set, and that this was “a six-month case.” The juvenile court also found that father failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in the court-ordered treatment plan, and that there was no substantial possibility of returning the children to his care, even if he was given another six months of services. Therefore, the juvenile court terminated reunification services as to all the children and set a section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court then granted the maternal aunt de facto parent status regarding E.C. and R.C.
ANALYSIS
I. The Juvenile Court Properly Found That Father Had Failed to Participate Regularly and Make Substantive Progress in His Case Plan
Father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that he failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in his case plan. He asserts that he made extraordinary efforts to reunify with the children. We disagree.
Section 366.21, subdivision (e), provides: “At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing, ... the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. [¶]... [¶] If the child was under three years of age on the date of the initial removal, or is a member of a sibling group... and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan, the court may schedule a hearing pursuant to Section 366.26 within 120 days. If, however, the court finds there is a substantial probability that the child, who was under three years of age on the date of initial removal, ... may be returned to his or her parent or legal guardian within six months or that reasonable services have not been provided, the court shall continue the case to the 12-month permanency hearing.”
We review a juvenile court’s order at a section 366.21 hearing for substantial evidence. (Dawnel D. v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 393, 397-398.) All conflicts must be resolved in favor of respondent on appeal and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the juvenile court’s findings. (Adoption of R.R.R. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 973, 983.)
Father’s case plan included the requirements that he participate in general counseling, complete a domestic violence program, complete a parenting education program, submit to random drug testing, complete an outpatient substance abuse treatment program, and, if it was determined to be necessary, participate in an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. In support of his position that the juvenile court erred in its finding, father points to his completion of a 14-week parenting education program and his appropriate interactions with the children at visits. He also asserts that he was compliant with his domestic violence/anger management class requirement, he was regularly attending the sessions, and he had approximately two or three more classes left to complete the program. Father further states that he had attended six substance abuse treatment sessions and reportedly had a good attitude toward his recovery. As to his random drug testing requirement, he claims he did not start testing until November 30, 2010, because he did not know he was required to test. Once he was informed about his responsibility to test, he tested negative on three occasions, only missed one test, and he “tested positive only for alcohol” on January 7, 2011. Father further asserts that he had been compliant with his counseling requirement, and his therapist said he would be discharging him, since he did not need further counseling. Father adds that the social worker observed that he and the children were bonded, during visitation, and that he displayed a loving disposition. He asserts that the twins are often sad after visits and have been noticed to cry as a result of “missing their parent.”
Father is correct in pointing out that he completed a parenting education program, that he had been compliant with his individual counseling requirement, and that his therapist did not feel he needed any further counseling sessions. However, the social worker opined that father had not seriously committed to fully participating in his case plan. As to the domestic violence/anger management program, the facilitator reported that father was only meeting the minimum standards, and that it was difficult to tell if he was benefitting from the program due to his lack of participation. Although he claims he regularly attended the class and only had two or three more to complete the program, the record shows that father missed three classes and was in danger of failing the course. Regarding the random drug testing requirement, father failed to appear for eight tests. Contrary to his claim that he did not know he was required to test until November 30, 2010, the record shows that he was advised repeatedly, from the start of the case, that his participation was crucial to his reunification with the children. Moreover, the record shows that he tested positive for alcohol on January 7, 2011, and he provided mother with drugs as recently as February 7, 2011.
We conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that father failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in his court-ordered treatment plan. Therefore, the juvenile court properly terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing as to A.P., since she was under the age of three at the time of removal.
II. The Juvenile Court Erred in Setting a Section 366.26 Hearing As to All Four Children
Father argues that the juvenile court erred in declaring the children to be a sibling set, pursuant to the factors enumerated in section 366.21, subdivision (e), which the juvenile court was required to address in making its determination. He contends that the majority of the factors did not apply here. We note that a sibling group is defined as “two or more children who are related to each other as full or half siblings.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(C).) Since the children are a sibling group by definition, we read father’s argument to be that the juvenile court erred in determining to schedule a section 366.26 hearing for all members of the sibling group at the six-month hearing. We agree with father’s contention to the extent that the section 366.21, subdivision (e), factors did not support the setting of a section 366.26 hearing for the older siblings, E.C. and R.C. However, we conclude that the factors did support the setting of a section 366.26 hearing as to A.P. and J.P.
We note the department’s claim that the juvenile court first found the children to be a sibling set on August 9, 2010, and that this determination cannot be attacked in this writ since it was never appealed. This claim is meritless. In support of its claim, the department cites to a report from the social worker merely recommending that the juvenile court find the children to be a sibling set. Moreover, at the hearing on August 9, the juvenile court specifically stated that it would make the sibling set determination at the six-month review hearing. Thus, the juvenile court never made the determination on August 9 as the department claims.
A. Relevant Law
“If a child is over the age of three when removed from parental custody, he is entitled to a minimum of 12 months of reunification services. In the interest of expediting permanency and improving the chances of adoption for very young children, the Legislature has limited the reunification period to six months for children who are under three on the date of the initial removal. In the case of a sibling group which includes children in both categories, at the six month hearing the court may split up the siblings by expediting permanency for the younger sibling, expedite permanency for the entire sibling group (thus reducing the older siblings’ minimum reunification period to six months), or continue the case to the 12-month hearing for all of the children (thus increasing the reunification period for the younger sibling). The clear purpose of these provisions is to give the court flexibility to maintain a sibling group together in a permanent home.” (Abraham L. v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 9, 13-14 (Abraham L.), italics added; see also § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) In other words, reunification services for a sibling group that includes a minor under the age of three at the time of removal may be limited to six months, even though minors over that age would normally be entitled to more, in order to maintain a sibling group together in a single placement. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).) A court may terminate services as to all the minors, at the six-month review hearing, if it complies with section 366.21, subdivision (e).
“In furtherance of the societal interest in placing and maintaining a sibling group together in a permanent home, the Legislature has imposed strict requirements before the court may make a determination at the six-month hearing to schedule a section 366.26 hearing for some or all of the sibling group members. Section 366.21, subdivision (e), paragraph four, provides that in making its determination the juvenile court must review and consider the Department’s report. Factors the report must address, and the court must consider, include the following: (a) whether the children were removed from parental care as a group; (b) the closeness and strength of the sibling bond; (c) the siblings’ ages; (d) the appropriateness of maintaining the group together; (e) the detriment to each child if sibling ties are not maintained; (f) the likelihood of finding a permanent home for the group; (g) whether the group is currently placed together in a preadoptive home or has a concurrent plan goal of legal permanency in the [same] home; (h) the wishes of each child whose age and condition permits a meaningful response; and (i) the best interest of each child in the group. Additionally, the court must specify the factual basis for its finding that it is in each child’s best interest to schedule a section 366.26 hearing for some or all of the members of the sibling group.” (Abraham L., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 14; see also § 366.21, subd. (e).)
As stated earlier, “‘[w]e review the correctness of an order pursuant to section 366.21 to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citations.]” (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1020.)
B. Relevant Background
At the six-month review hearing, counsel for the department recommended that the juvenile court terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing as to all the children. In doing so, counsel argued that the juvenile court should find the children to be a sibling set, pursuant to the factors in section 366.21, subdivision (e). Counsel acknowledged that the children were not currently placed in the same home together, but noted that it was only one of several factors that the juvenile court had to consider. Counsel asserted that the children were removed from parental care together, and that the children had maintained their sibling bond through weekly visits. Counsel stated that “they do know each other and [are] bonded together as siblings.” Counsel further asserted that all the children were the ages of six and under and were “all very close in age and bonded together, ” and that the hope was that the children could continue to maintain their sibling bond, despite being in two separate placements. Counsel also said that the children had “seen each other every weekend for significant periods of time since they [had] been removed and still [were] bonded together as siblings and [knew] each other as siblings.” Counsel acknowledged that, at that time, the maternal aunt was not able to have the younger children in her home, but she was willing to allow continued contact between them and the twins. As to the last factor regarding the wishes of each child, counsel stated that because the children were under the age of six, the department did not feel that their response would be meaningful at that time. Counsel concluded that the majority of the relevant factors applied to the children, and that, even though they did not meet the factor of being placed in the same home, they had maintained their sibling bond.
Mother’s counsel argued that the children were not placed together when they were detained. Mother’s counsel noted that, as to the concurrent plan of adoption, it would be rare for the four children to be placed together in an adoptive home. Mother’s counsel added that the children were not a sibling set, in that there was no guarantee that all four children would be adopted, let alone in the same home. He requested that the juvenile court make this a 12-month case as to the older children, E.C. and R.C., and that the juvenile court declare the younger children, A.P. and J.P., a sibling set, and make it a six-month case as to them. However, father’s counsel joined in on mother’s counsel’s arguments, and objected to the finding that all four children were a sibling set. Father’s counsel did not acknowledge the argument of mother’s counsel for the juvenile court to find A.P. and J.P. to be a sibling set.
The juvenile court stated: “The court does find that one of the children was under the age of three at the time of initial removal, and that was [A.P.] And the court has considered all the various factors and does find and declare these minors are continued to be a sibling set. They are a sibling set. They were moved together, and they grew up together. Although they are not currently placed in the same home, there is certainly a sibling bond, and they are currently placed with maternal relatives. The bond is continued. There is regular visitation. So, the court does find this to be a six month case.” The juvenile court then terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
C. The Juvenile Court Erred in Setting a Section 366.26 Hearing for the Older Siblings
When the juvenile court stated that it considered “all the various factors, ” in “find[ing] this to be a six month case, ” presumably it was referring to the section 366.21, subdivision (e), factors. The juvenile court’s decision to set a section 366.26 hearing for all four children at the six-month hearing, in order to maintain them together as a sibling group, was not supported by the record. The record did, however, support the determination to keep the two younger siblings, A.P. and J.P., together and set a section 366.26 hearing for them. “[T]he Legislature has imposed strict requirements before the court may make a determination at the six-month hearing to schedule a section 366.26 hearing for some or all of the sibling group members.” (Abraham L., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 14.) “For the purpose of placing and maintaining a sibling group in a permanent home, ” a court must consider the factors enumerated in section 366.21, subdivision (e), paragraph 4. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) As to the first factor of whether the children were removed from parental care as a group, the record shows that the four children were not living together, under the care of their parents, at the time of removal. E.C. and R.C. were living with the maternal aunt, and J.P. and A.P. were living with the paternal grandmother. Thus, they were not removed all together as a group, but rather in pairs.
It appears that, at some point, the children all lived together with mother. The record reflects that an unknown source alleged that E.C. often fed and bathed A.P. and changed her diapers. However, the record is unclear as to when or how long the children may have lived all together.
As to the second factor of the closeness of the sibling bond, the social worker reported that the children visited each other on the weekends and merely appeared to be “connected and interested in one another.” The social worker did report that E.C. said her younger siblings, J.P. and A.P., were “‘so cute, ’” and that E.C. became excited when talking about her siblings. The social worker also reported that J.P. said he and R.C. played together, and that the siblings talked to others about the activities they did together. However, these reports did not demonstrate a particularly strong sibling bond.
Regarding the third factor of the ages of the children, at the time of removal, R.C. and E.C. were six years old; J.P. was three years old; and A.P. was two years old. Thus, the older children were close (twins), and the younger children were close, with about a 10-month difference between them.
As to the fourth factor concerning the appropriateness of maintaining all four children together, there was no mention of this factor in the social worker’s reports. However, in the jurisdiction/disposition report, the social worker stated that E.C. and R.C. were placed with the maternal aunt, and A.P. and J.P. were placed with the maternal cousin, and that these placements were the most appropriate placements at the time. In the most recent report, the department recommended that the children “remain in out of home care in relative placement.” Presumably, the department meant that it was appropriate to maintain the children where they were, in their two separate homes.
As to the next factor, there was no evidence of any detriment if the sibling ties were not maintained. The record did mention, however, that A.P. cried when she was separated from E.C. and R.C. after visits.
As to the sixth factor, the likelihood of finding a permanent home for the four children together was minimal. The four children were not currently placed all together. Moreover, the juvenile court just granted the maternal aunt de facto parent status of R.C. and E.C., and she intended to seek legal guardianship of those two children only.
The seventh factor was whether the group was currently placed together in a preadoptive home or there was a goal of legal permanency in the same home. The four children were not currently placed together, but rather, A.P. and J.P. were living together, and E.C. and R.C. were living together. Moreover, there was no apparent goal for all four children to be placed in the same home. In fact, at the six-month hearing, counsel for the department informed the juvenile court that the maternal aunt was not able to have the younger children in her home, but she was willing to allow continued contact between E.C. and R.C. and their younger siblings.
As to the factor regarding the wishes of each child, R.C. indicated that he “wished that his parents and siblings could reside together”; E.C. simply said she missed her mother, but enjoyed living in her current placement; J.P. said he wished he could live with R.C. because “he [was] fun to play with”; and A.P. said she wanted to stay with J.P. The social worker observed that A.P. was “extremely bonded” to J.P. and followed him around. None of the children appeared to strongly desire that all four siblings stay together.
Finally, as to the best interest of each child in the group, it appeared to be in the best interests of E.C. and R.C. to stay together, since they had been living together and the maternal aunt wanted to keep them in her home. Furthermore, it appeared to be in the best interests of A.P. and J.P. to stay together, since they had been living together and were extremely bonded.
The record demonstates that the majority of the relevant factors did not apply to all four siblings as a group. Significantly, the four children were not currently living in the same home, and there was not even a goal to place them in the same permanent home. “The clear purpose of these [statutory] provisions is to give the court flexibility to maintain a sibling group together in a permanent home.” (Abraham L., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 14, italics added.) Since there was no apparent plan to place or maintain all four children together in a permanent home, there was no reason to schedule a section 366.26 hearing for all of them, under these provisions. In other words, there was no reason to reduce the reunification period to six months for the older siblings, E.C. and R.C. However, the factors did weigh in favor of reducing J.P.’s reunification period, in order to maintain him with the younger child, A.P. A.P. and J.P. were removed together when they were two and three years old, respectively, they were living together with the maternal cousin, and they were “extremely bonded.” This evidence sufficiently satisfied the factors enumerated in section 366.21, subdivision (e), for the juvenile court to terminate reunification services to them as a sibling group, at the six-month hearing.
In sum, E.C. and R.C. were three years or older at the time of removal. Thus, they were entitled to a minimum of 12 months of reunification services. (Abraham L., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 13; § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Since the factors in section 366.21, subdivision (e), did not favor maintaining them together with A.P. (and J.P.), the juvenile court erred in terminating services and setting a section 366.26 hearing for them. The juvenile court should have split up the children by reducing J.P.’s reunification period to six months, in order to maintain him with A.P., and continuing the case to the 12-month hearing for E.C. and R.C. (See Abraham L., at pp. 13-14.) Ultimately, the juvenile court properly terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing for A.P. and J.P., at the six-month hearing, but erred in doing so for E.C. and R.C.
We note that father is requesting this court grant him additional reunification services as to all four children, despite his position that the juvenile court erred in declaring them a sibling set. He is essentially asking this court to maintain the children together by extending the reunification period for A.P. to 12 months. In light of our conclusion, we cannot grant this request.
DISPOSITION
The writ petition is granted in part, and the juvenile court is directed to vacate its finding that all four children were a sibling group, and to enter a new finding that only J.P. and A.P. were a sibling group, pursuant to sections 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(C) and 366.21, subdivision (e). The juvenile court is also directed to vacate its order terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to E.C. and R.C., and to enter a new order continuing services to the 12-month status review hearing as to E.C. and R.C. In all other respects, the petition is denied.
On June 30, 2011, this court issued an order staying the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. The previously ordered stay is lifted.
We concur: RICHLI J., CODRINGTON J.