Here, the conditions of probation imposed on respondent - barring him from gangs and gang contact implicate his constitutional rights. See People v. Morger, 2019 IL 123643, ¶¶ 18-20, see also In re K.M., 2018 IL App (1st) 172349, ¶¶ 22, 57; and Interest of J.P., 2019 IL App (1st) 181087, ¶ 18; In re J'Lavon T., 2018 IL App (1st) 180228, ¶ 20. "A juvenile's liberty interests are protected by due process." In re K.M., 2018 IL App (1st) 172349, ¶ 22.

¶ 97 But we have consistently distinguished those probation conditions from ones, as here, that prohibit any activity that promotes street gangs, because such a restriction does not reach innocuous or innocent interactions with students, coworkers, or others in the community who happen to be gang members. See, e.g. , In re J.R. , 2019 IL App (1st) 190661, ¶ 31, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d –––– (restriction did not prevent respondent from "associating, communicating, and interacting with classmates and other groups of people in activities that did not promote or further a function of a street gang"); In re J.P. , 2019 IL App (1st) 181087, ¶ 24, 430 Ill.Dec. 211, 125 N.E.3d 1229 (no-gang-activity restriction did not reach innocent interactions with classmates or others); Jawan S. , 2018 IL App (1st) 172955, ¶ 32, 428 Ill.Dec. 228, 121 N.E.3d 1002 (prohibition on illegal gang activity was not overbroad, as it did "not prohibit the kinds of innocent, incidental contact that respondent is likely to have with gang members during the course of his ordinary daily activities"). ¶ 98 As in those cases, we see nothing here that renders the probation order overbroad.