This case involves Larry Winget's revocable trust, which "held most, if not all, of Winget's assets." JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 901 F.Supp.2d 955, 961 (E.D. Mich. 2012). As if to make this even easier, Winget is the Trust's settlor, trustee, and sole beneficiary.
Therefore, Defendants concluded that the Consent Order prohibited both Defendant Glieberman individually and also the Trust from transferring assets. To this end, Defendants relied upon the holding in JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Winget, 901 F. Supp. 2d 955 (E.D. Mich. 2012), which found, "[a]s settlor, Winget owned the assets in the Winget Trust. See MCL ยง 556.128. The Winget Trust was essentially Winget's alter ego.
In the earlier decision, Judge Cohn held that the trust was Winget's "alter ego." JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 901 F. Supp. 2d 955, 972 (E.D. Mich. 2012). But, as noted, Chase timely appealed that decision and it was reversed.
There is a heavy presumption under Michigan law that "a deliberately prepared and executed [agreement] manifest[s] the true intention[s] of the parties, especially between counseled businessmen," and that "a correspondingly high order of evidence is required to overcome that presumption." JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 901 F. Supp. 2d 955, 972 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 797 F. Supp. 2d 254, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). It is true that a court of equity is empowered to reform a contract, but only when necessary to make it conform to the agreement actually made by the contracting parties.
29, (2009 WL 440900 (E.D.Mich. Feb.23, 2009)) and Doc. 365 (901 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.Mich.2012)).VI. ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, GM's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.