Joyner v. Middletown Med., P.C.

40 Citing cases

  1. M. T. v. Eav Lim

    203 A.D.3d 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 7 times

    Zarghami and Lao separately appeal. "A defendant seeking summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must make a prima facie showing either that he or she did not depart from the accepted standard of care or that any departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries" ( Palazzolo v. Green, 189 A.D.3d 1056, 1058, 137 N.Y.S.3d 58 ; seeJoyner v. Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593, 123 N.Y.S.3d 169 ; Hayden v. Gordon, 91 A.D.3d 819, 820, 937 N.Y.S.2d 299 ). "To rebut the defendant's prima facie showing, a plaintiff must submit an expert opinion that specifically addresses the defense expert's allegations" ( Pirri–Logan v. Pearl, 192 A.D.3d 1149, 1150, 145 N.Y.S.3d 545 ; seeJoyner v. Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593, 123 N.Y.S.3d 169 ). " ‘Summary judgment is not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions’ " ( Joyner v. Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d at 594, 123 N.Y.S.3d 169, quoting Feinberg v. Feit, 23 A.D.3d 517, 519, 806 N.Y.S.2d 661 ; seeHutchinson v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 172 A.D.3d 1037, 1040, 101 N.Y.S.3d 96 ).

  2. M. T. v. Eav Lim

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 1339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

    Zarghami and Lao separately appeal. "A defendant seeking summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must make a prima facie showing either that he or she did not depart from the accepted standard of care or that any departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries" (Palazzolo v Green, 189 A.D.3d 1056, 1058; see Joyner v Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593; Hayden v Gordon, 91 A.D.3d 819, 820). "To rebut the defendant's prima facie showing, a plaintiff must submit an expert opinion that specifically addresses the defense expert's allegations" (Pirri-Logan v Pearl, 192 A.D.3d 1149, 1150; see Joyner v Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593). "'Summary judgment is not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions'" (Joyner v Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d at 594, quoting Feinberg v Feit, 23 A.D.3d 517, 519; see Hutchinson v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 172 A.D.3d 1037, 1040). Here, Zarghami established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging medical malpractice insofar as asserted against him through the affirmation of his expert, who opined that Zarghami's treatment of the plaintiffs was in accordanc

  3. Lilly v. Kim

    2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 31370 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2021)

    Discussion "The essential elements of a cause of action to recover damages for medical malpractice are a deviation or departure from accepted medical practice and evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of injury" (Harris v St. Joseph's Med. Ctr., 128 AD3d 1010, 1012 [2d Dept 2015]; see also Joyner v Middletown Med., P.C., 183 AD3d 593, 594 [2d Dept 2020]; Poter v Adams, 104 AD3d 925, 926 [2d Dept 2013]; Hayden v Gordon, 91 AD3d 819, 820 [2d Dept 2012]; Guzzi v Gewirtz, 82 AD3d 838, 838 [2d Dept 2011]). "Proximate cause is established where the defendant's conduct was a 'substantial factor' in bringing about the injury" (King v St. Barnabas Hosp., 87 AD3d 238, 245 [1st Dept 2011]; see also Goldberg v Horowitz, 73 AD3d 691, 694 [2d Dept 2010]).

  4. Schoenhardt v. Sidhom

    2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 30899 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023)

    Here; plaintiffs expert disagrees with the opinions of Dr. Johnson's expert, and has raised factual issues regarding whether Dr. Johnson's care and treatment of plaintiff with regard to teeth #'s 13 and 15, including the performance of apicoectomies, was a departure from the standard of care and whether such departures were a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. Accordingly, the conflicting opinions of plaintiffs expert and defendants' experts present triable factual issues which cannot be resolved on this summary judgment motion (see: Schmidt v Bangiyev,___A.D.3d___, 2022 NY Slip Op 06510 [2d Dept 2022]; Many, 190 A.D.3d 721; 723 [2d Dept 2021]; Kiernan v Arevalo-Valencia, 184 A.D.3d 727,728 [2d Dept 2020]; Joyner v Middletown Med., P;C, 183 A.D.3d 593, 594 [2d Dept 2020]). Based upon the foregoing, Dr. Johnson's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims as asserted against him is denied in its entirety.

  5. Agostini v. Varughese

    190 A.D.3d 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 11 times

    In order to establish the liability of a physician for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that the physician deviated or departed from accepted community standards of practice, and that such departure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries (seeM.C. v. Huntington Hosp., 175 A.D.3d 578, 579, 106 N.Y.S.3d 382 ; Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d 18, 23, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176 ). "A defendant seeking summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must make a prima facie showing either that he or she did not depart from the accepted standard of care or that any departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries" ( M.C. v. Huntington Hosp., 175 A.D.3d at 579, 106 N.Y.S.3d 382 ). Where the defendant has satisfied that burden, a plaintiff must submit evidentiary facts or materials to rebut the defendant's prima facie showing (seeJoyner v. Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593, 123 N.Y.S.3d 169 ; Castillo v. Surasi, 181 A.D.3d 786, 121 N.Y.S.3d 291 ; Mehtvin v. Ravi, 180 A.D.3d 661, 118 N.Y.S.3d 646 ). Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the detailed affirmations of their experts, who opined that the defendants' treatment of the decedent did not depart from the applicable standard of care and was not a proximate cause of the decedent's injuries and death (seeSimpson v. Edghill, 169 A.D.3d 737, 93 N.Y.S.3d 399 ; Pagano v. Cohen, 164 A.D.3d 516, 82 N.Y.S.3d 492 ; Sukhraj v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 106 A.D.3d 809, 965 N.Y.S.2d 532 ).

  6. Palazzolo v. Green

    189 A.D.3d 1056 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 4 times

    "In order to establish the liability of a physician for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that the physician deviated or departed from accepted community standards of practice, and that such departure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries" ( Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d 18, 23, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176 ). A defendant seeking summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must make a prima facie showing either that he or she did not depart from the accepted standard of care or that any departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries (seeJoyner v. Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593, 594, 123 N.Y.S.3d 169 ). Where the defendant has satisfied that burden, a plaintiff must submit evidentiary facts or materials to rebut the defendant's prima facie showing (seeid.

  7. Sessa v. Peconic Bay Med. Ctr.

    200 A.D.3d 1085 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 6 times

    e issues of fact by submitting an affirmation from a medical expert who competently concluded, inter alia, that Wackett and McMahon departed from good and accepted medical practice by failing to request an orthopedic consultation, failing to consult a radiologist, subjecting the plaintiff to a second attempt at elbow reduction, and discharging the plaintiff from Peconic Bay with an unstable dislocated elbow, and that these alleged departures were a proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and amputation. The plaintiff also raised a triable issue of fact in opposition to Brennan's motion by submitting an affirmation from another medical expert who competently concluded, inter alia, that Brennan's failure to order an angiogram of the plaintiff's left arm was a departure from and good and accepted medical practice, that ordering a vascular consultation alone was not sufficient, and that these departures were a proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and amputation (seeJoyner v. Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593, 594–595, 123 N.Y.S.3d 169 ; Carter v. Tana, 68 A.D.3d 1577, 1579–1580, 891 N.Y.S.2d 714 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly denied the respective branches of the motion of Wackett and McMahon, and the separate motion of Brennan, which were for summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice cause of action and all cross claims insofar as asserted against each of them.

  8. Maestri v. Pasha

    No. 2018-04929 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 6, 2021)

    Further, the conclusions of the plaintiff's expert were not vague or conclusory, and did not fail to address the opinions of the appellants' expert (see id. at 759-760). The plaintiff's expert opined, inter alia, that the appellants negligently failed to consider a vascular etiology of the pseudo-obstructive condition causing the distension of the decedent's abdomen and failed to refer the decedent for an aortogram or other diagnostic tests related to a possible vascular cause of the condition, in a departure from the applicable standard of care (see Loccisano v Ascher, 195 A.D.3d 610, 613; Joyner v Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593, 594-595; Contreras v Adeyemi, 102 A.D.3d 720, 722). The plaintiff's expert further opined that the failure to refer the decedent for such diagnostic tests and instead to continue to treat him in the manner which they did during his 13-day hospital stay diminished his chance of a better outcome or increased his injuries (see Wiater v Lewis, ___ A.D.3d at ___, 2021 NY Slip Op 04783, *2; Cox v Herzog, 192 A.D.3d at 759-760).

  9. Maestri v. Pasha

    198 A.D.3d 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 21 times

    Further, the conclusions of the plaintiff's expert were not vague or conclusory, and did not fail to address the opinions of the appellants’ expert (seeid. at 759–760, 139 N.Y.S.3d 881 ). The plaintiff's expert opined, inter alia, that the appellants negligently failed to consider a vascular etiology of the pseudo-obstructive condition causing the distension of the decedent's abdomen and failed to refer the decedent for an aortogram or other diagnostic tests related to a possible vascular cause of the condition, in a departure from the applicable standard of care (seeLoccisano v. Ascher, 195 A.D.3d 610, 613, 149 N.Y.S.3d 229 ; Joyner v. Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593, 594–595, 123 N.Y.S.3d 169 ; Contreras v. Adeyemi, 102 A.D.3d 720, 722, 958 N.Y.S.2d 430 ). The plaintiff's expert further opined that the failure to refer the decedent for such diagnostic tests and instead to continue to treat him in the manner which they did during his 13–day hospital stay diminished his chance of a better outcome or increased his injuries (seeWiater v. Lewis, 197 A.D.3d 782, 783–84, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, 2021 N.Y. Slip Op., *2 ; Cox v. Herzog, 192 A.D.3d at 759–760, 139 N.Y.S.3d 881 ).

  10. Joynes v. Donatelli

    190 A.D.3d 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 13 times

    Moreover, the plaintiff's experts concluded that Palmer failed to inform the decedent and his primary care physician of the decedent's risks, failed to document her treatment of the decedent, and failed to insure that the decedent continued to treat his liver disease and hepatitis C after she closed her practice. Finally, the plaintiff's experts concluded that Palmer's negligence and departure from the accepted standards of care proximately caused the decedent's death. "Summary judgment is not appropriate in a medical malpractice action where, as here, the parties adduce conflicting medical expert opinions" ( id. at 788–789, 121 N.Y.S.3d 291 ; seeLarcy v. Kamler, 185 A.D.3d 564, 565–566, 127 N.Y.S.3d 122 ; Joyner v. Middletown Med., P.C., 183 A.D.3d 593, 594, 123 N.Y.S.3d 169 ). "Such credibility issues can only be resolved by a jury" ( Feinberg v. Feit, 23 A.D.3d 517, 519, 806 N.Y.S.2d 661 ; seeCastillo v. Surasi, 181 A.D.3d at 789, 121 N.Y.S.3d 291 ). Contrary to Palmer's contention, the plaintiff's experts were qualified to render an opinion on the standard of care for the decedent.