Opinion
Civil Action CV-2021-239
12-21-2023
STEPHEN JOYCE and CINDA JOYCE, Plaintiffs, v. MARTINA M. SULLIVAN Defendant.
Plaintiffs-Theodore Smail, Esq. Defendant-Martina M Sullivan (Pro Se).
Plaintiffs-Theodore Smail, Esq.
Defendant-Martina M Sullivan (Pro Se).
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Mary Gay Kennedy, Maine Superior Court Justice
Before the Court is Defendant Martina M. Sullivan's Motion for a New Judge and Plaintiffs Stephen and Cinda Joyce's ("the Joyces") Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award. Arbitrator William Robitzek issued an interim award on July 1,2023 ("the Interim Award"), and a Final Arbitration Award on August 31, 2023 ("the Final Arbitration Award"), awarding the Joyces $7,310.49 in costs and $42,942.43 in attorney fees, For the following reasons, the Court denies Ms. Sullivan's motion, grants the Joyces' motion, and enters judgment in the Joyces' favor consistent with the Final Arbitration Award.
I. Motion for a New Judge
Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.11 provides that "[a] judge shall disqualify or recuse himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned...." Canon 2.11 provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances which may cause a judge's impartiality to reasonably be questioned. A judge may not recuse when recusal is not required. See In re Michael M., 2000 ME 204, ¶¶ 10-15, 761 A.2d 865.
Ms. Sullivan asserts that the undersigned should recuse herself in this matter for myriad reasons. First, she asserts that "[Justice] Kennedy has misinterpreted the court's role and jurisdiction in this arbitration matter." To the contrary, the Court has authority pursuant to the Maine Uniform Arbitration Act, 14 M.R.S. §§ 5927-5949 (2023), to confirm or vacate arbitration awards. The Court is aware of the bounds of its authority under the Maine Uniform Arbitration Act, and Ms. Sullivan has not identified any specific way in which she believes the Court has exceeded that authority.
Ms. Sullivan further asserts that the Court has "ignor[ed]" Ms. Sullivan's claims. Default was entered against Ms. Sullivan on December 28, 2021, and on June 8, 2022, default judgment was entered. When default is entered for failure to plead or otherwise defend, the allegations in the Complaint are deemed true, and any counterclaims or affirmative defenses Ms. Sullivan might have presented to the Court are waived and warrant no further discussion. See Haskell v. Bragg, 2017 ME 154, ¶ 21, 167 A.3d 1246; McAlister v. Slosberg, 658 A.2d 658, 660 (Me. 1995); Ireland v. Carpenter, 2005 ME 98, ¶ 18, 879 A.2d 35.
Finally, she argues that the Court impermissibly failed to consider the transcript from arbitration when deciding her Motion to Vacate, but no transcript was submitted to the Court. The Court has considered each of Ms. Sullivan's arguments, and none justifies recusal. The undersigned is not aware of any other reason why her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. To be clear, the undersigned has no personal bias or prejudice concerning any party. Accordingly, the undersigned declines to recuse herself.
II. Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award
"Upon application of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award." 14 M.R.S. § 5937 (2023).
Ms. Sullivan previously brought a motion to vacate the Interim Award, which the Court denied. She has opposed the Joyces' Motion to Confirm, but she has not filed any separate motion to vacate, modify, or correct the Final Arbitration Award within the ninety-day statutory period. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 5938, 5939.
In opposition to the Joyces' Motion to Confirm, Ms. Sullivan argues that the arbitrator and the Joyces violated Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 when the arbitrator issued the Final Arbitration Award and the Joyces moved to confirm the Final Arbitration Award while Ms. Sullivan's appeal was pending. Rule 3 prohibits the trial court from acting on most kinds of motions. It does not prevent an arbitrator from issuing an award or a party from filing a motion (although the Court could not dispose of the motion during the pendency of the appeal). In any event, Ms. Sullivan's appeal has since been dismissed as interlocutory and the Joyces' motion is now properly before the Court.
Ms. Sullivan contests the Final Arbitration Award on the grounds that the arbitrator received additional evidence after the hearing was concluded and after the Interim Arbitration Award was issued. Ms. Sullivan is apparently referring in part to evidence regarding the Joyces' attorney fees and costs. In the Interim Arbitration Award, the arbitrator expressly requested evidence regarding attorney fees from the Joyces, to which Ms. Sullivan was given an opportunity to respond. The arbitrator did not exceed the bounds of his authority in this regard.
Ms. Sullivan also specifically references an email from the Joyces' attorney, Theodore Small, to the arbitrator on August 15, 2023, which she has attached to her opposition. (See Exs. A, D.) The email, on winch Ms. Sullivan is copied, attaches email correspondence with Judge John Sheldon, before whom the parties had initially agreed to arbitrate this matter in 2021. In the body of the email to the arbitrator, Attorney Small refers to the attachment as "supplemental information."
It appears that Attorney Small attached the correspondence with Judge Sheldon because Judge Sheldon asked the parties to agree to "a one-time deviation from the November 29, 2012, Boundary Agreement" to grant him discretion to decline to award costs and attorney fees. (Def's Ex. A.) Attorney Small wrote, regarding the correspondence with Judge Sheldon, "I don't think it changes anything from what I previously sent you. I think it just confirms there was never a meeting of the minds on the proposal Sheldon offered. And, there was no signed agreement." (Def.'s Ex. D.)
The Boundary Agreement's arbitration clause provides: "The costs of the arbitration, including reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be borne by the non-prevailing party."
Ms. Sullivan does not contend that the content of the August 15th email impacted the Interim Award, which was not amended thereafter. The August 15th email appears to contain evidence related to the Joyces' entitlement to attorney fees and costs, in keeping with the arbitrator's decision to receive evidence on the issue of attorney fees and costs after hearing. This is not grounds for denying the Joyces' Motion to Confirm.
III. The Joyces' Request for Sanctions
In their Motion to Confirm, the Joyces request that the Court grant them attorney fees in connection with opposing Ms. Sullivan's Motion to Vacate. The Court has discretion to impose sanctions, including an award of attorney fees, against a party who brings a motion "in circumstances where the moving or opposing party does not have a reasonable basis for that party's position." M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(6); see M.R. Civ. P. 11(a).
The Court declines to impose sanctions against Ms. Sullivan for bringing the Motion to Vacate. Although her motion was unsuccessful, the Court hesitates to find that it was brought in bad faith.
The Joyces also request that the Court enter a Spickler order to prevent Ms. Sullivan from initiating further litigation against them regarding their properties' boundaries. See Spickler v. Key Bank of S. Me., 618 A.2d 204, 207 (Me. 1992). To obtain a Spickler injunction, which requires a party to obtain prior approval of the court before acceptance of a filing, the moving party "must make a detailed showing of a pattern of abusive and frivolous litigation." Id. The injunction should "sweep[] no broader than necessary to protect the [moving party] from frivolous litigation." Id.
The Court acknowledges that Ms. Sullivan is subject to a Spickler order enjoining her from filing additional claims or post-judgment motions against property owners who are not parties to this suit regarding a different boundary of Ms. Sullivan's property. The Joyces, however, have not demonstrated that Ms. Sullivan's conduct before the Court (rather than in arbitration) in this case establishes that a Spickler order will be necessary to protect them from frivolous litigation.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court confirms the Final Arbitration Award and denies the Joyces' request for sanctions.
The entry is:
1. Defendant Martina M. Sullivan's Motion for a New Judge is DENIED;
2. Plaintiffs Stephen and Cinda Joyce's Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award is GRANTED. The Final Arbitration Award is hereby CONFIRMED. Judgment is entered in Plaintiffs' favor consistent with the Final Arbitration Award in the amounts of $7,310.49 in costs and $42,942.43 in attorney fees; and
3. Plaintiffs' requests for imposition of sanctions and entry of a Spickler order against Defendant are denied.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order and Judgment into the docket by reference pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).