Opinion
C. A. 2:23-cv-01011-JD-MGB
02-07-2024
JOYCE C.,[1] Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI,[2] Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Joyce Truman Campbell, (“Plaintiff”), brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42 U.S.C. Section 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration regarding her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). See Section 205(g) of the SSA, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends the Court affirm the Commissioner's decision.
RELEVANT FACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff was 54 years old on her date last insured, December 31, 2020. (R. at 1036, 1051.) Plaintiff claims disability due to, inter alia, migraine headaches, diabetes, bursitis in left shoulder, surgery on left shoulder, and carpal tunnel surgery on left hand. (R. at 304.) Plaintiff has past relevant work as a hair stylist. (R. at 305, 1051.)
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on February 14, 2016. (R. at 121.) Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. at 121.) After a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on July 19, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision on October 17, 2018, in which the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 121-29.) Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council remanded the case back to the ALJ. (R. at 135-38.) Plaintiff appeared before a new ALJ in a hearing on March 19, 2020. On April 7, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision in which he found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 15-27.) After the Appeals Council declined the request for review (R. at 1-5), Plaintiff filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. On November 9, 2021, the District Court remanded the action for further proceedings. (R. at 1125-39). The Court indicated remand was appropriate because “the Court cannot find that the ALJ appropriately considered the evidence pertaining to Plaintiff's migraine headaches, including Dr. Scott's November 2019 opinion, such that his RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.” (R. at 1130.)
Based on the District Court's Order, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded the case on May 24, 2022. (R. at 1141-45.) A telephone hearing was held on October 26, 2022, before the same ALJ who had issued the April 7, 2020 decision. (R. at 1063-96.) On November 17, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 1052.) The November 2022 decision is the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In making the determination that the Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits, the Commissioner has adopted the following findings of the ALJ:
(1) The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2020.
(2) The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of September 16, 2015 through her date last insured of December 31, 2020 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
(3) Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments: adhesive capsulitis of the left shoulder,hypertension, migraine headaches and C5-6 radiculopathy (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
(4) Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).
(5) After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). I specifically find that the claimant can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. The claimant can sit and stand and/or walk, with normal breaks, for 6 hours each in an 8-hour workday. The claimant can push or pull frequently with the upper extremities. The claimant can frequently crouch, stoop or climb ramps or stairs. The claimant can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She can occasionally kneel or crawl. She is limited to occasional overhead reaching and handling with the left upper extremity. The claimant is limited to occasional exposure to bright lights (specifically outdoor work), hazards (such as dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights), vibration, loud background noise, and pulmonary irritants (like fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and unventilated environments). The claimant will miss two hours of work per week as needed to deal with migraines. Because of her migraines interfering with focus and attention, the claimant is limited to performing simple and detailed work with occasional decision-making, frequent judgment required on the job, and frequent changes in the work setting. This can be performed on a sustained basis eight hours a day, five days a week, in two-hour increments with normal breaks for an eight-hour day.
(6) Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).
(7) The claimant was born on July 9, 1966 and was 54 years old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age, on the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1563).
(8) The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 404.1564).
(9) Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
(10) Through the date last insured, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569a).
(11) The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from September 16, 2015, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2020, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).(R. at 1034-52.)
“Frozen shoulder, also known as adhesive capsulitis, is a condition characterized by stiffness and pain in your shoulder joint.” Frozen shoulder, MayoClinic.org, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/frozen-shoulder/symptoms-causes/syc-20372684 (last visited Dec. 5, 2023).
APPLICABLE LAW
The Act provides that disability benefits shall be available to those persons insured for benefits, who are not of retirement age, who properly apply, and who are under a “disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). “Disability” is defined in the Act as the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of “disability” to a series of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in the Social Security Administration's official Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) has an impairment which prevents past relevant work, and (5) has an impairment which prevents him from doing substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If an individual is found not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The claimant bears the burden of proof with respect to the first four steps of the analysis. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); Patterson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 2017). Once the claimant has established an inability to return to his past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant-considering his age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity-can perform alternative jobs and that such jobs exist in the national economy. SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3; Grant, 699 F.2d at 191; Pass, 65 F.3d at 1203; Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2016).
The scope of judicial review by the federal courts in disability cases is narrowly tailored to determine whether the Commissioner supported his findings with substantial evidence and applied the correct law. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015); Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2018); Arakas v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 983 F.3d 83, 94 (4th Cir. 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Consequently, the Act precludes a de novo review of the evidence and requires that the court uphold the Commissioner's decision as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Pyles v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 846, 848 (4th Cir. 1988); Bird v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Mascio, 780 F.3d at 640; Dowling v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2021); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015)). It is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Pearson, 810 F.3d at 207 (citing Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court does not undertake to “reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95; Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383. “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled,” the reviewing court must defer to the ALJ's decision. Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472).
However, the court does not “reflexively rubber-stamp an ALJ's findings.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 383 (citing Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2017)). An ALJ may not cherrypick, misstate, or mischaracterize material facts. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 99 (citing Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869). Rather, ALJs “must ‘build an accurate and logical bridge' from the evidence to their conclusions.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95 (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his assessment of Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”) by failing to properly evaluate the severity of Plaintiff's migraine headaches and musculoskeletal problems. (Dkt. No. 11 at 21-30.) Relatedly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff's testimony about the severity and limiting effects of these impairments. (Id. at 30-32.) The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's limitations do not preclude all work activity. (Dkt. No. 12.)
The undersigned considers these arguments, below.
A. Standards
A claimant's RFC, which represents “the most [she] can still do despite [her] limitations,” is determined by assessing all relevant evidence in the case record, including “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1), (a)(3); see also Ladda v. Berryhill, 749 Fed.Appx. 166, 172 (4th Cir. 2018). The assessment must be based upon all of the relevant evidence, including the medical records, medical source opinions, and the individual's subjective allegations and description of her own limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3).
Social Security Ruling 96-8p further requires that an ALJ's “RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (noting that the ALJ “must also explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were considered and resolved”). Moreover, the ALJ “must discuss the individual's ability to perform sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case record.” Id. Every conclusion reached by an ALJ when evaluating a claimant's RFC must be accompanied by “a narrative discussion describing [ ] the evidence” that supports it. Dowling, 986 F.3d at 387 (quoting Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019)) (alteration in original); see Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “the ALJ must both identify evidence that supports his conclusion and build an accurate and logical bridge from that evidence to his conclusion”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, “a proper RFC analysis has three components: (1) evidence, (2) logical explanation, and (3) conclusion.” Thomas, 916 F.3d at 311.
The medical opinions in the record and a claimant's statements are among the evidence the
ALJ must consider and reconcile with the RFC assessment. “[A]n ALJ follows a two-step analysis when considering a claimant's subjective statements about impairments and symptoms.” Lewis, 858 F.3d at 865-66 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b)-(c), 416.929(b)-(c)). “First, the ALJ looks for objective medical evidence showing a condition that could reasonably produce the alleged symptoms.” Id. at 866 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b)). The ALJ proceeds to the second step only if the claimant's impairments could reasonably produce the symptoms he alleges. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1).
Because Plaintiff filed her claims prior to March 27, 2017, the ALJ was required to assess the medical opinions in the record under the treating physician rule. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c; 404.1527. “Under the ‘treating source rule,' the applicant's treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight in the ALJ's analysis, unless there is persuasive, contradictory evidence.” Easterbrook v. Kijakazi, No. 21-2193, 2023 WL 8533330, at *5 (4th Cir. Dec. 11, 2023) (citing Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1983)). If a treating physician's opinion is not accorded controlling weight, it still must be evaluated and weighed “pursuant to the following non-exclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician's opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist.” Johnson, 434 F.3d at 654 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Any other factors that may support or contradict the opinion should also be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(6). While Plaintiff does not raise any arguments specific to the ALJ's analysis under this rule, the undersigned recounts the requirements here to ensure a comprehensive Report and Recommendation.
At the second step the ALJ must “evaluate the intensity and persistence of an individual's symptoms such as pain and determine the extent to which an individual's symptoms limit his or her ability to perform work-related activities ....” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *4 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017).In evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual's symptoms, the ALJ should “examine the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence; an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other relevant evidence in the individual's case record.” Id. Pursuant to SSR 16-3p, the ALJ must explain which of the claimant's symptoms the ALJ found “consistent or inconsistent with the evidence in [the] record and how [the ALJ's] evaluation of the individual's symptoms led to [the ALJ's] conclusions.” Id. at *8. The ALJ must evaluate the “individual's symptoms considering all the evidence in [the] record.” Id.
In March 2016 the Social Security Administration published SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (2016), which rescinds and supersedes SSR 96-7p, eliminates use of the term “credibility,” and clarifies that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual's character. SSR 16-3p applies to determinations and decisions made on or after March 29, 2016. Thus, this regulation applies to the instant ALJ decision, which was decided on November 17, 2022. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *13 n.27 (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017) (“Our adjudicators will apply this ruling when we make determinations and decisions on or after March 28, 2016.”). Although SSR 16-3p eliminates the assessment of credibility, it requires assessment of most of the same factors considered under SSR 96-7p.
The ALJ may not discredit a claimant solely because his or her subjective complaints are not supported by objective medical evidence, Craig v. Chafer, 76 F.3d 585, 595-96 (4th Cir. 1996), but neither is the ALJ required to accept the claimant's statements at face value; rather, the ALJ must “evaluate whether the statements are consistent with objective medical evidence and the other evidence.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *6; see also Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95 (“[T]he ALJ must consider the entire case record and may ‘not disregard an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence does not substantiate' them.” (quoting SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *5)).
B. Evaluation of Migraine Headaches
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the severity of her migraine headaches when assessing her RFC. (Dkt. No. 11 at 23-27.) Relatedly, she argues that the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff's testimony about the severity and limiting effects of this impairment. (Id. at 30-32.)
1. The ALJ's Decision
In his detailed 18-page decision, the ALJ thoroughly considered the evidence pertaining to Plaintiff's migraines, including her subjective statements and the opinion evidence. In the 12 pages of his decision assessing Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ devoted a significant portion to Plaintiff's migraines. (R. at 1038-50.) He first summarized Plaintiff's testimony about the limiting effects of her migraines, as stated at the three ALJ hearings; specifically:
The claimant . . . reported severe neck and shoulder pain and frequent headaches. She indicated that she has two to four headaches a month, which can last all day. She has “lesser” headaches almost every day (Exhibit 27B). However, she subsequently testified that she has one or two severe headaches a week and medications help her migraine symptoms (Exhibit 28B).
At her most recent hearing, the claimant testified that her ability to work is primarily limited frequent migraines and neck, shoulder, and upper extremity issues....She testified that her migraines have worsened and medications do not help. She reports having two to three headaches a month which have worsened in frequency to two or three a week. Her headaches last five to eight hours....(R. at 1039.) The ALJ found that while Plaintiff's “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, . . . [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for reasons explained in this decision.” (R. at 1039.)
After summarizing the evidence specific to Plaintiff's alleged impairments of diabetes, obesity, carpal tunnel syndrome, and left shoulder and neck impairments, the ALJ stated that he had accounted for Plaintiff's
complaints of pain, migraine headaches, and potential contributory impairments like hypertension and cervical radiculopathy. In accounting for these impairments and in consideration of the claimant's subjective allegations, I have imposed functional limitations in addition to the exertional, postural and manipulative restricted noted above. The claimant is limited to occasional exposure to bright lights (specifically outdoor work), hazards (such as dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights), vibration, loud background noise, and pulmonary irritants (like fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and unventilated environments). In assessing these limitations, I have taken into consideration the recent opinion of neurologist Dr. Collins. I also note that the claimant will miss two hours of work per week as needed to deal with migraines. Because of her migraines interfering with focus and attention, the claimant is limited to performing simple and detailed work with occasional decision-making, frequent judgment required on the job, and frequent changes in the work setting. This can be performed on a sustained basis eight hours
a day, five days a week, in two-hour increments with normal breaks for an eight-hour day.(R. at 1042.)
The ALJ proceeded to discuss at length his reasons for affording only certain limitations based on Plaintiff's migraines. He detailed Plaintiff's treatment history, including the reported frequency of her headaches between 2016 and 2022 and the various attempted treatments with medication. (R. at 1042-46.) Relevant, here the ALJ discussed opinion evidence provided by neurologist Hunter Collins on September 30, 2022, wherein he opined, inter alia, Plaintiff would need unscheduled breaks once a week lasting from several minutes to hours and she would likely be absent from work more than four times a month. (R. at 1043-44, 1411-17.) The ALJ discussed Dr. Collins' opinions at length. After noting, inter alia, that: (1) Plaintiff “notes frequent headaches occurring once or twice a week” and they “are exacerbated by certain factors as indicated by Dr. Collins”; and (2) Plaintiff “uses Tylenol for abortive measures and she has also had some help from Depakote,” the ALJ found Plaintiff's
absence from the workplace is adequately accounted for by limiting the claimant to missing two hours of work per week as needed to deal with migraines. Because of her migraines interfering with focus and attention, the claimant is limited to performing simple and detailed work with occasional decision-making, frequent judgment required on the job, and frequent changes in the work setting.(R. at 1043.)
The ALJ further discussed Dr. Collins' opinions about Plaintiff's time off task and absenteeism, stating, inter alia,
Dr. Collins also noted that the claimant would likely be absent from work four times a month (Exhibit 30F). I find this assessment less persuasive as it is internally inconsistent. Dr. Collins' conclusion that she can perform low stress work, but only need unscheduled breaks once a week (for varying amounts of time and up to several hours), to be inconsistent and speculative The claimant was only treated by Dr. Collins on one occasion. Treatment was conservative with medications and recommendations to engage in activities to alleviate migraines.(R. at 1043-44, 1411-17.)
The ALJ discussed at length the opinions of Plaintiff's treating neurologist, Dr. Glen Scott, and his treatment records. (R. at 1044-47.) The ALJ first assessed a questionnaire completed by Dr. Scott on May 7, 2018, wherein he opined Plaintiff would miss either one day per month or two days per month, and he wrote “see notes” instead of completing the remaining questions. (R. at 920, 1045.) The ALJ afforded little weight to this opinion, finding, inter alia, Dr. Scott's treatment notes “since shortly prior to the onset date through 2021 . . . indicate[] periods of time that the claimant was without experiencing headaches or migraines,” and that the “opinion regarding missing either one day per month or two days per month lacks specificity and I am unable to determine whether the claimant will miss one day per month or two days a month.” (R. at 1045.) Following this assessment, the ALJ detailed Dr. Scott's treatment records from 2014 through 2021, some of which he had already discussed earlier in his RFC assessment. (R. at 1043, 1045-46.) The ALJ then explained how he analyzed these records when assigning the functional limitations related to Plaintiff's migraines in her RFC:
I have laboriously scrutinized Dr. Scott's records at exhibits 28F, 21F and 16F with particular attention to the claimant's reports with respect to the frequency, intensity and symptomology regarding headaches and migraines. I have done so to determine the frequency and intensity of the claimant's headaches/migraines to determine whether Dr. Scott's opinions are supported by the evidence as well as appropriate functional limitations supported by the evidence. From this sampling of the evidence, I reached my conclusions not only with respect to the weight of Dr. Scott's opinions but also functional limitations. The sampling used in making my determination is not all inclusive of Dr. Scott's records, however, consideration has been given to every office visit with the claimant but not to the degree of scrutiny given to the three exhibits noted above. Consideration was given to his treatment records at exhibits 25F, 20F and 11F even though these exhibits contain numerous duplicate records. The treatment records do not support the opinion that the claimant would need the frequency and duration of breaks or miss the number of days missing work per month set forth in the opinion. Undoubtedly, the claimant's headaches and migraines cause significant limitations but the record lacks specificity to support. Dr. Scott opined the claimant will need to rest from work
activities but did not know how often this would happen, however, he concluded the claimant would need to rest hours - days before returning to the workstation (Exhibit 24F3)....
Based on Dr. Scott's records[,] the claimant was limited to exposure to bright lights, no outdoor work, occasional exposure to loud background noise and frequent exposure to fumes, occasional exposure to hazards, never being exposed to ropes ladders and scaffolds, and that the claimant would be limited to simple and detailed work with occasional decision-making, frequent judgment required on the job and frequent changes in the work setting as well as the need to take time off from work on a weekly basis of two hours....(R. at 1046-47.)
Finally, the ALJ assigned “limited weight” to Dr. Scott's medical source opinion dated November 21, 2019. (R. at 960-63, 1050.) Here, the ALJ discussed Dr. Scott's statement that Plaintiff has severe headaches 15 to 18 days out of the month and his opinion that, inter alia, she would need unscheduled breaks that could last hours or days, would be unable to tolerate low stress jobs, and would be absent from the workplace more than four days a month. (R. at 1050.) After again discussing Dr. Scott's treatment records, the ALJ ultimately discounted this opinion, finding: Dr. Scott's “statements regarding the frequency of headaches are not supported by his objective examination findings”; “his assessment is inconsistent with prior statements and generally inconsistent with the weight of the treatment record”; it “is inconsistent with Dr. Collins' conclusion that the claimant is capable of low stress jobs.” (R. at 1050.) The ALJ concluded that “these inconsistencies and lack of support render Dr. Scott's assessment less persuasive.” (R. at 1050.)
2. Analysis
Specific to her migraines, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to sufficiently explain how he “used the evidence to create the limitations cited in the RFC”; specifically, “how he concluded that the two hours total per week would be a sufficient break to deal with [Plaintiff's] headache pain.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 23, 26.) Here, Plaintiff points to Dr. Collins' opinion about the need for unscheduled breaks and Dr. Scott's treatment records documenting the reported frequency of Plaintiff's headaches between 2016 and 2022 and the various attempted treatments with medication. (Id. at 24-26.) Plaintiff asserts the “ALJ's RFC explanation is void of a logical connection between the evidence, Dr. Collins' opinion, and Campbell's reports.” (Id. at 26.) Plaintiff further argues that “the extensive record documenting [Plaintiff's] ongoing attempts to deal with her migraines and the numerous different medications and treatments tried over the course of the relevant period should greatly buttress” Plaintiff's subjective statements about “the frequency and duration of her headaches.” (Id.)
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ's RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 12 at 12-20.) She asserts that “the ALJ's written decision addresses the salient evidence, weighs all of the medical opinions, and informs the reader why his RFC finding was appropriate.” (Id. at 15.) The Commissioner further maintains that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective statements in accordance with the applicable regulations. (Id. at 22.)
As demonstrated above, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed the record and discussed at length his reasons for affording only certain limitations in Plaintiff's RFC based on her migraines, including his finding that she “will miss two hours of work per week as needed to deal with migraines.” (R. at 1038-50.) In his RFC assessment, the ALJ expressly discussed many of Dr. Scott's treatment records and emphasized that he “laboriously scrutinized” these records “with particular attention to the claimant's reports with respect to the frequency, intensity symptomology regarding headaches and migraines.” (R. at 1043, 1045-47.) The ALJ explained that he scrutinized these records to determine, inter alia, “appropriate functional limitations supported by the evidence.” (R. at 1046.) As quoted supra section B.1, the ALJ proceeded from here to explain in detail how he assessed the time off task and absenteeism afforded to Plaintiff in the RFC. (R. at 1046-47.) Additionally, as quoted supra section B.1, the ALJ thoroughly discussed Dr. Collins' opinion about Plaintiff's need for unscheduled breaks and explained why he found this opinion only “partially persuasive.” (R. at 1043-44.) Further, given his discussion of the foregoing evidence, the ALJ sufficiently explained how he discounted Plaintiff's subjective statements about the frequency and severity of her migraines. (R. at 1038-50.) Plaintiff does not point to any subjective statements here that the ALJ failed to consider.
While Dr. Collins is a treating physician, Plaintiff does not argue the ALJ failed to properly assess Dr. Collins' opinion under the treating physician rule. Regardless, the undersigned finds the ALJ appropriately considered the factors under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) when declining to afford Dr. Collins' opinion controlling weight as a treating physician. More specifically, as discussed supra section B.1, the ALJ expressly found, inter alia, that: (1) Dr. Collins is a specialist in neurology and treated Plaintiff on only one occasion; (2) his opinion was not supported other evidence in the record; and (3) his assessment was internally inconsistent. (R. at 1043-44.)
Ultimately, Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ's evaluation of the record and his finding that Plaintiff's “absence from the workplace is adequately accounted for by limiting the claimant to missing two hours of work per week as needed to deal with migraines.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 26, R. at 1043.) However, the ALJ undeniably conducted a thorough review of the relevant evidence and justified his RFC finding here with substantial evidence. While Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence, including Plaintiff's subjective statements, it is not for the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a reviewing court should not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ); Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court”); Thomas v. Saul, No. 1:19-cv-290, 2020 WL 3318049, at *8 (M.D. N.C. June 18, 2020) (finding the “ALJ's decision as it relates to Plaintiff's migraine headaches is susceptible to judicial review and supported by substantial evidence”; noting, inter alia, ALJ found claimant “regularly revealed normal sensory and neurological functioning”), adopted by, 2020 WL 5705925 (M.D. N.C. July 9, 2020); Lisa N. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 4:18-CV-00034, 2019 WL 9055823, at *12 (W.D. Va. Sept. 5, 2019) (finding no error where the ALJ “reasonably found that [claimant's] ‘reported limitations' from headaches were out of proportion to providers' normal exam findings throughout the relevant period”); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (the standard of substantial evidence only requires that “a reasonable mind might accept [the evidence] as adequate to support a conclusion”) (citation omitted); Kellough v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1147, 1149 (4th Cir. 1986) (“If the Secretary's dispositive factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, they must be affirmed, even in cases where contrary findings of an ALJ might also be so supported.”) (citation omitted).
C. Evaluation of Musculoskeletal Problems
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the severity of her musculoskeletal problems when assessing her RFC. (Dkt. No. 11 at 27-30.) Relatedly, she argues that the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff's testimony about the severity and limiting effects of these impairments. (Id. at 30-32.)
1. The ALJ's Decision
As with his discussion of Plaintiff's migraines, the ALJ thoroughly considered the evidence pertaining to Plaintiff's musculoskeletal problems throughout his decision. In his RFC assessment, the ALJ first acknowledged Plaintiff's hearing testimony about the limiting effects caused by her neck, shoulder, and joint pain as follows:
The claimant previously testified to similar limitations. She reported severe neck and shoulder pain and frequent headaches.... At her most recent hearing, the claimant testified that her ability to work is primarily limited frequent migraines and neck, shoulder, and upper extremity issues. Her neck pain radiates down her left arm and is exacerbated by reaching. She can lift about 10 pounds. She also reports a recurrence of wrist pain related to her prior carpal tunnel syndrome
treatment.... Her impairments also affect her ability to complete activities of daily living like cooking.(R. at 1039.) The ALJ found that while Plaintiff's “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, . . . [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for reasons explained in this decision.” (R. at 1039.)
Relevant here, the ALJ explained that he found Plaintiff's “mild carpal tunnel syndrome to be a nonsevere impairment,” but that “[t]o the extent that [it], in combination with her other impairments, imposes work related limitations, I have accounted for these limitations by restricting her to light exertional work with additional manipulative restrictions.” (R. at 1040.) He continued,
In terms of the claimant's left shoulder and neck impairments, I have limited the claimant to light work with additional manipulative restrictions as noted above. In doing so, I note that the longitudinal medical record documents a history of adhesive capsulitis of the left shoulder and C5-6 radiculopathy.
The claimant has a medical history remarkable for complaints of left shoulder pain resulting in multiple surgeries and physical therapy with limited improvement. While the evidence clearly supports exertional and manipulative limitations, objective findings do not warrant additional functional restrictions to the claimant's RFC.(R. at 1040.)
The ALJ proceeded to discuss at length his reasons for affording only certain limitations based on Plaintiff's musculoskeletal problems, including the objective findings, Plaintiff's statements to providers, methods of treatments, and the opinion evidence. He first detailed Plaintiff's treatment history for pain in her neck and upper extremities from 2015 through 2022. (R. at 1040-42.) For example, the ALJ noted, inter alia,
Orthopedic records dated July 21, 2015, note findings of weakness with abduction, pain with impingement, tenderness around the acromion and pain with range of
motion. The claimant underwent debridement and subacromial decompression of the left shoulder. On September 29, 2015, two weeks after surgery, the claimant was noted to be doing well. However, treatment notes dated October 27, 2015, indicate the claimant is not getting better with physical therapy. She was assessed with adhesive capsulitis and cortisone injections were recommended. Treatment notes indicate no improvement from injections: however, she exhibited improved range of motion and her strength was “pretty good.”(R. at 1040.)
The ALJ continued to discuss Plaintiff's treatment records throughout 2016 documenting Plaintiff's frozen shoulder and her related symptoms, including:
Orthopedic records from December of 2016 note that motion is quite limited with abduction, forward flexion, and internal and external rotation. Strength remained 4+/S within the small range of motion. The claimant was assessed with adhesive capsulitis of the left shoulder not improving with conservative treatment (Exhibit 9F). Accordingly, the claimant underwent a lysis of adhesion with manipulation surgery (Exhibit 12F). The claimant was subsequently referred for physical therapy: however, records note no improvement in symptoms (Exhibit 12F).
However, on April 27, 2017, the claimant reported she has had a lot of improvement and feels a good bit better (Exhibit 13F). Orthopedic records dated July 27, 2017, note an evaluation for bilateral shoulder pain. The claimant reported that her left shoulder is doing better but she has some residual soreness and stiffness. She attempted to return to work but stopped secondary to her left shoulder symptoms. She recently developed some right shoulder pain, but this improved.
An examination revealed some limitation with abduction, flexion and rotation of both shoulders. However, rotator cuff strength was good. Some impingement and pain was noted in the shoulders. She was assessed with bilateral shoulder tendonitis, more prominent in the left shoulder (Exhibit 13F). Primary care records dated July 27, 2017, note no complaints and the claimant reports that she is doing well. She recently received an injection in the right shoulder, which helped control her pain. An examination revealed the claimant is able to do range of motion with reports of pain (Exhibit 14F).(R. at 1040-41.)
After addressing Plaintiff's neurology records indicating Plaintiff's pain “is likely related to her shoulder impairment rather than a cervical problem,” the ALJ considered records from August 29, 2017, where Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Karl Boellert for “radiating left arm pain but no associated numbness or tingling.” (R. at 1041.) Here, the ALJ noted,
An examination of the cervical spine was normal with full, pain free range of motion and no tenderness. Motor testing revealed normal strength in the upper extremities. Sensation and reflexes were normal in the upper extremities. Hoffmann's signs were negative bilaterally. Limited left shoulder range of motion was noted with positive Harkin's signs. An examination of the lumbar spine and lower extremities revealed full ranges of motion, full motor strength, and a normal, non-antalgic gait and upright posture. Dr. Boellert noted that the claimant has no upper extremity neurological changes, limitations with cervical range of motion or neck pain. She has no symptoms below the elbow. Overall, her symptoms are more consistent with left shoulder pathology as her recent MRI findings were fairly mild. Accordingly, a cervical epidural was not recommended (Exhibit 15F).
Despite these recommendations, the claimant received an injection from the pain management clinic secondary to a clinical history consistent with nerve root irritation. Findings from the pain management clinic were also inconsistent with those of the neurosurgical specialist. For instance, decreased motor function and sensation to light touch were noted. There is no indication that additional diagnostic tests were performed to support this course of action. Furthermore, motor function testing was normal in both upper and lower extremities and (Exhibit 18F).(R. at 1041.)
The ALJ continued to consider relevant treatment records from 2018 through 2019, and noted that
More recent objective exams from the claimant's primary care clinic note normal bilateral shoulder strength and range of motion. Motor strength and range of motion are noted to be normal throughout the extremities. Her reflexes, coordination, sensation, gait and station are also noted to be normal (Exhibit 28F). Similarly, records from Prisma Health Neuroscience notes good range of motion in all extremities, 5/5 motor strength, and intact sensation (Exhibit 29F).(R. at 1042.)
Relevant here, the ALJ discussed certain opinion evidence provided by Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Heidi Rodillo, who treated Plaintiff for diabetes, hypertension and obesity. (R. at 1044-45, 1048.) He first summarized Dr. Rodillo's opinion as follows:
In a medical source statement dated May 15, 2018, treating physician Dr. Rodillo noted that the claimant is being treated for diabetes, hypertension and obesity. Her pain and other symptoms are severe enough to occasionally interfere with attention and concentration needed to perform simple work tasks. The claimant could occasionally lift carry less than 10 pounds and rarely lift carry up to 10 pounds. She can occasionally look down and frequently look in other directions. She can frequently twist, stoop, crouch and climb stairs. The claimant can rarely climb ladders. However, Dr. Rodillo noted that the above functional restrictions were based on the claimant's subjective reports. Dr. Rodillo noted that the claimant has limitations reaching and can finger and handle 80 percent of the workday with the upper extremities. She can reach 80 percent of the day with her right arm and 50 percent of the day with her left arm (Exhibit 22F).(R. at 1044.) The ALJ gave an initial assessment of this opinion evidence as follows:
Dr. Rodillo's limitations are largely based on the claimant's subjective complaints, which are inconsistent with the limitations the claimant reported at the hearing. As these are not based on Dr. Rodillo's objective findings, I find them to be of little probative value. Dr. Rodillo also notes some manipulative limitations, while it is unclear as to whether these limitations are based on subjective complaints: the record clearly supports some degree of manipulative restriction. Accordingly, I note that these findings are consistent with the objective evidence. However, to the extent that his opinions support a more restrictive RFC, I find this part of the assessment to be generally inconsistent with the weight of the medical record....(R. at 1044-45.) Thereafter, the ALJ devoted an entire page of his decision to assessing “the supportability and consistency of [Dr. Rodillo's] opinions with other sources.” (R. at 1048.) Here, the ALJ detailed Dr. Rodillo's treatment records suggesting her “opinions are not supported by diagnostic tests and physical examinations.” (R. at 1048.) After noting that Dr. Rodillo “[s]pecializes in internal medicine and has treated the claimant conservatively throughout the course of treatment,” the ALJ stated
Limited weight is given to her opinion with respect to rarely lifting 10 pounds and occasionally lifting less than 10 pounds, occasionally looking down, frequently rotating and holding her head in a static position, frequently twisting stooping bending, crouching, squatting and climbing stairs. Similarly limited weight is given to the opinion with respect to climbing ladders and manipulative limitations as they are predicated on what the claimant reported to the doctor. More importantly the physical examinations and diagnostic tests performed by Dr. Rodillo fail to reveal any findings to support these limitations. Examinations by other sources do not support any of the opinions. For example the claimant has repeatedly been noted to
have no numbness, normal sensation and strength (Exhibits 28F, 29F, 27F, 26F, 25F, 23F, 21F,19F, 16F, 15F, 14F, 12F, 11F, 8F, 7F, 5F and 3F).(R. at 1048.)
The ALJ then considered the opinions from the state agency medical consultants, who both “found the claimant limited to light work with additional postural and manipulative restrictions.” (R. at 1049.) Relevant here, the ALJ stated, inter alia,
Despite these opinions being rendered in December 2016 and July 2016 subsequent treatment records reveal findings to impose greater limitations with respect to pushing and pulling with the left upper extremity .... (Exhibits 4A and 1A). With respect to the opinion limiting the claimant to1 occasional kneeling I give limited weight with respect to the degree of limitation (Exhibit 4A). Based on the repeated examinations of pain with range of motion of the left upper extremity I was persuaded pushing and pulling with the left upper extremity should be limited (Exhibits 19F and 14F)..... I have noted a less restrictive capacity for lifting, carrying, standing, sitting and walking in light of the claimant's testimony.(R. at 1049.)
Finally, the ALJ considered an opinion issued by Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Lee Patterson, on February 12, 2016. (R. at 1049-50.) Specifically, Dr. Patterson opined Plaintiff would qualify for short-term disability until her symptoms improved. Dr. Patterson indicated that due to symptoms from her frozen shoulder, Plaintiff “is going to be off [work] for several more months either with just physical therapy or with physical therapy and more surgery to get her shoulder functional again for doing the type of job she does.” (R. at 405.) In his decision, the ALJ summarized Dr. Patterson's opinion and his supporting treatment records, ultimately finding, “to the [extent] that Dr. Patterson is opining that the claimant is disabled from engaging in all work, I find his opinion to lack support from objective examination findings and it is generally inconsistent with the weight of the treatment record.” (R. at 1049.) The ALJ then discussed numerous portions of Plaintiff's medical record that contained findings “inconsistent with the limitations and ability to work [and] reflect[ed] improvement since the opinion was rendered.” (R. at 1049-50.)
b. Analysis
In her brief, Plaintiff argues that “it is unclear how the ALJ reached the conclusion that [Plaintiff] could frequently push and pull or reach forward or laterally with her left upper extremity” given the evidence in the record. (Dkt. No. 11 at 27-29.) Relatedly, Plaintiff argues that her hearing testimony “is in accord with the history established by her treatment records,” and the ALJ “does not specify which of [Plaintiff's] allegations he finds uncredible.” (Id. at 30.) Here, Plaintiff cites the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Rodillo's opinion, stating there is some confusion because the ALJ dismissed portions of her opinion as based “largely on [Plaintiff's] subjective reports.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, because the ALJ “does accept Dr. Rodillo's finding that [Plaintiff] is subject to some manipulative restrictions, . . . it is unclear why the ALJ accepts part of Dr. Rodillo's findings while rejecting other aspects of those same findings.” (Id. at 30-31.)
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ's RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 12 at 12-20.) She asserts that the “ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff's musculoskeletal impairments limited her functionality, and explained that he accounted for them with exertional, postural, and manipulative limitations.” (Id. at 18.) The Commissioner further maintains that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective statements in accordance with the applicable regulations. (Id. at 22.)
Contrary to Plaintiff's allegations, the ALJ's decision sufficiently explains how he assessed the record, including Plaintiff's subjective statements, to form Plaintiff's RFC specific to her musculoskeletal problems. At the ALJ hearing on October 26, 2022, Plaintiff testified, inter alia, that she is able to lift and carry “about 10 pounds” and that if she “do[es] a lot of reaching . . . it can get worse in the shoulder . . . and neck area.” (R.at 1079-1080.) Plaintiff further testified that she had not received any treatment from her orthopedic doctor in the last “two to three years.” (R. at 1081.) Plaintiff testified that her left wrist started hurting “about four months ago.” (R. at 1085.)
Throughout his decision, the ALJ identified medical evidence that was not entirely consistent with Plaintiff's subjective statements about the severity of her limitations. (R. at 10391050.) As discussed above, the ALJ referenced, inter alia: (1) the numerous objective exams noting Plaintiff's normal strength in the upper extremities and a limited range of motion in Plaintiff's left shoulder that improved over time (R. at 1040-48 (citing, inter alia, R. at 450, 481, 486, 489, 495, 539, 765, 809-11, 883, 994, 1015, 1344, 1404); and (2) Plaintiff's statements to providers, including her statement on April 27, 2017 that “[s]he has had a lot of improvement and . . . feels good bit better . . . but she has not tried to work yet,” and on July 27, 2017 that she “has been doing well” after receiving an injection in the right shoulder (R. at 752, 763, 1040-41).
With respect to the opinion evidence highlighted by Plaintiff, Dr. Rodillo opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff can occasionally lift and carry less than 10 pounds and rarely lift and carry 10 pounds; can finger and handle 80 percent of the workday with her upper extremities; can reach 80 percent of the workday with her right arm; and can reach 50 percent of the workday with her left arm. (R. at 928, 1044.) When assessing this opinion evidence, the ALJ noted that while “the record clearly supports some degree of manipulative restriction,” to the extent Dr. Rodillo's opinions supported a more restrictive RFC, the ALJ found “this part of the assessment to be generally inconsistent with the weight of the medical record.” (R. at 1045.) Here, he recounted “more recent objective exams” noting Plaintiff's normal bilateral shoulder strength and range of motion as well as other exams where Plaintiff was noted to have no numbness, normal sensation, and strength. (R. at 1045, 1048.) He also noted, inter alia, that Dr. Rodillo “[s]pecializes in internal medicine and has treated the claimant conservatively throughout the course of treatment.” (R. at 1048.)
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions here, the ALJ's analysis of Dr. Rodillo's opinions did not create confusion as to why he found Plaintiff's subjective statements less credible. Rather, the ALJ's assessment of this opinion evidence supported his finding that the record was “not entirely consistent” with Plaintiff's subjective statements about the severity of her limitations.(R. at 1039.) Indeed, based on the evidence before the ALJ, the ALJ conducted a proper evaluation of subjective symptoms and cited substantial evidence to support the finding that Plaintiff's allegations of disabling symptoms were not entirely consistent with the record. See, e.g., Christopher G. v. Kijakazi, No. 7:22-cv-00392, 2023 WL 5103151, at *7 (W.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2023) (finding the ALJ “supported his analysis of [claimant's] subjective complaints with substantial evidence”; “It is for the ALJ to determine the facts of a particular case and to resolve inconsistencies between a claimant's alleged impairments and his ability to work.”); Hightower v. Kijakazi, No. 4:21-cv-04192-TER, 2023 WL 1990371, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2023) (“The ALJ properly discounted allegations because they were inconsistent with the record and this is contemplated by the regulations which state that, in evaluating a claimant's symptoms, an ALJ should examine the entire case record, which includes the objective medical evidence, along with other relevant evidence.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c)); Ross v. Kijakazi, No. 4:22-cv-00145-TER, 2022 WL 17248966, at *8 (D.S.C. Nov. 28, 2022) (“Even where there is conflicting evidence that might have resulted in a contrary decision, our review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Based on the evidence before the ALJ, the ALJ conducted a proper evaluation of subjective symptoms and cited substantial evidence to support the finding that Plaintiff's allegations of disabling symptoms were not consistent with the record.”).
While Dr. Rodillo is a treating physician, Plaintiff does not argue the ALJ failed to properly assess Dr. Rodillo's opinion under the treating physician rule. Regardless, the undersigned finds the ALJ appropriately considered the factors under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) when declining to afford Dr. Rodillo's opinion controlling weight as a treating physician. More specifically, as discussed supra section C.1, the ALJ expressly found, inter alia, that: (1) Dr. Rodillo specializes in internal medicine and treated Plaintiff every three months for diabetes, hypertension, and obesity prior to the onset date through 2021; (2) Dr. Rodillo's opinions were not supported by her own physical examinations and diagnostic tests; and (3) Dr. Rodillo's opinions were not supported by examinations from other sources. (R. at 104445, 1048.)
In short, the ALJ conducted a thorough review of the evidence relevant to Plaintiff's musculoskeletal problems, including Plaintiff's subjective statements, and he justified his RFC findings based on these impairments with substantial evidence. Plaintiff is essentially asking the Court to reweigh the evidence and come to different a different conclusion about her functional limitations. However, it is not for the Court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (holding that a reviewing court should not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ); Smith, 99 F.3d at 638 (“The duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court”); Jordan v. Berryhill, No. 0:17-cv-2354-BHH, 2019 WL 1074819, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2019) (finding that ALJ properly considered claimant's limitations in determining RFC where the “decision as a whole reflect[ed] how she considered and weighed the evidence of record in determining Plaintiff's RFC”).
In sum, the undersigned finds no error in the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's RFC and her subjective statements and recommends that remand is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED, for the foregoing reasons, that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).