Opinion
Civil No. 2015-5
09-30-2016
VANESSA JOSEPH, Plaintiff, v. VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DUANE HOWELL Defendants.
APPEARANCES: Karin A. Bentz Law Office of Karin Bentz, P.C. St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. For plaintiff, Ariel Marie Smith-Francois Office of the Attorney General St. Thomas, U.S.V.I. For Virgin Islands Department of Health and Duane Howell
APPEARANCES: Karin A. Bentz
Law Office of Karin Bentz, P.C.
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
For plaintiff, Ariel Marie Smith-Francois
Office of the Attorney General
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
For Virgin Islands Department of Health and Duane Howell ORDER GÓMEZ, J.
The Court will issue a memorandum opinion outlining its reasons at a later date.
Before the Court is the motion of the Virgin Islands Department of Health and Duane Howell to dismiss each count of Vanessa Joseph's Complaint for failure to state a claim.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004).
A complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability . . . 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement of relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, the Court must take the following three steps:
Iqbal describes the process as a "two-pronged approach" but the Supreme Court took note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim before proceeding to its two-step approach. Accordingly, the Third Circuit has deemed the process a three step approach. See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130. --------
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F. 3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674, 679).
The premises considered it is hereby
ORDERED that, as to Counts One, Two, Three, Five, and Eight, the motion to dismiss is DENIED; it is further
ORDERED that, as to Count Four, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Count Four is DISMISSED; it is further
ORDERED that, as to Count Six, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Count Six is DISMISSED; it is further
ORDERED that, as to Count Seven, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED insofar as it asserts a claim for wrongful discharge under 24 V.I.C. § 76; it is further
ORDERED that Count Seven, insofar as it asserts a claim for wrongful discharge under 24 V.I.C. § 76, is DISMISSED; it is further
ORDERED that, as to Count Seven, the motion to dismiss is DENIED insofar as it asserts a claim under 10 V.I.C. § 64(14); it is further
ORDERED that, as to Count Nine, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Count Nine is DISMISSED; it is further
ORDERED that, as to Count Ten, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Count Ten is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that, to the extent Vanessa Joseph wishes to do so, she may amend Counts Four, Six, Seven, Nine, and Ten of the Complaint by no later than 3:00 P.M. on Wednesday, October 21, 2016.
S\_________
Curtis V. Gómez
District Judge