Opinion
Case No. 03-CV-1612 (FB)
November 24, 2003
JEREMIAH JOSEPH, Greenhaven Correctional Facility, Stormville, New York, for the Plaintiff
CHARLES J. HYNES, ESQ., CYNTHIA KEAN, ESQ., Renaissance Plaza, Brooklyn, NY, for the Defendant
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se petitioner Jeremiah Joseph ("Joseph") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 following his March 23, 2000 conviction in New York Supreme Court, Kings County, on two counts of conspiracy to commit murder in the second degree, four counts of criminal contempt in the first degree, and four counts of criminal contempt in the second degree. Joseph alleges three errors at trial: 1) in sentencing Joseph to a term of twenty to forty years after previously offering him a plea of one-and-a-half to three years, the judge was improperly punishing Joseph for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; 2) the judge violated Joseph's due process rights by admitting testimony about a statement Joseph had made regarding his role in a previous murder; and 3) the People failed to prove conspiracy in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. The petition is denied.
Only federal issues can be raised on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (" AEDPA"), habeas relief may not be granted for claims that were adjudicated on their merits by the state court unless the state court decision (1) was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "A state-court decision is `contrary to' [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedents if it `applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases' or if it `confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.'" Early v. Packer, 123 U.S. 362, 365 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)). Factual determinations made by the state court "shall be presumed to be correct" and the presumption can be overcome only by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Whitaker v. Meachum, 123 F.3d 714, 715 (2d Cir. 1997).
Joseph's first claim relies on a mischaracterization of the record. The plea offer of one-and-a-half to three years related solely to Joseph's violations of an order of protection the victim, Maxine Goring ("Goring"), had obtained against him; whereas his sentence of twenty to forty years was based on his conspiracy convictions. See Sentencing Transcript, at 13. Moreover, "no federal constitutional issue is presented where, as here, the sentence is within the range prescribed by state law." White v, Keane, 969 F.2d 1381, 1383 (2d Cir. 1992).
Joseph's second argument is that the trial judge violated his due process rights by admitting testimony from Devon Gooden ("Gooden"), the individual whom Joseph attempted to recruit to murder Goring, regarding a statement made by Joseph about his role in a previous attempt on Goring's life that resulted in someone else getting killed. Over defense counsel's objection that no conspiracy was in existence at the time of Joseph's statement, the trial judge ruled this admissible as a statement made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Trial Transcript, at 118.
The state trial court's determinations that 1) the conspiracy was under way at the time Joseph made the statement at issue, and 2) that the challenged comment was made in furtherance of the conspiracy, were not objectively unreasonable. Gooden testified that Joseph's statement about a prior related murder persuaded him that Joseph "was really, really serious" about arranging Goring's murder. See Trial Transcript, at 228. Statements that provide information or reassurance to a coconspirator or seek assistance from a coconspirator are in furtherance of a conspiracy. See United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 436 (2d Cir. 1994).
Moreover, even if an evidentiary ruling is erroneous, the error is not necessarily one of constitutional dimension cognizable in a habeas proceeding. See Rosario v. Kuhlman, 839 F.2d 918, 924 (2d Cir. 1988). Rather, federal courts are traditionally reluctant to impose constitutional constraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial courts. See Wade v. Mantello, 333 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2003). In order for an erroneous evidentiary ruling to rise to the level of a due process violation, its effect must have been so pervasive as to have denied the petitioner a fundamentally fair trial. See Collins v. Scully, 755 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1985). This occurs "only if the evidence in question was sufficiently material to provide the basis for conviction or to remove a reasonable doubt that would have existed on the record without it." Johnson v. Ross, 955 F.2d 178, 181(2d Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). Joseph can make no such showing.
In reviewing Joseph's final claim, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence on the conspiracy counts, the Appellate Division found the issue unpreserved, but nevertheless concluded that the evidence at trial was "legally sufficient" to establish Joseph's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Joseph, 295 A.D.2d 536, 536 (2d Dept. 2002).
A habeas petitioner challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction "bears a very heavy burden." Ponnapula v. Spitzer, 297 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2002). He must show that the verdict was so clearly against the weight of the evidence that "`no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Einaugler v. Supreme Court of the State of New York, 109 F.3d 836, 839 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)). When considering the petitioner's claim, the Court must "`viewthe evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.'" Id, at 839-40 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
Joseph's cursory argument that his intent to engage in the conspiracies was not established beyond a reasonable doubt fails to meet this heavy burden. As the Appellate Division correctly noted, there was evidence and testimony at trial showing that Joseph attempted to recruit Gooden to kill Goring, that Joseph provided Gooden with Goring's address and phone number, and that Joseph told Gooden where he could locate the gun he was to use to kill Goring. See Joseph, 296 A.D.2d at 536. There is thus ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Joseph's intent to engage in the conspiracy.
CONCLUSION
The petition is denied. A certificate of appealability will not issue because Joseph has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.