Opinion
February 21, 1950. Rehearing Denied March 16, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Charles A. Carroll, J.
Robineau, Budd, Levenson Van Devere, Miami, for appellant.
Patton Kanner, Miami, for appellees
The appellant-lessee contends on this appeal that the bill of complaint was prematurely filed in the lower court. It is the writer's view, after a careful consideration of all the evidence, that the appellant-lessee acted in good faith and exercised reasonable diligence about commencing the construction referred to in the lease. It is true that the Chancellor from the disputes and conflicts in the evidence reached the conclusion that the appellant-lessee breached the lease by not commencing the construction on or before July 31, 1948. We find in the record sufficient testimony to sustain the conclusion reached. Reversible error has not clearly been made to appear. Kent v. Knowles, 101 Fla. 1375, 133 So. 315, and similar cases.
The terms of the lease provided that the construction of the buildings should commence not later than July 31, 1948, and the Chancellor construed the lease to mean that the construction of the buildings should be completed within a reasonable time thereafter. Pursuant to notice of cancellation of the lease a bill of complaint was filed in the court below on the 6th day of August, 1948, praying for a judicial construction or interpretation thereof. The decree entered below made it the continuing duty under the terms of the lease for the lessee to construct the buildings.
The Chancellor ruled that the filing of the suit for a declaratory decree and other relief on August 6, 1948, had the effect of delaying the construction, as required by the lease, on the part of appellant-lessee and additional time was allowed by the Chancellor in which to commence the construction. Likewise, the appeal here again has delayed the time of commencing the construction as provided for in the lease. It is equitable and just that the period of commencing the construction should again be extended for a period of ninety days after the going down of our mandate in this cause as the appellant had a right to review here the order or decree entered below.
The contentions of the respective parties have been carefully considered, and we fail to find reversible error in the record.
Affirmed.
ADAMS, C.J., and SEBRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.