Joseph D. Foreman & Co. v. Neri

7 Citing cases

  1. McIntyre v. Balagani

    2019 Ill. App. 3d 140543 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    We review the trial court's decision on this issue for abuse of discretion. See Joseph D. Foreman & Co. v. Neri, 6 Ill. App. 3d 313 (1972). As noted, an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would adopt its view.

  2. McIntyre v. Balagani

    2019 Ill. App. 3d 140543 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    We review the trial court's decision on this issue for abuse of discretion. See Joseph D. Foreman & Co. v. Neri, 6 Ill. App. 3d 313 (1972). As noted, an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would adopt its view.

  3. Kohler v. Central Southern Truck Lines

    360 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 5 times

    The court was justified in granting defendants' motion to strike because it is improper to allow plaintiff to supplement the record with new evidence never considered by the trial court. Joseph D. Foreman Co. v. Neri, 6 Ill. App.3d 313, 285 N.E.2d 528 (1st Dist. 1972). • 4 Our resolution of the foregoing issues requires a reversal of the circuit court's decision to grant a new trial.

  4. People v. Chitwood

    42 Ill. App. 3d 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 8 times
    In Chitwood, the court determined that the uniform traffic ticket was sufficient, but reversed the conviction on other grounds.

    [Citations.]" 63 Ill.2d at 425, 428, 348 N.E.2d 457, 458-59. Many of the cases applying this rule involved attempts by one of the parties to supplement the record with evidence never presented to the trial court ( e.g., Joseph D. Foreman Co. v. Neri, 6 Ill. App.3d 313, 285 N.E.2d 528 (1st Dist. 1972)). The rule, however, is also applied when evidence is introduced in an attempt to supply something which, through mere oversight, was omitted from the original record.

  5. Southgate Bank v. Wooden

    309 N.E.2d 609 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)

    In support of their argument, defendants infer that the trial court took judicial notice of the entire record in the former case and reason that this entitled them to include that record in the instant appeal. The inference is unfounded. All that the trial court noted from case No. 72-3758 was that both counsel appeared before another judge and the original restraining order did not include the vehicles and equipment pledged as securities. These facts do not create a material omission of introduced evidence in the case at bar nor are they material to the issues raised here. (Supreme Court Rule 329 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, § 329); Joseph D. Foreman Co. v. Neri, 6 Ill. App.3d 313, 316 (1972).) We find no error on this issue.

  6. In re Application of County Collector

    309 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 9 times

    Hence, it has been held that a purely collateral or supplemental matter will not deprive the trial court of authority to handle it, but when the proposed correction or amendment would remedy a defect of substance so as to create a new case, the line has been crossed, and the trial court is denied the power to grant the requested relief. ( Southland Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates (1970), 130 Ill. App.2d 311, 264 N.E.2d 451.) Both before and after the adoption of Rule 329, courts have required that the record disclose the basis upon which the amendment or correction is made. ( People v. Miller (1936), 365 Ill. 56, 5 N.E.2d 458; Joseph D. Foreman Co. v. Neri (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 313, 285 N.E.2d 528.) Yet in the instant case the record does not afford any basis whatsoever for the trial court's action. (Compare Southland Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, supra.)

  7. Equilease Corp. v. Cattlemen's Freezer Meats, Inc.

    299 N.E.2d 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)   Cited 7 times

    • 6 The plaintiff argues that the defendant is estopped to assert the defense that it did not execute the lease agreement because the defendant was the real party in interest. Whether the defendant was the real party behind the transaction is a question of fact. ( Joseph D. Foreman Co. v. Neri (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 313, 315, 285 N.E.2d 528.) The plaintiff also argues that it is entitled to additional attorney's fees and costs in accordance with the provisions of the lease agreement.