Consistent with this precedent, the Court of Appeals has correctly held that, because both the liability for and amount of attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 are solely for the jury's determination, a trial court is not authorized to grant summary judgment in favor of a claimant therefor. Hyde v. Gill, supra; American Medical Transport Group v. Glo-An, supra; Page v. HSI Financial Svcs., 218 Ga. App. 283, 286 (5) ( 461 SE2d 239) (1995), rev'd on other grounds, Henderson v. HSI Financial Svcs., 266 Ga. 844 ( 471 SE2d 885) (1996); Joseph Camacho Assoc. v. Millard, 169 Ga. App. 937, 939 (2) ( 315 SE2d 478) (1984); Fountain v. Burke, 160 Ga. App. 262, 264 (3) ( 287 SE2d 39) (1981); Pritchett v. Rainey, 131 Ga. App. 521, 522 ( 206 SE2d 726) (1974). Ingles argues that the Court of Appeals, citing City of Marietta v. Holland, 252 Ga. 299, 304 (3) ( 314 SE2d 97) (1984), has stated that "[e]xpenses of litigation under OCGA § 13-6-11 can be awarded on summary judgment, but the movant must be entitled to them as a matter of law. [Cit.

" [Cit.]Joseph Camacho Assoc. v. Millard, 169 Ga. App. 937, 938(1)(a) ( 315 S.E.2d 478) (1984). The parties' expressed intent to contract for the sale of peanuts at a final price to be determined later according to an easily applied formula necessarily contemplates an additional understanding as to the establishment of that missing term, and that contractual intent will control over any inconsistent pre-printed merger clause.

Id.; OCGA § 13-2-2(5).Joseph Camacho Assoc. v. Millard, 169 Ga. App. 937, 938 (1)(a) ( 315 S.E.2d 478) (1984). See 3 Corbin on Contracts 173-176, § 547.

Generally speaking, "the law in Georgia [is] that the first of two contradictory contract clauses will prevail." Joseph Camacho Assoc. v. Millard, 169 Ga. App. 937, 938 ( 315 S.E.2d 478) (1984). Furthermore, the contract was prepared by appellant Crook, who testified that he had a law degree; and "[i]t is well established that any ambiguity in a contract is to be construed against the party who drafted it."

Hearn v. Old Dominion Freight Lines, 172 Ga. App. 658 (1), 659 ( 324 S.E.2d 517). "Further, we note that the law in Georgia remains that the first of two contradictory contract clauses will prevail." Joseph Camacho Assoc. v. Millard, 169 Ga. App. 937, 938 (1a) ( 315 S.E.2d 478). Thus, the contract language making plaintiff liable for the utilities at the listed premises prevails over language providing that plaintiff must pay any and all obligations of Value Finishing, Inc., to defendant for utility services.

]" Horne v. Drachman, 247 Ga. 802 (2) ( 280 S.E.2d 338) (1981). 4. While it appears that the Supreme Court has condoned the ability of the trial court to award attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 on summary judgment (see City of Marietta v. Holland, 252 Ga. 299 (3) ( 314 S.E.2d 97) (1984); compare Joseph Camacho Assoc. v. Millard, 169 Ga. App. 937 (2) ( 315 S.E.2d 478) (1984)), the trial court in the case at bar, "sitting as the trier of fact," awarded attorney fees to appellee after finding appellant to have acted in bad faith and to have been stubbornly litigious. "The cardinal rule in the summary judgment procedure is that the court can neither resolve the facts nor reconcile the issues, but only look to ascertain if there is an issue of fact. [Cit.

A subsidiary provision should be so interpreted as not to be in conflict with what clearly appears to be the ‘dominant purpose’ of the contract. Id. at 120 (quoting Joseph Camacho Assoc. v. Millard , 169 Ga.App. 937, 315 S.E.2d 478 (1984) (internal quotations and alterations omitted) ). In this case, the provision limiting the warranty appears earlier in the warranty than the latter, broader provisions.