Opinion
10-25-1825
Jordan's Administratrix v. Williams
Spooner, for the appellant. Daniel, for the appellee.
This was an appeal from the Richmond Chancery Court. The case, so far as it is necessary to be stated, was this:
In the year 1783, Charles Cross, conveyed ten slaves in trust, for the benefit of his wife, Phabe Cross, for life, and after her death, to his daughter, Elizabeth Cross. The consideration expressed is " love and good will," and the sum of five shillings. This deed was recorded in proper time.
In 1814, the same C. Cross, conveyed to Thomas Jordan, two slaves, named Burwell and Young Jenny, who are alledged to be descendants of the slaves mentioned in the first deed, for 1601. paid by Jordan.
Elizabeth Cross, afterwards intermarried with the appellee Williams; and Thomas Jordan having died, Elizabeth Jordan, became his administratrix, with the will annexed.
Elizabeth Jordan, as administratrix, brought an action of detinue against Charles Cross, in the County Court of Nottoway, for the two slaves, Burwell and Young Jenny, who had been conveyed by the deed of 1814, to Thomas Jordan; and obtained a judgment for the slaves, and 1001. damages and costs. A distringas fi. fa. issued on the said judgment, and the sheriff returned, " Executed on one negro man, named Phill, one negro boy, named George, and one negro girl, named Milley. Satisfied by the sale of Phill and Milley."
Thomas Williams filed his bill, setting forth the foregoing facts; asserting the right of his wife, formerly Elizabeth Cross, to the slaves Burwell and Young Jenny, under the deed of 1783; charging that the deed to Jordan was fraudulently obtained from C. Cross, while in a state of intoxication; alledging that the execution on the judgment in Nottoway, is in the hands of the sheriff, who is daily harrassing him; and praying that Elizabeth Jordan may be made a defendant: that she may be injoined from all further proceedings on the judgment aforesaid; and that the effect of the execution may be suspended, until the right of property can be fairly investigated and decided, & c.
An injunction was awarded.
Elizabeth Jordan answered, that the deed to Phabe Cross, was made without the intervention of a trustee, and therefore that C. Cross had a right to dispose of the said slaves, during the life of his wife, who is still living: that the plaintiff had no right, during the life of Phabe Cross, to interfere with the slaves: that Burwell, one of the slaves sold to Thomas Jordan, is not mentioned in the deed of 1783, and that Young Jenny is too young to have been included in that deed: that if Jenny is descended from any of the slaves mentioned in the deed, yet the increase of those slaves are not given to Elizabeth Cross. She denied that any improper means were used by her testator to obtain the bill of sale to him; but that it was made for a valuable consideration, & c.
The Court, on a hearing, decreed that the injunction should be made perpetual; and the defendant appealed.
The order of the Chancellor is reversed, the injunction dissolved, and the bill dismissed.
Spooner, for the appellant.
Daniel, for the appellee.
OPINION
Cabell, Judge. [*]
As Mrs. Cross is no party to this suit, it is not important to ascertain what title or rights she acquired, at law or in equity, by virtue of the deed of 1783. Nor will we say any thing as to the deeds found in the record, subsequent to Cross's deed to Jordan. They were not stated in the bill, nor relied on by Williams, as forming any part of his title.
Whatever may be Williams's rights as to the property in controversy, the judgment of Nottoway Court was correct, as to the parties to that judgment; and even if it were otherwise, Williams had no right to complain of it, he being no party. It was therefore manifestly wrong to award, at his instance, an injunction to the judgment. And even admitting that he had a present right to the two negroes recovered by the judgment of Nottoway Court, he had no right to injoin this particular execution, which was a distringas fi. fa.; for, on such an execution, the sheriff cannot distrain the very property for which the distringas issued; nor can he seize and sell it to pay the damages mentioned in the execution; for that would be to sell the plaintiff's own property to pay a debt due to himself.
The order of the Chancellor is reversed, the injunction dissolved, and the bill dismissed.
[*]The President, absent.