Jordan v. State Highway Dept

6 Citing cases

  1. Hedgepath v. S.C. State Highway Dept

    207 S.E.2d 820 (S.C. 1974)   Cited 9 times

    August 14, 1974.Furman R. Gressette, Esq., of St. Matthews, for Appellant, cites: As to the Circuit Court's erring and abusing itsdiscretion in permitting the respondent to answer appellant'scomplaint after expiration of time for answering: 243 S.C. 565, 135 S.E.2d 94; 254 S.C. 161, 174 S.E.2d 163; 190 S.C. 397; 3 S.E.2d 201; 192 S.C. 137, 5 S.E.2d 729; 231 S.C. 545, 99 S.E.2d 391. As to theCircuit Court's committing an error of law in permittingthe respondent to answer appellant's complaint after expirationof time for answering: 229 S.C. 44, 91 S.E.2d 723. Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen. and Donald V.Myers, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to the Lower Court's not having abused its discretion inallowing the Respondent, after Respondent was in default,to file an answer to the Complaint pursuant to Section10-609 and based upon the evidence presented to the LowerCourt by Respondent: 108 S.C. 49, 93 S.E. 243; 258 S.C. 500, 189 S.E.2d 291; 170 S.C. 121, 169 S.E. 871; 93 S.C. 487, 76 S.E. 1099; 81 S.C. 265, 62 S.E. 259; 72 S.C. 567, 52 S.E. 648; 242 S.C. 451, 131 S.E.2d 508; 195 S.C. 376, 11 S.E.2d 436; 243 S.C. 421, 38 S.E.2d 255; 155 S.C. 179, 152 S.E. 176; 240 S.C. 203, 125 S.E.2d 353; 254 S.C. 161, 174 S.E.2d 163; 92 S.C. 33, 75 S.E. 278; 53 S.C. 222, 31 S.E. 226;

  2. Rhodes v. Spartanburg County

    262 S.C. 644 (S.C. 1974)   Cited 4 times
    Discussing whether an error had operated to the plaintiff's prejudice in the assessment of the amount awarded for "loss of time from her employment."

    2 S.C. 179, 165 S.E.2d 797; 250 S.C. 17, 156 S.E.2d 759; 216 F.2d 245; 216 F.2d 245; 257 S.C. 443, 186 S.E.2d 247; 332 F. Supp. 1127; 102 S.C. 348, 86 S.E. 678; 226 S.C. 249, 84 S.E.2d 719. As to the Court's erring inrefusing to charge the Collateral Source Rule which statesthat total or partial compensation for an injury which theinjured party receives from a collateral source wholly independentof the wrongdoer does not operate to lessen thedamages recoverable from the wrongdoer: 18 S.C. 543; 156 S.E.2d 750; 165 S.E.2d 797; 19 S.C. 20, 45 Am. Rep. 754; 70 S.C. 8, 48 S.E. 616. As to the Court'serring and abusing its discretion in failing to find that photographsshowing damage to Plaintiff's automobile were admissiblefor purposes other than to establish damage toPlaintiff's automobile: 22 Am. Jur.2d Damages, Section 307; 80 A.L.R.2d 1228; 253 S.C. 103, 169 S.E.2d 278; 221 S.C. 433, 70 S.E.2d 911; 37 Cal.App.2d 133, 98 P.2d 816; 66 Cal.App.2d 524, 152 P.2d 526; 52 Wn.2d 885, P.2d 1089; 190 S.C. 397, 3 S.E.2d 201; 15 S.C. 322. As to the Court'serring and abusing its discretion in holding as a matter oflaw that testimony concerning a complaint involving anotheraccident in which the Plaintiff was involved is inadmissible: McCormick, "Evidence", Handbook Series, West Publishing Company, 1959, Page 344; 229 S.C. 461, 93 S.E.2d 604; 61 S.C. 292, 39 S.E. 515; 29 Am. Jur.2d, Evidence, Section 298, Page 343; 190 S.C. 397, 3 S.E.2d 201; 15 S.C. 322; 185 S.C. 78, 193 S.E. 199; 185 S.C. 78, 193 S.E. 199. Rembert D. Parler, Esq., of Spartanburg, for Respondent, cites: As to the Court's not having erred in finding thattestimony as to lost wages by the Plaintiff may be impeachedby testimony brought out or elicited on cross-examinationthat the Plaintiff did in fact receive sums of money fromher father, who was also President of the Corporation bywhich she had been employed during the time of her recovery,such being a violation of the Collateral Source Rule: 223 S.C. 204, 74 S.E.2d 914, 916; 27 C.J.S., Discov

  3. Dahlberg v. Brown

    198 S.C. 1 (S.C. 1941)   Cited 10 times

    As to claimfor continuous services, under contract, embracing severalitems in one cause of action: 1 C.J., Sec. 293, p. 114, setting out cases in Note 49; 187 S.C. 344; 197 S.E. 385; 107 F. 58; 295 F. 1; 2 F.2d 1. As to "practice of law"by certified public accountant: U.S. Code, Title 5, Sec. 261; U.S.C.A., Title 26, p. 604 et seq.; Rule 2, Subs. (b). Asto questions raised by exceptions being in discretion of CircuitJudge, and not appealable: 8 S.C. 112; 168 S.C. 63; 166 S.E. 886; 194 S.C. 60; 9 S.E.2d 38; 105 S.C. 25; 89 S.E. 467; 170 S.C. 395; 170 S.E. 666; 87 S.C. 254; 91 S.C. 417; 74 S.E. 1067; 107 S.C. 81; 91 S.E. 987; 162 S.C. 87; 160 S.E. 149; 164 S.C. 94; 161 S.E. 873; 185 S.C. 189; 194 S.E. 332; 11 S.C. 122; 60 S.C. 521; 39 S.E. 9; 143 S.C. 264; 141 S.E. 450; 90 S.C. 196, 229; 71 S.E. 371; 109 S.C. 285; 96 S.E. 118; 179 S.E. 457 (N.C.); 190 S.C. 397; 3 S.E.2d 201. Counsel for appellant, in reply, cite: As to payment oftaxes under protest: U.S.C.A., Title 26, Sec. 3772; S.C. Code, 1932, Sec. 2846.

  4. Bruce v. S.C. High School League

    258 S.C. 546 (S.C. 1972)   Cited 18 times
    Finding that individual determinations would not be possible and that the objective transfer rule is reasonably related to the legitimate goal of eliminating recruiting of students

    ied 379 U.S. 960, 13 L.Ed.2d 555; 221 Tenn. 164, 425 S.W.2d 597. As to Courts' not interveningin the actions of voluntary associations in the absenceof some showing of fraud, collusion, arbitrariness or otherillegality: 6 Am. Jur.2d 2, Associations and Clubs, Sec. 27; 381 P.2d 718; 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854. As to participation in high school interscholastic athleticsbeing a mere privilege, not a legally protected constitutionalright: 240 Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250; 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718; 183 Okla. 359, 82 P.2d 1023; 220 So.2d 802. Leo H. Hill, Esq., of Hill, James, Long, Fore Wyatt, and Rhoten Shetley, of Greenville, for Respondents, cite: Asto the decree of the Circuit Court's being a proper exerciseof its jurisdiction under the facts herein: 31 Arizona 503, 254 Pacific 1056, 52 A.L.R. 244, 2 Am. Jur., 2d Administrative Law, Sec. 399 at pp. 204-207; 247 S.C. 104, 146 S.E.2d 93; 246 S.C. 113, 142 S.E.2d 737; 6 Am. Jur.2d Associations and Clubs, Secs. 27 and 28, pp. 453-454; 190 S.C. 397, 3 S.E.2d 201; 194 S.C. 490, 10 S.E.2d 1. Messrs. Lehman A. Moseley, Jr., and C. Kennon Robertson, of Greenville, Amicus Curiae, cite: As to Article Eight,Section Eight of the South Carolina High School LeagueRules being void as contrary to public policy: 33 Supreme Court, 312, 227 U.S. 278, 57 Law Edition 510; 212 Fed. 76, 128 C.C.A. 532. Affirming, 199 Fed. 237; 55 Supreme Court 340, 349 U.S. 103, 179 Law Edition 271, 98 A.L.R. 406; 101 U.S. 22-25; 312 Federal Supplement, 411 (1970) Constitutional Law Key 9, 208(1); 56 Iowa, 476, 9 N.W. 356; 14th Amendment, Constitutional Law Key, Secs. 213, 254; 293 F. Supp. 485. As to a student's transferringfrom a private school to a public school and if otherwisequalified in all particulars being allowed to participate in thesports program regardless of any prohibition in High SchoolLeague Rules of eligibility governing transfer of studentswho may have been proselyted or persuaded to change inorder to play for a particular school: Constitutional Law Key 9; 3

  5. Gregory v. Powell

    206 S.C. 261 (S.C. 1945)   Cited 42 times

    unty, Defendants appeal. Mr. John D. Nock, of Cheraw, S.C. and Mr. H.L.Smith, of Georgetown, S.C. Counsel for Appellants, cite: As to Change of Venue: 190 S.C. 66, at p. 72, 1 S.E.2d 920; 38 S.C. 399, 17 S.E., 141; 195 S.C. 132, 10 S.E.2d 333; 199 S.C. 349, 19 S.E.2d 471; 185 S.C. 437, 194 S.E., 336. As to Sufficiency of Showingfor Change of Venue: 158 S.C. 496, 155 S.E., 828; 190 S.C. 66 at p. 72, 1 S.E.2d 920; Code of S.C. 1942, Sec. 643. Mr. James E. Leppard and Mr. Jack Horton, both of Chesterfield, S.C. Counsel for Respondent, cite: As toChange of Venue for Convenience of Witnesses: 158 S.C. 496, 155 S.E., 828. As to Change of VenueBeing in the Sound Judicial Discretion of the TrialJudge: 195 S.C. 132, 10 S.E.2d 333 at p. 334; 47 S.C. 488, 25 S.E., 797, 801; 199 S.C. 349, 19 S.E.2d 471; 158 S.C. 496, 155 S.E., 828; 193 S.C. 137, 7 S.E.2d 850; 186 S.C. 265, 195 S.E., 560; 108 S.C. 234, 99 S.E., 109; 54 S.C. 368, 32 S.E., 417; 194 S.C. 490, 10 S.E.2d 1; 171 S.C. 276, 172 S.E., 221; 190 S.C. 397, 3 S.E.2d 201; 61 S.C. 261, 39 S.E., 364; 190 S.C. 66, 1 S.E.2d 920; 168 S.C. 139, 167 S.E., 164. As to Service of Counteraffidavits on Opposing Party Before Hearing on Motion: 42 C.J., 502. April 2, 1945.

  6. Poston v. State Hwy. Dept

    192 S.C. 137 (S.C. 1939)   Cited 21 times
    In Poston v. State Highway Department, 192 S.C. 137, 5 S.E.2d 729 (1939), the principal reason given for the Attorney General's failure to appear at the trial of an action against the Highway Department was his involvement in many other official matters and his distress over illness in his family.

    Although a department of the State of South Carolina is the defendant and moving party in this case its status as a litigant is subject to the same rules governing other litigants. See Jordan v. State HighwayDepartment, 190 S.C. 397, 3 S.E., 2d 201. The ruling in this case that the facts presented did not make out such a case of surprise or excusable neglect as would warrant the opening of the judgment is, in our opinion, entirely correct; and there being no showing of an abuse of discretion, this ruling cannot be disturbed.