Jordan v. Second Stone Ridge Cooperative Corp.

Full title: Mary Jane Jordan v. Second Stone Ridge Cooperative Corp.

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Feb 21, 2017

FBTCV166061176S (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2017)

Opinion

FBTCV166061176S

02-21-2017

Mary Jane Jordan v. Second Stone Ridge Cooperative Corp.

Edward T. Krumeich, J.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Edward T. Krumeich, J.

Defendant City of Bridgeport (" Bridgeport") moves to strike the Fourth Count of this slip and fall lawsuit that seeks to hold Bridgeport liable for injuries plaintiff alleges she sustained when she slipped on a snowy, icy public sidewalk abutting real property owned by defendant Stone Ridge Cooperative Corporation (the " Coop").¹ For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.

1 The First Count is alleged against the Coop, where plaintiff resides, the Second Count is against its management company and the Third Count is against its snow plow contractor.

The Standards for Deciding a Motion to Strike

" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 2003). " [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). " If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). On the other hand, " [a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).

Bridgeport is Immune from Suit for Icy or Snowy Sidewalks Abutting Private Property.

Connecticut General Statutes § 7-163a permits a municipality by ordinance to shift liability from it to the private owner of land abutting the public sidewalk " to any person or property caused by the presence of ice and snow on a public sidewalk . . ." ² See generally, Robinson v. Cianfarani, 314 Conn. 521, 525-26, 107 A.3d 375 (2014).

2 C.G.S. § 7-163a provides:

Pursuant to C.G.S. § 7-163a Bridgeport enacted two ordinances, § § 12.16.150 and 12.16.160 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Bridgeport, that imposed the duty to keep public sidewalks clear of ice and snow and shifted liability for icy or snowy public sidewalks to abutting private property owners.³ See e.g., Carter v. City of Bridgeport, 2002 WL 523110 *2 (Conn.Super. 2002) (Rush, J.) [31 Conn.L.Rptr. 540, ]. Both ordinances construed together shift liability for slip and fall cases from Bridgeport to the abutting private owner. Id. at 4. Accord, Robinson, 314 Conn. at 527 n. 5.⁴

3 The Bridgeport Municipal Code, Section 12.16.160 entitled, " Liability for ice and snow on public sidewalks, " provides in relevant part: " A. The provisions of Connecticut General Statutes Section 7-163a are adopted, and are set forth in subsections B and C of this section. B. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 13a-149 of the General Statutes or any other general statute or special act, the city shall not be liable to any person injured in person or property caused by the presence of ice or snow on a public sidewalk unless the city is the owner or person in possession and control of land abutting such sidewalk, other than land used as a highway or street, provided the city shall be liable for its affirmative acts with respect to such sidewalk. C. The owner or person in possession and control of land abutting a public sidewalk shall have the same duty of care with respect to the presence of ice or snow on such sidewalk toward the portion of the sidewalk abutting his property as the municipality had prior to the effective date of the ordinance codified in this section adopted pursuant to the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes Section 7-163a and shall be liable to persons injured in person or property where a breach of duty is the proximate cause of injury . . ."

4 In Robinson, 314 Conn. at 527 n.5, the Supreme Court, in contrast to an Enfield ordinance that merely imposed a penalty on private owners for failure to keep an abutting sidewalk free from ice and snow, cited Section 12.16.60 of the Bridgeport Code of Ordinances as an example of an ordinance enacted pursuant to C.G.S. § 7-163a that shifted liability for icy or snowy public sidewalks from the municipality to the abutting private owner.

Bridgeport's motion to strike the Fourth Count is granted.

" (a) Any town, city, borough, consolidated town and city or consolidated town and borough may, by ordinance, adopt the provisions of this section. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13a-149 or any other general statute or special act, such town, city, borough, consolidated town and city or consolidated town and borough shall not be liable to any person injured in person or property caused by the presence of ice or snow on a public sidewalk unless such municipality is the owner or person in possession and control of land abutting such sidewalk, other than land used as a highway or street, provided such municipality shall be liable for its affirmative acts with respect to such sidewalk. (c)(1) The owner or person in possession and control of land abutting a public sidewalk shall have the same duty of care with respect to the presence of ice or snow on such sidewalk toward the portion of the sidewalk abutting his property as the municipality had prior to the effective date of any ordinance adopted pursuant to the provisions of this section and shall be liable to persons injured in person or property where a breach of said duty is the proximate cause of said injury. (2) No action to recover damages for injury to the person or to property caused by the presence of ice or snow on a public sidewalk against a person who owns or is in possession and control of land abutting a public sidewalk shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained."