59 Ill. App.3d 138, 140, 376 N.E.2d 26, 28. The Jones court cited Jordan v. Savage (1967), 88 Ill. App.2d 251, 232 N.E.2d 580. There, a tenant had requested a landlord to repair a bannister on a stairway used only for her apartment. The landlord had come to the apartment and attempted to repair the bannister.

In Shick, the issue was whether the court could discharge the defendant based on a purported want of prosecution. The Shick court noted that statute prohibited discharging the defendant until the State had had the opportunity to present its evidence; the court then cited two cases, People v. Friason, 22 Ill. 2d 563 (1961), and Jordan v. Savage, 88 Ill. App. 2d 251 (1967), for the proposition that "[a jury] trial does not begin until the accused has been arraigned and the jury impaneled and sworn." Shick, 101 Ill. App. 2d at 379.

Lastly, plaintiff argues that defendant assumed a duty to properly maintain the premises, based on his course of conduct in making all necessary repairs. Plaintiff relies on Jones v. Chicago Housing Authority, 59 Ill. App. 3d 138 (1978), and Jordan v. Savage, 88 Ill. App. 2d 251 (1967), for this proposition. In Jones, the evidence showed that the housing authority had the practice of consistently making repairs to the tenant's premises upon the tenant's request.

Cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their position that a different rule should apply because Seaton was their landlord are not persuasive. In Jordan v. Savage (1967), 88 Ill. App.2d 251, it was the landlord himself who made the repair, and in Roesler v. Liberty National Bank (1954), 2 Ill. App.2d 54, it was the landlord's agent who made the repair. Neither case involved an independent contractor as in the case at bar.

Similarly, it is held that a landlord under no duty who nevertheless makes repairs and does so negligently is liable to a tenant for injuries caused thereby. Jordan v. Savage (1967), 88 Ill. App.2d 251, 232 N.E.2d 580. In Jordan ( 88 Ill. App.2d 251, 262-63, 232 N.E.2d 580, 585) this court quoted with approval Justice Cardozo's statement:

Illinois courts recognize the general principle of tort law, enunciated by Judge Cardozo, that a landowner “who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.” See, e.g., Jordan v. Savage, 232 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Ill.App.Ct. 1967) (quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922)). Even if Union Pacific had no duty to post a flagman, having done so, it might still be liable if its employee acted negligently.

¶ 39 As for the calculation of the number of days to which this fee applies, defendant argues that trial does not begin until the jury is sworn in, which occurred on February 14, 2013, and that the State has cited no authority finding that the sentencing date constitutes a day of trial for purposes of the statute. To the contrary, this court has held on numerous occasions that trial begins at voir dire. See, e.g., Jordan v. Savage, 88 Ill. App. 2d 251, 257 (1967); People v. Wilhite, 2 Ill. App. 2d 29, 33 (1954). Defendant argues, nevertheless, that when trial begins depends on the issue before the court.

For many purposes, trial is deemed to have begun when the process of jury selection begins. ( People v. Crawford Distributing Co. (1979), 78 Ill.2d 70, 397 N.E.2d 1362 (speedy trial); People v. Heidelberg (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 574, 338 N.E.2d 56, appeal denied (1976), 62 Ill.2d 590 (removal to Federal court); People v. Bey (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 250, 272 N.E.2d 726 (change of venue); Jordan v. Savage (1967), 88 Ill. App.2d 251, 232 N.E.2d 580 (assignment to magistrate).) Trial has not begun when potential jurors are simply brought into a courtroom.

Generally, a lessor is under no obligation to repair portions of rented premises which are in the exclusive use of the tenant. ( Dapkunas v. Cagle (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575; Jordan v. Savage (1967), 88 Ill. App.2d 251, 232 N.E.2d 580.) The lessor also is not liable for injuries to a third party on the premises leased to the tenant and under the tenant's control.

• 4 While the defendant has merely argued that Hardy controls, we must point out that even if the repair of plaster did not fall under the covenant in the lease obligating the lessee to make repairs, this would not mean the lessor could be held liable for the damages sustained by the lessee. Absent a covenant in a lease obligating the landlord to make repairs, a landlord has no obligation to repair leased premises ( Elizondo v. Perez (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 313, 356 N.E.2d 112; McDaniel v. Silvernail (1976), 37 Ill. App.3d 884, 346 N.E.2d 382; Yuan Kane Ing v. Levy (1975), 26 Ill. App.3d 889, 326 N.E.2d 51; Moldenhauer v. Krynski (1965), 62 Ill. App.2d 382, 210 N.E.2d 809, appeal denied (1966), 33 Ill.2d 625; 24 Ill. L. Prac. Landlord and Tenant § 281 (1956)), unless he has actual knowledge of a defect and fraudulently conceals it. ( Jordan v. Savage (1967), 88 Ill. App.2d 251, 232 N.E.2d 580.) Furthermore, it is the general rule that a landlord is not responsible for injuries sustained on the demised premises by reason of their defective condition, by the tenant or by others ( Thorson v. Aronson (1970), 122 Ill. App.2d 156, 258 N.E.2d 33; 24 Ill. L. Prac. Landlord Tenant § 302 (1956)), unless it appears that the landlord had actual knowledge of a defect which a tenant could not be expected to discover upon reasonable inspection and the landlord failed to disclose his knowledge of the defect to the tenant ( Hendricks v. Socony Mobil Oil Co. (1963), 45 Ill. App.2d 44, 195 N.E.2d 1), at least in the absence of an express agreement by the landlord to make repairs. ( Gula v. Gawel (1966), 71 Ill. App.2d 174, 218 N.E.2d 42; Moldenhauer v. Krynski (1965), 62 Ill. App.2d 382, 210 N.E.2d 809, appeal denied (1966), 33 Ill.2d 625.)