Opinion
Submitted June 17, 1999
October 4, 1999
In three actions to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., Lydia Jordan, a plaintiff in Action No. 1 and a defendant in Action No. 3, and Jean Jordan, a plaintiff in Action No. 1, appeal from so much of (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Oshrin, J.).
ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated June 10, 1998, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated December 29, 1998, made upon reargument; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated December 29, 1998, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further.
ORDERED that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs.
In prior litigation in the Court of Claims, the appellants in the present actions sought to establish that there was negligence on the part of the State in the design or construction of the intersection at which the accident occurred. After trial, the Court of Claims dismissed the claim based, inter alia, upon its conclusion that the accident was due solely to driver error and that it would not have occurred had Lydia Johnson "cautiously `inched up' [the vehicle] toward the intersection" after stopping for a red light.
The present actions were commenced in the Supreme Court relating to the same accident. Following dismissal of the Court of Claims matter, Bettigole Andrews Clark, Inc. (hereinafter BAC), which was the engineering firm that constructed the intersection, Acme Bus Corp., and the other respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground of collateral estoppel. The court granted BAC's motion in its entirety but found that the issue of liability as to the other movants had not been decided in the Court of Claims. The court also held, however, that the appellants were estopped from denying Lydia Jordan's negligence in the accident or that her negligence was a proximate cause thereof.
"The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from litigating `an issue which has previously been decided against him in a proceeding in which he had a fair opportunity to fully litigate the point'" ( Kaufman v. Lilly Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 455, quoting Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291; see, Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 69). Inasmuch as the issues of Lydia Jordan's negligence and proximate causation were already decided against the appellants in the Court of Claims matter which determined whether any liability attached to the State as a result of the accident, the Supreme Court properly precluded the appellants from relitigating those issues in the Supreme Court actions. There is nothing to suggest that the appellants were not afforded a fair opportunity to fully litigate the issues in the Court of Claims ( see, Kaufman v. Lilly Co., supra; Wollman v. Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 170 A.D.2d 673, 675; Forcino v. Miele, 122 A.D.2d 191).
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.
S. MILLER, J.P., SANTUCCI, SULLIVAN, and FLORIO, JJ., concur.