Opinion
Cause No. 1:00-CV-306
October 18, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 2, 1999, Officer Timothy L. Schulz ("Schulz") of the Allen County Police Department received a dispatch radio communication advising that a complaining party, Ms. Charlene Jordan ("Ms. Jordan"), had called Emergency 911 and stated that her ex-husband was threatening and harassing her. The dispatch communication advised Schulz that Wallace E. Jordan ("Jordan"), Ms. Jordan's ex-husband, had shown up early in the morning at Ms. Jordan's home and began pounding on the front door, which was heard by the 911 operator. Schulz was advised that the 911 operator had heard Ms. Jordan tell Jordan to leave, which he did, but that he then began to drive his vehicle by Ms. Jordan's home repeatedly. The radio dispatch also stated that a restraining order had been issued against Jordan.
Schulz proceeded to and arrived at Ms. Jordan's residence at 918 Autumn Ridge Lane in Fort Wayne, Indiana at approximately 5:56 a.m. and found Jordan's vehicle parked on Ashbourne Drive, just east of Autumn Ridge Lane. Schulz observed Jordan walking westbound toward Ms. Jordan's house and stopped to question him. Jordan denied that he had been to the door of Ms. Jordan's house and denied being divorced. He stated that he was in the neighborhood looking for a house to buy. However, he did admit that he drove by Ms. Jordan's house several times but denied that he had been served with a restraining order. While Schulz questioned Jordan, Officer Joe Bickel of the Allen County Police Department, who had also arrived at the scene, talked with Ms. Jordan and she repeated that she had a restraining order against Jordan.
Based upon the information received by Schulz, he placed Jordan under arrest for violation of a restraining order. Subsequent to these events, it was determined that there was, in fact, no restraining order issued by Ms. Jordan against Jordan.
Jordan filed suit against Schulz, James Herman, the Sheriff of Allen County, Indiana, and the Board of Commissioners of Allen County, Indiana alleging four claims. This court, pursuant to a screening order issued on September 1, 2000, dismissed Counts I, III, and IV, as well as the Board of Commissioners of Allen County and James Sherman, as defendants. Plaintiff's remaining claim, Count II, alleges a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, Jordan claims that Schulz illegally searched him, falsely accused him of committing a crime, and falsely charged him with a crime.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
"Summary judgment is proper only if `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1031 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The standard for granting summary judgment requires the district court to grant summary judgment if the record before us "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." McClendon v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has stated, "It is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained." Mason v. Continental Illinois National Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir. 1983).
The burden is therefore on the non-movant to set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The non-moving party may not rest on the allegations of the pleadings in opposing a motion for summary judgment. See Crim v. Bd. of Educ. of Cairo Sch. Dist. No. 1, 147 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 1998). Rather, the non-moving party must produce some evidence sufficient to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Thus, a summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.
DISCUSSION
In Jordan's memorandum in opposition to Schulz's motion for summary judgement, Jordan only reiterates his claim against Schulz and the facts in support of his claim. The facts recited by Jordan are not in dispute and, as the non-moving party, he has failed to set forth any specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. See Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d at 750. Consequently, Schulz's Motion for Summary Judgement is Granted. Even if Jordan had provided arguments that genuine issue of material facts exist, as discussed below, Schulz would still prevail as a matter of law.
Jordan's document is actually titled "Plaintiff Legal Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement." Since Jordan did not file a motion for summary judgement, the court will treat his memorandum as in opposition to Schulz's motion for summary judgement.
I. Fourth Amendment
Jordan is seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Officer Schulz violated his rights against unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when Schulz stopped, questioned and arrested Jordan for violating a temporary restraining order, when it was later shown that a restraining order was not in effect. As discussed below, Officer Schulz did not violate Jordan's rights when he arrested him because Schulz had the proper probable cause to do so.
A police officer may stop a person briefly for questioning if the officer "has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity `may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 3088 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). However, the police officer must have something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch.'" Id.
Officer Schulz was informed by radio dispatch that Ms. Jordan had called emergency 911 to report that her ex-husband was pounding on the front door of her house and that the 911 operator had heard the pounding on the door while on the phone with Ms. Jordan. Schulz then encountered Jordan walking toward Ms. Jordan's home at 6 a.m. at which time he claimed to be looking for a house to buy. Jordan also admitted that he had driven by Ms. Jordan's house numerous times. Both radio dispatch and Ms. Jordan informed Officer Schulz that a restraining order was issued against Jordan. The facts of the instant case clearly show that Officer Schulz had a reasonable suspicion that was supported by articulable facts that Jordan may have been involved in an criminal activity, the violation of a restraining order, and therefore, his stopping and questioning of Jordan was proper. See id.
The existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to claims of unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 1989). An officer has probable cause when "the facts and circumstances within [his] knowledge and of which [he has] reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Jones by Jones v. Webb, 45 F.3d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). Probable cause is evaluated "not on the facts as an omniscient observer would perceive them but on the facts as they would have appeared to a reasonable person in the position of the arresting officer — seeing what he saw, hearing what he heard." Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir. 1992). Although the issue of probable cause generally is a jury question, the court appropriately may conclude that probable cause existed as a matter of law "when there is no room for a difference of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them." Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1247 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128, 115 S.Ct. 937, 130 L.Ed.2d 882 (1995).
Officer Schulz had reasonably trustworthy information that Ms. Jordan had a restraining order against Jordan. He received this information not only from Ms. Jordan but also received verification of the restraining order from the Allen County radio dispatch. Even though this information about the restraining order was false, Officer Schulz was unaware of the mistake and had no way of discovering it. Officer Schulz was also informed that the emergency 911 operator had heard someone pounding on the front door of Ms. Jordan's home and Ms. Jordan telling Jordan to leave, all while on the phone with her. Together with Officer Schulz finding Jordan walking towards Ms. Jordan's home and his admissions that he had driven his automobile in front of Ms. Jordan's home numerous times, it is "sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Webb, 45 F.3d at 181. Therefore, Officer Schulz had probable cause to arrest Jordan for the violation of a restraining order. Consequently, Jordan's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred. See Waupaca County, 875 F.2d at 582.
II. Qualified Immunity
In any event, even if Jordan had raised a factual issue with respect to probable cause, Officer Schulz would be entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Police officers performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Waupaca County, 875 F.2d at 583 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Jordan must demonstrate that Officer Schulz, when confronted with the specific facts at issue and the law in effect at the time, would have known that his conduct violated Jordan's constitutional rights. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d at 583. Accordingly, whether Officer Schulz is "entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds depends on whether a reasonable officer, in light of the information he possessed at the time of the arrest, could have believed he had probable cause to arrest [Jordan]." Wollin v. Gondent, 192 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 1999).
Officer Schulz was informed from two independent sources that a restraining order had been issued against Jordan that required him not to disturb the peace of Ms. Jordan. The radio dispatch to Officer Schulz stated that the 911 operator, while on the phone with Ms. Jordan, heard someone pounding on her front door. When he arrived at the scene, Officer Schulz encountered Jordan walking toward Ms. Jordan's house and he admitted that he had driven his automobile in front of Ms. Jordan's house numerous times. Based on the situation and the information provided to Officer Schulz at the time of the arrest, he obviously believed that he had probable cause to arrest Jordan. Based on his honest belief that he had probable cause to arrest Jordan for the violation of a restraining order, Officer Schulz would have qualified immunity from Jordan's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants.