Jordan v. Dinwiddie

4 Citing cases

  1. Amburgh v. Boadle

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 4168 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    This preserves defendants' right to exercise the early termination clause while also adequately accounting for plaintiffs' rights as they relate to emblements. Defendants' actions in exercising the early termination provision without allowing plaintiffs to reenter the land to care for and harvest their crops set forth a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see generally 23A Props., Inc. v New Mayfair Dev. Corp., 212 A.D.3d at 902-903; Hilgreen v Pollard Excavating, Inc., 210 A.D.3d at 1348-1349; Dinwiddie v Jordan, 228 SW 126, 128 [Tex Commn App 1921]). Granting plaintiffs every possible favorable inference as we must, they have "pleaded facts sufficient to allege" a breach of contract cause of action (Cavosie v Hussain, 215 A.D.3d at 1083 [citations omitted]; see Eccles v Shamrock Capital Advisors, LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 02841 at *13).

  2. Garlitz v. Carrasco

    339 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)   Cited 4 times

    Fagan v. Vogt, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 528 [ 35 Tex. Civ. App. 528], 80 S.W. 664. The proper measure of damages cannot be determined until it is known which party breached the contract. Curlee v. Rogan, Tex.Civ.App., 136 S.W. 1126; Jordan v. Dinwiddie et al., Tex.Civ.App., 205 S.W. 862. There is no doubt that appellee was liable to be discharged for cause, subject to his right to recover such an amount of the crop, or its proceeds, as is proportioned to the time which he worked on it. 15 Am.Jur. (Crops) 247, sec. 55

  3. McCormick v. Ricks

    213 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)   Cited 1 times
    In McCormick v. Ricks, 213 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.), it was stated in the opinion that there was testimony that wheat on the land in question had been harvested by the middle of July, and in Knudsen v. J. I. Case Co., 86 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1935, no writ), the court stated that it is a matter of common knowledge that wheat planted in 1932 would ripen and be ready for harvest not later than 1933.

    It is well established that courts will take judicial knowledge of such matters. Roberts v. Armstrong, Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W. 371; Matagorda Canal Co. v. Markham Irr. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 154 S.W. 1176; McCullough v. Rucker, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 89, 115 S.W. 323; Jordan v. Dinwiddie, Tex. Civ. App. 205 S.W. 862 (reversed on other grounds). Appellee challenges our finding that, on the 20th of July, 1947, he was informed by the appellant that appellant was the landlord for the year 1947.

  4. Dibble v. Jones

    130 Misc. 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1927)   Cited 2 times

    In passing it may be observed that it is a matter of common knowledge of which judicial cognizance will be taken that in this jurisdiction wheat is sown during the autumn months and harvested the following summer. (23 C.J. 156; Jordan v. Dinwiddie, [Tex. Civ. App.] 205 S.W. 862, 863.) And the same is true of the grass seed which defendants ordered of plaintiff, it being composed of eighty per cent timothy and twenty per cent alsike; the common custom here being to sow grass seed in which timothy is the dominant quantity with the wheat.