See Connecticut National Bank, 241 Conn. at 45, 694 A.2d 1246. Because a Title VII claimant may pursue his or her claim in either State or Federal Court, Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990), there was no jurisdictional bar to the State Superior Court's determination of this issue. See also Joo v. Capitol Switch Inc., 231 Conn. 328, 338 n. 15, 650 A.2d 526 (1994). The only remaining issue is whether a Connecticut court would afford preclusive effect to a prior judgment rendered on statute of limitations grounds.

29 U.S.C. § 626 (d) and 633(b)." Joo v. Capitol Switch, 231 Conn. 328, 332-33, CT Page 12309 650 A.2d 526 (1994). "Connecticut qualifies as a deferral state under § 633(b) of Title 29 of the United States Code. The CHRO is the state agency with which a person pursuing an ADEA claim must file a report.

Contrary to the City's assertion, an ADEA plaintiff need only first file such a claim with the relevant state agency and wait 60 days before commencing an action in federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) ; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) (“Section [626(d)(1) ] does not stipulate an exhaustion requirement. The section is intended only to give state agencies a limited opportunity to settle the grievances of ADEA claimants in a voluntary and localized manner so that the grievants thereafter have no need or desire for independent federal relief.”); accord Joo v. Capitol Switch, Inc., 231 Conn. 328, 334–38, 650 A.2d 526 (1994) (discussing holding in Oscar Mayer and finding no requirement that state administrative remedies must be exhausted before a federal age discrimination claim can be brought to state court). Moreover, in paragraphs 25 to 29 of his CHRO complaint [Doc. 152–17], Fasoli expressly references retaliation.

In general, we look to the federal courts for guidance in resolving issues of federal law. See, e.g., Joo v. Capitol Switch, Inc., 231 Conn. 328, 332-36, 650 A.2d 526 (1994) (considering federal court precedent to interpret federal statute); see also Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 743 and n. 4, 646 A.2d 152 (1994) (noting that court looks to Second Circuit precedent when interpreting federal statute). Decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, although not binding on us, are particularly persuasive.

In general, we look to the federal courts for guidance in resolving issues of federal law. See, e.g., Joo v. Capitol Switch, Inc., 231 Conn. 328, 332-36, 650 A.2d 526 (1994) (considering federal court precedent that interprets federal statute); see also Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 743 n. 4, 646 A.2d 152 (1994) (noting that court looks to Second Circuit precedent that interprets federal statute); Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 329 and n. 20, 627 A.2d 909 (1993) (same); Red Maple Properties v. Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 730, 739 n. 7, 610 A.2d 1238 (1992) (same). Because LaPier is the only federal precedent that is precisely on point, its holding, although not binding on us, is entitled to significant weight.

We are unpersuaded that Congress, having elected to permit concurrent jurisdiction, intended to condone such unequal treatment between forums. See Donnelly, 494 U.S. at 823, 110 S.Ct. at 568, 108 L.Ed.2d at 839; Joo v. Capitol Switch, Inc., 650 A.2d 526, 532 (Conn. 1994). Mr. Anderson has provided no case support for his proposition that we need only selectively apply the provisions of the ADA, and we have found none.

" In general, [the Connecticut Supreme Court] look[s] to the federal courts for guidance in resolving issues of federal law. See, e.g., Joo v. Capitol Switch, Inc., 231 Conn. 328, 332-36, 650 A.2d 526 (1994) (considering federal court precedent to interpret federal statute); see also Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 743, 646 A.2d 152 and n.4, (1994) (noting that court looks to Second Circuit precedent when interpreting federal statute). Decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, although not binding on [the Connecticut Supreme Court], are particularly persuasive.

"In general, we look to the federal courts for guidance in resolving issues of federal law. See, e.g., Joo v. Capitol Switch, Inc., 231 Conn. 328, 332-36, 650 A.2d 526 (1994) (considering federal court precedent to interpret federal statute); see also Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 743 and n. 4, 646 A.2d 152 (1994) (noting that court looks to Second Circuit precedent when interpreting federal statute)." Turner v. Frowein, 253 Conn. 312, 340-41, 752 A.2d 955 (2000).

Briones v. Bunyon, 101 F.3d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1996). "Filing an administrative complaint with the EEOC is a statutory prerequisite to maintaining a Title VII action in the [federal] district court"; Pikulin v. City University of New York, 176 F.3d 598, 599 (2d Cir. 1999); Shah v. New York Dept. of Civil Service, 168 F.3d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1997); or in state court. See, e.g., Duplessis v. Warren Petroleum, Inc., 672 So.2d 1019, (La.App. 1996); Roache v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 1283, (D.C.App. 1995); Benedict v. Xerox Corp., 144 Misc.2d 490, 544 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1989); cf. Joo v. Capitol Switch, Inc., 231 Conn. 328, 650 A.2d 526 (1994) (where plaintiff has exhausted under EEOC, additional exhaustion of state administrative remedy is not required) In determining whether the plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedy, the court is limited to the well pleaded facts of the plaintiffs' complaint.

She seeks compensatory and punitive damages, and there is no prohibition to her bringing such action in this court. "Concurrent jurisdiction over a federally created cause of action is presumed in the absence of some clear indication to the contrary." Joo v. Capitol Switch, 231 Conn. 328, 339 n. 16 (1994). Moreover, the fact that Title VII contains no language that expressly confines jurisdiction to federal courts or ousts state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction is strong evidence that Congress did not intend to divest state courts of concurrent jurisdiction.