Opinion
G032616.
10-30-2003
JONNIE J., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent; ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY et al., Real Parties In Interest.
Deborah A. Kwast, Interim Orange County Public Defender, James Steinberg, Assistant Public Defender and Paul T. DeQuattro, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel and Mark R. Howe, Deputy County Counsel for Real Party in Interest Orange County Social Services Agency. Craig E. Arthur for the Minor.
Clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile courts denial of reunification services to petitioner. Petition denied.
I
FACTS
On March 29, 2003, the Fullerton Police Department received a report there was a female inside an apartment who had given birth to an infant approximately four days earlier, and had not received any medical treatment. When the police arrived, neighbors advised them that Jonnie J., the mother of the infant and the petitioner herein, was a paranoid schizophrenic. When the police knocked on her door, there was no answer at first. When petitioner eventually answered and saw the police, she slammed the door. They spoke to her through the door, and she finally reopened it.
A small infant (Baby Boy) was crying on the bed. The officers explained Baby Boy needed medical attention, but petitioner refused to allow it. The officers reported petitioner appeared to be irrational and incoherent. At one point, she accused them of threatening her with guns, and later claimed she would not allow any metal in her body. At the point an officer picked up Baby Boy, petitioner became uncontrollable and had to be handcuffed and placed on a 72-hour mental health evaluation hold, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 5150.[] Baby Boy was taken to St. Judes Hospital, where he was found to be minimally dehydrated.
While at the hospital, petitioner reported she had two other children. She said one had been killed in an airplane, and the other had been killed in a vehicle accident. When petitioners mother, the maternal grandmother, was contacted, she confirmed there had been two other children, but said they had both been adopted because petitioner had been found to be incompetent and unfit.
Petitioner gave birth to Grace prematurely in 1988. The baby had a deformed trachea and a collapsed lung. Petitioner refused to sign a surgical consent for emergency surgery for Grace. Reunification services were offered, but with a poor prognosis. Petitioner was involved somewhat, but later her whereabouts became unknown, although she surfaced in a psychiatric hospital in Colorado. When she returned to California, a conservator was appointed. Reunification services were terminated in late 1989, after petitioner had visited Grace only one time. In 1993, Graces adoption was finalized.
Six days after petitioner gave birth to Michelle in 1996, she was brought into protective custody. Later that year, petitioner was found to be gravely disabled and a conservator was appointed once again. Michelles adoption was finalized in late 1998. In a 1996 psychiatric evaluation, Dr. David Shefner reported petitioner was grossly impaired with a guarded prognosis. He said she was chronically psychotic and was "devastatingly ill." In another 1996 psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Mohan Nair stated petitioner had a bipolar psychotic schizophrenic disorder and was at risk of harm and injury to others.
An assessment of Baby Boy on May 2, 2003 revealed his neck to be "floppy" and a conclusion he was delayed in all areas. As he did not respond to noises at times, a hearing problem was suspected. Later tests indicated he may be able to hear. Because he seems to have a heightened sense of touch, blindness is also suspected. Later, he was found to have difficulty breathing. He was reported to be eating less, and had to be awakened for each feeding. As doctors attempted to rule out various conditions and illnesses of Baby Boy, petitioner adamantly contested any necessary tests for the child.
Meanwhile, petitioner was in the hospital. She complained the hospital staff and social workers were trying to "place metal in her body" and the staff "keep taking blood from me and giving me medicine, that makes me tired, so I will forget about my baby." She revealed Baby Boy was born on March 25, 2003, and admitted she did not receive any prenatal care. At one point, she said Baby Boys name was Earl J. and later said it was Earle Alexander Gerald Bush Lee S. III. She refused to sign a consent form for Baby Boys past medical records so his current doctors could see them. She was reported to be "delusional and paranoid" and to have "disorganized thoughts." On June 25, 2003, she was again placed under full conservatorship. In a July 14, 2003 addendum report, the social worker reported a voice mail message left by petitioner which concluded with "Have a Happy New Year and drive safe."
A dispositional hearing was conducted on July 15, 2003. During the hearing, senior social worker Richelle Merrell recommended no family reunification services should be granted to petitioner, based on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11). She testified petitioners parental rights to Baby Boys half siblings, Grace and Michelle, had been terminated, and she did not believe petitioner had made any efforts to treat the problems that led to their removal. She explained Baby Boy was having similar medical problems to the ones suffered by Grace, due to lack of prenatal and postnatal care. At the time of the hearing, Baby Boy was having feeding difficulty, and a cyst was found on his cerebellum. Grace had the same feeding problems, and was hospitalized for the first year and a half of her life. Merrell said petitioner has a lengthy history of hospitalizations for mental illness since she was 15-years-old, which was one of the reasons Grace and Michelle were removed from her care. Petitioner continues to be hospitalized with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and petitioners mother reported petitioner has a history of not complying with her medication orders because she doesnt like the side effects. Merrell reported petitioner stopped taking her medication 10 months before Baby Boy was born. Merrell elaborated on her reasons for recommending no reunification services by explaining petitioner said she did not believe in medical care for herself or Baby Boy, and lacks insight that she has a mental illness. Merrell said petitioners delusions and paranoia render her incapable of properly caring for Baby Boy.
The court provided detailed reasons for making its ruling. "The mental illness the mother suffers from prevents her from appreciating the physical health of her children as well as herself. She has no confidence whatsoever in doctors. [¶] As to her child Grace, she almost at birth had severe medical problems which were not addressed. [¶] Baby Boy . . . has severe medical problems that she did not address. [¶] She delivered her own baby because she has no confidence in doctors, and she is actually delusional as to what doctors do to their patients. [¶] The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial danger to the physical and emotional health of the child, and there are no reasonable means to protect the child without removal from the mothers physical custody." With regard to the denial of reunification services, the court stated, "The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no reunification services be provided under section 361.5[, subdivision] (b)(10) and (11) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. [¶] The court finds a factual basis for the proposed orders and findings and makes all orders and findings pursuant to the proposed order as presented to the court."
Petitioner contends reunification services should have been provided to her. She says she made a reasonable effort to treat her mental instability and transiency within the meaning of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11). She asserts that the court did not make the required statutory findings and that it erred in setting a section 366.26 hearing.
II
DISCUSSION
The duty of a court reviewing a denial of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court. (Curtis F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) When an appellant challenges an order on the ground of insufficient evidence, an appellate court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile courts order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880.) The party claiming lack of substantial evidence bears the burden to show there is no evidence of a substantial nature to support the trial courts finding or order. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.) When reviewing for substantial evidence, an appellate court must determine whether there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could make the finding being challenged. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.) In addition, where the standard of proof in the trial court is by clear and convincing evidence, appellate courts review the evidence through the prism of the clear and convincing evidence standard. (In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169-170.)
Petitioner argues the trial court erred when it denied services. Reunification services are offered whenever the goal of preservation of family is furthered. But sometimes it is fruitless to offer reunification services. (Raymond C. v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 159, 163.) Section 361.5, subdivision (b) provides that services need not be provided when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent falls into one or more specified circumstances. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) provides that services need not be provided when the court ordered termination of services for a sibling or half-sibling, and subdivision (b)(11) provides services need not be provided when the parental rights with respect to a sibling or half-sibling have been permanently severed. Each of these provisions applies only if the parent has not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal or severance. In this case, two of petitioners other children had been removed and declared dependents of the juvenile court and adopted.
Petitioners chief complaint has to do with the language used by the juvenile court when services were denied. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) uses the language "and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half-sibling of that child from that parent or guardian." Subdivision (b)(11) contains similar language. According to petitioner, the court somehow shifted the burden to petitioner since the judge did not specifically make findings about whether or not she made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal and adoption of Grace and Michelle.
While we will not adopt the accusation of the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) that the argument is specious, we do find it to be superficial. The court went into detail about petitioners condition with relation to Baby Boys challenging medical needs. The records in evidence provide exquisite detail of petitioners past mental condition. Her present symptoms appear to be identical. The social worker testified she did not believe petitioner had made any efforts to treat the problems that led to the prior removals. An obvious inference that can be drawn from the juvenile judges language is a finding petitioner did not make a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of Grace and Michelle.
Petitioner places great reliance on the courts holding in In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214. While some of the facts of Heather P. are similar to the instant case, there are important differences. In Heather P., the social worker failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 1378(c) by not providing updated reports to the court, and relying on outdated information. (In re Heather P., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1229 .) In petitioners matter, the social worker submitted several supplemental reports documenting changes in the condition of both petitioner and Baby Boy. Though the last psychiatric evaluation performed on petitioner was after Michelles birth in 1996, there was substantial other evidence of mothers present mental condition as a basis for the courts order.
SSAs motion to dismiss is denied. It is unclear from the record how or whether petitioner was given notice of the courts order.
III
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P.J. and FYBEL J. --------------- Notes: All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.