Opinion
2:21-cv-02014-RMG-MGB
03-02-2022
Harold Jones, III, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Chuck Wright and Deputy McCormick, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Harold Jones, III (“Plaintiff”), a former state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action alleging inadequate medical care pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The instant case is premised on an alleged slip-and-fall that occurred while Plaintiff was housed at the Spartanburg County Detention Center in April 2021. After reviewing the original Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his case was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 7.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court.
Although Plaintiff complied with the undersigned's instructions and filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 10), the revised allegations largely restate those presented in the initial pleading, such that Plaintiff's claims are still subject to summary dismissal. Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that on or around April 10, 2021, Plaintiff injured his head and back when he slipped on water that had leaked from the ceiling onto the floor in front of his room. (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, there was no “wet floor” sign marking the area. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff was taken to the detention center's medical unit, where he received Tylenol and ibuprofen for his head and back pain. (Id. at 6.) He received more pain medication approximately one week later due to continuing discomfort. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $750,000 in damages for “improper medical treatment.” (Id.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff fails to raise a plausible claim under § 1983 for several reasons.
First, a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Nevertheless, Sheriff Wright does not appear in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint beyond the caption and being named as a defendant. Without any factual allegations regarding Defendant Wright's personal role in the purported deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, any claims against him are subject to summary dismissal. See Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020) (dismissing claims where, other than naming defendants in caption of complaint, plaintiff failed to include sufficiently clear allegations of personal conduct or wrongdoing in connection with the alleged federal violations).
With respect to Deputy McCormick, the only allegation regarding his personal involvement in this case appears to be that he witnessed Plaintiff fall on April 10, 2021. (Dkt. No. 10 at 5-6, 9.) This allegation, however, falls well short of a cognizable constitutional violation. Indeed, to demonstrate that Defendant McCormick violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical treatment, the Amended Complaint must establish that, objectively, Plaintiff had a serious medical need and, subjectively, Defendant McCormick acted with deliberate indifference to that need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225-26 (4th Cir. 2016). As to the first prong, a “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). As to the second prong, a claim of deliberate indifference requires a showing that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). An assertion of mere negligence or even malpractice is not sufficient to state a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims of inadequate medical treatment brought by pretrial detainees. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). However, the standard of review is essentially the same as that for convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. See Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021); Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001).
As the undersigned previously explained, Plaintiff's bare allegations of head and back pain are insufficient to demonstrate a serious medical need and/or injury resulting from the slip-and-fall. (See Dkt. No. 7 at 2.) See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that although the federal pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” it “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”); see also See, e.g., Wright v. Lassiter, No. 1:18-cv-90-FDW, 2018 WL 4186418, at *11 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2018) (dismissing claims of inadequate medical treatment under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) where prisoner's references to certain injuries were too conclusory and vague to demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need).
Moreover, any allegations of deliberate indifference are undermined by the medical treatment Plaintiff apparently received prior to filing this action. As discussed above, it appears Plaintiff was examined by the jail's medical team and received pain medication on an ongoing basis. Accordingly, there is no indication that Defendant McCormick was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs or failed to secure medical attention following the slip-and-fall. To the extent Plaintiff disagrees with the course of treatment, such claims do not constitute deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (explaining that negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid constitutional violation); Stovall v. Parsons, No. 3:12-cv-676-RJC, 2013 WL 3466903, at *3 (W.D. N.C. July 10, 2013) (finding no deliberate indifference where plaintiff “failed to demonstrate anything other than that he was not progressing to his satisfaction or that he disagreed with the course of his medical treatment”). Thus, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege an actionable Fourteenth Amendment violation based on his medical care following the slip-and-fall.
It also appears that Plaintiff was given two mattresses to alleviate the pain in his back, as well as medication for his alleged headaches. (Dkt. No. 10 at 8.) The undersigned notes, however, that it is unclear whether Plaintiff received this treatment at the Spartanburg County Detention Center or the Anderson County Detention Center, where he was later transferred.
CONCLUSION
The undersigned is of the opinion that any further opportunities to amend the pleadings would be futile in this case, as evidenced by Plaintiff's failure to cure the identified deficiencies in filing his Amended Complaint. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS , for the reasons discussed above, that the Court summarily dismiss this action with prejudice. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (noting that where the district court has already afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to afford another opportunity to amend or can “dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”). In light of the undersigned's conclusion, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons forms or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).