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Jones v. Warden

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville
Apr 8, 2005
2005 Conn. Super. Ct. 6121 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)

Opinion

No. CV 03 082 29 72

April 8, 2005


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION


The petitioner, Anthony Jones, alleges in his petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, initially filed on January 21, 2003, that his conviction in the Judicial District of Hartford under Docket Number CR 97-132856 for Larceny in the first degree in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 53a-122(a)(3) and for Robbery in the second degree in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 53a-135(a)(1), was obtained in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the state of Connecticut. He claims to have been unconstitutionally deprived of the effective assistance of trial defense counsel and that he is actually innocent of the charge of which he was convicted. Consequently, the petitioner demands that his conviction be set aside and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

This matter came for trial before this Court on March 8, 2005 at which time testimony was received from the petitioner and his trial defense counsel, Attorney Auden Grogins. Numerous items of documentary evidence were received into evidence, including transcripts from the underlying criminal trial in docket number CR 97-132856, as well as an incident report dated September 24, 1997 and a stolen vehicle report dated September 24, 1997. Copies of photos were also admitted into evidence. As is explained in greater detail hereafter, this Court finds that the petitioner has failed in meeting his burden of proof and the petition is denied.

The Court has reviewed all of the testimony and evidence and makes the following findings of fact.

Findings of Fact CT Page 6122

1. The petitioner was the defendant in a case in the Judicial District of Hartford, under Docket Number CR 97-132856, entitled State v. Jones, in which he was convicted of Larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-122(a)(3), Robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-135(a)(1) as well as of being a persistent dangerous felony offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40(a).

2. Attorney Auden Grogins, a special public defender, was appointed to represent the petitioner.

3. The underlying facts of this case show that "On September 24, 1998, between 1:30 a.m. and 1:45 a.m., the victim, Ladislav Konecny, picked up a prostitute while returning home from visiting friends. He later dropped her off at the grocery store in Bridgeport where he had picked her up. As she left his car, she grabbed his purse, which contained his wallet credit cards, checkbook and the keys to his house.

4. "The victim chased the woman, who ran behind the market. The victim caught her there and retrieved his purse. As the victim was walking to his car, he saw five men walking toward him. He ran but the men surrounded him. The defendant one of the group of five, demanded the victim's purse and the victim gave it to him. The men then beat the victim and told him to run.

5. "Upon finding that his car had been stolen, the victim went back to the area where his purse had been taken, and the only two remaining men told him to run away. The victim ran to a police station to report the incident. Later that morning, the victim and a friend returned to the area and, upon seeing the prostitute and his car, informed the police. Police Officer Donna Stewart of the Bridgeport police department drove the victim to the area where the he had seen the prostitute. The prostitute directed Stewart and the victim to Coleman and Washington Streets.

6. "Upon arriving in that area, the victim saw his stolen car with the defendant inside it. As Stewart drove closer the defendant got out of the car and started talking to Stewart. It was during this time that the victim recognized the defendant as the man who had robbed him earlier. The defendant proceeded to run away from Stewart and was apprehended by other police officers. A pat-down of the defendant revealed the victim's wallet in his rear pocket and the victim's purse was found in the front seat of the car." State v. Jones, 59 Conn.App. 762, CT Page 6123 764-65 (2000).

7. After a trial to the jury, the petitioner was convicted of Larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-122(a)(3) and Robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-135(a)(1). Following a trial by the court (Stodolink, J.), the petitioner was convicted for being a persistent dangerous felony offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40(a).

8. On November 6, 1998, the Court (Stodolink, J.) sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of fifteen years to serve.

9. Additional facts shall be discussed as necessary.

Discussion

It is important at the outset to understand a critical difference between the legal status of a person who has been accused of a crime as opposed to one who has been convicted of a crime. While the person who has been accused of a crime is entitled to a presumption of his or her innocence, the petitioner in a habeas corpus petition, having already been convicted, is not. "It is undoubtedly true that '[a] person when first charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 385, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).' Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 859, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) . . . The presumption of innocence, however, does not outlast the judgment of conviction at trial . . . Thus, in the eyes of the law, [the] petitioner does not come before the Court as one who is 'innocent,' but on the contrary as one who has been convicted by due process of law." Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 422-23 (1994).

In order to prevail on the issue of whether there has been ineffective representation by the petitioner's trial defense counsel, the petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh. denied 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2d (1984) before the Court can grant relief. Specifically, the petitioner must first show "that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. p. 687. If, and only if, the petitioner manages to get over the first hurdle, then the petitioner must clear the second obstacle by proving "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Id. In short, the petitioner must show both deficiency and prejudice. A failure to prove both, even though counsel's trial performance may have been substandard, will result in denial of the petition.

Trial in this Court of a habeas petition is not an opportunity for a new counsel to attempt to re-litigate a case in a different manner. In this regard, the Court notes that counsel for the petitioner has cited several specific matters he styles as trial defense counsel deficiencies. One must bear in mind that "[t]he right of a defendant to effective assistance [of counsel] is not however, the right to perfect representation. State v. Barber, 173 Conn. 153, 159-60, 376 A.2d 1108 (1977); Chance v. Bronson, 19 Conn.App. 674, 678, 564 A.2d 303 (1989). He must also show 'that this lack of competency contributed so significantly to his conviction as to have deprived him of a fair trial.' Herbert v. Manson, 199 Conn. 143, 144-45, 506 A.2d 98 (1986). The, reviewing court must employ a strong presumption of the reasonableness of that counsel's assistance. Levine v. Manson, 195 Conn. 636, 640 (1985); Chance v. Bronson, supra, 678. The assistance must be viewed in light of the circumstances that existed at the time, and not with either the benefit or the distortions of hindsight. Levine v. Manson, supra. Even if that assistance is found to have been lacking in competency, the petitioner bears the further burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that, were it not for the deficiency of counsel, the result of the trial would have been different. Aillon v. Meachum, 211 Conn. 352, 357 (1989)." Williams v. Bronson, 21 Conn.App. 260, 263 (1990).

It is, therefore, incumbent upon a habeas court, knowing the outcome of the trial "[to] not indulge in hindsight to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct, but . . . evaluate the acts or omissions from trial counsel's perspective at the time of trial." Beasley v. Commissioner of Corrections, 47 Conn.App. 253 at 264 (1979), cert. den. CT Page 6125 243 Conn. 967 (1998). "A fair assessment of an attorney's performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances to counsel's challenged conduct and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Henry v. Commissioner of Correction, 60 Conn.App. 313, 317 (2000). This Court will, therefore, examine the totality of the trial defense counsel's representation to determine if his performance, overall, fell below the range of competence expected of attorneys with ordinary training and skill in criminal law. Strickland v. Washington, supra, 687.

Moreover, it is not even necessary to consider whether a trial counsel's performance was deficient if the habeas court is satisfied that there was no prejudice to the defendant by the actions or inactions of the trial counsel in representing the petitioner. "A reviewing court can find against a petitioner on either ground, whichever is easier. Id. p. 697; see Nardini v. Manson, 207 Conn. 118, 124, (1988) ('[a] court deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim need not address the question of counsel's performance, if it is easier to dispose of the claim on the ground of insufficient prejudice')" Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 86 (1988).

In the instant case, the petitioner claims that Attorney Grogins' performance as trial counsel was deficient in three ways. First, he claims that she did not adequately challenge the fair market value of the stolen car. Second, he asserts that she failed to produce Gloria Evans at trial. Finally, he asserts that she failed to introduce the stolen vehicle incident report, which would have proved exculpatory at trial and that said evidence also supports his claim that he is actually innocent of the charges.

Fair Market Value of Stolen Car

With respect to his fair market value claim, the petitioner claims that but for Attorney Grogins' deficient performance, he would have received a lesser sentence pursuant to Larceny in the Second degree. He asserts that had she been more diligent, the jury would have entertained a reasonable doubt that the fair market value of the car was greater than $10,000.

In fact, this Court is persuaded that Attorney Grogins not only zealously investigated the true market value of the stolen car, but that no amount of effort would have resulted in creating reasonable doubt that the fair market value was greater than $10,000. According to Attorney Grogins, the automobile was a relatively new car. She utilized the National Automobile Dealers' Association ["NADA"] reference book, a standard resource for valuing cars, to determine the value of the car and then applied the appropriate deduction for the amount of mileage indicated on the car; she testified that her figures were well in excess of $10,000. Moreover, she also checked her results with her cousin, who is employed in the automobile business. Once she consulted with him, she was convinced that she would have little success in pursuing this course of action. Nevertheless, the transcript clearly establishes the efforts Attorney Grogins made in cross-examining Trooper McCarthy and his valuation of the car. In any event not only does the court credit Attorney Grogins in her assessment of the car's fair market value, the petitioner offered virtually no evidence to persuade this court that the car's value was less than $10,000. As such, the petitioner has failed to establish that Attorney Grogins' performance was deficient in this regard.

Witness Gloria Evans

The petitioner also criticizes Attorney Grogins' failure to secure Gloria Evans as a witness. He asserts that her testimony would somehow prove exculpatory or raise some reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The evidence, however, indicates that Gloria Evans was a codefendant and allegedly, part of a conspiracy with five other individuals involved in this incident. As such, Attorney Grogins reasonably assumed that Ms. Evans was not likely to provide favorable testimony to the petitioner, and thereby risk increasing her own culpability. In other words, her testimony was not likely to be helpful to the petitioner. Nevertheless, and consistent with her duty to thoroughly investigate the case on behalf of her client Attorney Grogins did employ an investigator who was unsuccessful in contacting Ms. Evans, even though Attorney Grogins did secure permission from Ms. Evans' attorney to speak with her. Ultimately, Attorney Grogins also believed that she was able to exploit Ms. Evans' absence by suggesting to the jury that Ms. Evans was solely responsible for the crime, and indeed, Attorney Grogins made this argument to the jury.

Moreover, the petitioner was caught in the stolen vehicle and in possession of the victim's wallet and other belongings. As the appellate court noted, the jury is entitled to consider circumstantial evidence as having as much probative force as direct evidence, and indeed, the petitioner was positively identified by the victim as well. State v. Jones, supra, 59 Conn.App. 769. It is difficult to imagine how Gloria Evans' testimony would benefit the petitioner to the degree that it would somehow have resulted in anything but a conviction. Indeed, the claim that Ms. Evans' testimony would have been helpful is empty and speculative, in the absence of Ms. Evans testimony at the trial on the habeas petition. As such, this court cannot conclude that Ms. Grogin's failure to secure Ms. Evans was deficient performance or that if secured, Ms. Evans' testimony would have had any effect on the ultimate outcome.

Stolen Vehicle Report

Finally, the petitioner also claims that the failure to introduce the stolen vehicle incident report supports his actual innocence claim and would have implanted in the minds of the jury reasonable doubt of the petitioner's guilt. Reasserts that the stolen vehicle report is inconsistent with the evidence produced because it describes the incident as a "carjacking." In response to whether this evidence would have made a difference to her in her defense strategy, Attorney Grogins testified, "Absolutely not." This court agrees and can only conclude it would have no difference to the jury when it deliberated.

In addition to being inconsequential, the incident report, by its very nature and as the petitioner concedes, is evidence that was available at trial. As such, there is a threshold question regarding the issue of whether the question of actual innocence should even be considered at all by this Court.

It is well settled in Connecticut that a claim of actual innocence may be raised in a petition for habeas corpus even where that claim does not allege a claim that the petitioner's state or federal constitutional rights have been violated. See Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397 (1994), and Clarke v. Commissioner, 43 Conn.App. 374 (1996). However, in order to prevail in such a claim, a petitioner must overcome two extraordinarily large obstacles. "First, taking into account both the evidence produced in the original criminal trial and the evidence produced in the habeas hearing, the petitioner must persuade the habeas court by clear and convincing evidence, . . . that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted. Second, the petitioner must establish that after considering all of that evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom . . . no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty." Miller v. Commissioner, 242 Conn. 745, 791-92 (1997). Unlike the original criminal trial in which the petitioner (then the defendant) enjoyed the presumption of innocence with the burden of proving his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt resting upon the prosecutor, in the habeas proceeding, the burden of proof rests upon the petitioner. This is so because of the "fact that in many cases an order for a new trial may in reality reward the accused with complete freedom from prosecution because of the debilitating effect of the passage of time on the state's evidence." Summerville v. Warden, supra 427. Furthermore, there is a strong societal interest "in not degrading the properly prominent place given to the original trial as the forum for deciding the question of guilt or innocence within the limits of human fallibility." Id.

The burden of proof in a habeas proceeding in which the claim is actual innocence requires that "the habeas court first must be convinced by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is actually innocent. The clear and convincing standard of proof is substantially greater than the usual civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, but less than the highest legal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Miller v. Commissioner, supra, 794. Clear and convincing evidence must "induce in the mind of a trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist" State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 66, cert. den. 490 U.S. 1082, 109 S.Ct. 2103, 104 L.Ed.2d 664 (1989).

What evidence may be proffered in support of an actual innocence claim is an issue our Supreme Court, however, has declined to reach. In Clarke v. Commissioner of Correction, 249 Conn. 350, 375-58 (1999), our Supreme Court has left the absolute requirement of 'newly discovered evidence' an open question in our habeas jurisprudence 'until the actual outcome of the case is likely to depend on the answer to the legal question.' Id. at 351." LaPointe v. Warden, Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford, No.-CV 97-0571161 (Sep. 6, 2000). Consequently, while the final rule in this state may be to the contrary, as it stands at this time, the operative appellate decision on this issue is Clarke v. Commissioner, supra, 43 Conn.App. 374.

In Clarke, the Appellate Court concluded that while there exists no governing standard of proof "under which a claim of actual innocence should be evaluated, such a claim must nonetheless, be based on newly discovered evidence." Id. 379. Moreover, "a writ of habeas corpus cannot issue unless the petitioner first demonstrates that the evidence put forth in support of his claim of actual innocence is newly discovered." Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 41 Conn.App. 527, 530 (1996). In addition, "[the Appellate Court] incorporate[d] the due diligence component of the standard used in determining whether a new trial should be granted because of newly discovered evidence in the determination of whether a writ of habeas corpus should issue as a result of a petitioner's claim of actual innocence." Id., 528. Thus, the Clarke court reaffirmed its holding that "'a petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered evidence is such that it could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence.'" Clarke v. Commissioner, supra, 379 (citing Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 530).

Here, the petitioner relies on the stolen vehicle report for his actual innocence claim, but concedes that it was evidence which was discoverable and available at the time of trial. As such, this Court finds that the evidence is not newly discovered evidence such that it can be proffered in support of an actual innocence claim, and in any event has no exculpatory value.

In a habeas claim involving the claim of actual innocence, the petitioner asks this Court to set aside that conviction and order a new trial. The "clear and convincing" standard that this Court must apply "should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory." Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 539 (1981). Here, there is simply no basis upon which to set aside the jury's finding of guilty.

In light of all of this, the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence with clear and convincing evidence. With respect to his other claims in support of his. allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has also failed to meet his burden of proof. He has failed to establish that trial defense counsel's representation was either deficient or prejudiced his defense in any way.

Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.

N. Elgo, Judge


Summaries of

Jones v. Warden

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville
Apr 8, 2005
2005 Conn. Super. Ct. 6121 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)
Case details for

Jones v. Warden

Case Details

Full title:ANTHONY JONES INMATE #822972 v. WARDEN

Court:Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville

Date published: Apr 8, 2005

Citations

2005 Conn. Super. Ct. 6121 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)