Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 02-CV-3540.
February 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Presently pending is the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 14) and Petitioner's Objections thereto (Doc. 17). For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's Objections will be overruled and the Report and Recommendation will be adopted and approved.
BACKGROUND
On July 18, 1975, the Petitioner Eughinia Jones, Mark Garrick, and Andre Wright allegedly robbed and murdered Maurice Wilson in the apartment of Esther Jones, while Esther Jones, her roommate, Earline Gates, and Gates's daughter witnessed the murder. Thereafter, the Petitioner, Garrick, and Wright were arrested and charged with the murder. However, the Commonwealth filed a motion to withdraw prosecution on August 1975, because the key witnesses, Jones, Gates, and Gates' daughter were unavailable to testify. The Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County granted the motion without prejudice. Around December 1980, after the key witnesses were located, the grand jury returned murder indictments upon the petitioner and his accomplices, and they were rearrested and charged again with the murder of Maurice Wilson.
On October 24, 1981, the petitioner and his co-defendants had a trial by jury, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty and convicted the petitioner of second degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. After all post-trial motions were denied, the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, five to ten years of imprisonment for robbery, five to ten years of imprisonment for conspiracy, and two and one-half to five years of imprisonment for the weapon offense to run concurrently.
On May 9, 1983, the petitioner filed a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court (the "Superior Court") claiming that the selection of "death qualified" jury created a prosecution-prone jury, thereby denying him a fair trial and other various claims. The Superior Court affirmed the Judgment of the trial court, but vacated the sentence of robbery on July 12, 1985. The petitioner filed a petition for allowance of appeal in Pennsylvania Supreme Court (the "Supreme Court"), which the Court denied on September 25, 1986.
On January 19, 1996, the petitioner filed a pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), and the petition was denied on May 4, 1998. The petitioner filed an appeal to the Superior Court on July 28, 1997, and the Court dismissed his petition without prejudice on July 20, 1998, due to failure to prosecute the appeal. Approximately a year later on July 7, 1999, the petitioner filed a petition seeking permission to file an appeal nunc pro tunc, and the Superior Court granted the petition. On October 20, 2000, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of his PCRA petition. The petition filed for allowance of appeal in the Supreme Court, and it was denied on June 4, 2001.
On May 22, 2002, the petitioner filed this instant petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming:
(1) the selection of "death qualified" jury created a prosecution-prone jury, thereby denying Jones a fair trial;
(2) the comments of the prosecutor during the course of the trial amounted to prosecutorial misconduct;
(3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Commonwealth's application for a nolle prosequi in 1975 and for failing to file a pretrial motion to dismiss under Rule 1100(f);
(4) all prior counsel were ineffective for not presenting the claim that the trial court erred by permitting the testimony of a former assistant district attorney;
(5) all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to present the petitioner's claim that the court restricted his ability to cross-examine Esther Jones about her motive to lie; and
(6) all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to present the petitioner's medical records which would have shown that the wound to his hand was from a burn, rather than a gunshot.
Rule 1100 has been renumbered to Pa. R. Crim. P. 600.
The Magistrate Judge recommended to this Court that we deny the Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus petition because the state court's disposition of his claims were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
LEGAL STANDARD
This Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation to which specific objections have been made 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which went into effect on April 24, 1996, amended the standards for reviewing state court judgments in federal habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Werts v. Vaugh, 228 F.3d 178, 195 (3d Cir. 2000). Since Jones filed his habeas petition on May 22, 2002, after the effective date of the AEDPA, this Court is required to apply the amended standards set forth in the AEDPA to his claim for federal habeas corpus relief.Id. (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997)).
Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
The AEDPA increases the deference federal courts must give to the factual findings and legal determinations of the state courts. Id. (citing Dickerson v. Vaughn. 90 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1996)). In Werts, the Third Circuit held that:
Federal habeas corpus relief is precluded as to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding unless such adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.Id. at 196 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2) (1997)). The Third Circuit also noted that "[f]actual issues determined by a state court are presumed to be correct and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1997)).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the United States Supreme Court explained that:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Id. at 412-413; See Wert, 228 F.3d at 196.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Id. at 410. The Supreme Court held that "[u]nder § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."Id. at 411.
DISCUSSION
In the Petitioner's objections, Petitioner contends that the "[M]agistrate [Judge]'s reports [sic] clearly over looks the facts of the case and adopts everything the prosecutor has alleged." See Petitioner's Objection at 1. The Petitioner contends that "the record reveals that it was objectively unreasonable for the defense counsel's [sic] failure to preserve the issues for appeal and at trial." Id. Petitioner argues in its objection that "the state's determination of the constitutional issues involved is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law . . ." Id.
This Court finds that the Petitioner has failed to point out any error committed by the Magistrate Judge or how the state court's finding is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Petitioner does not state specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's finding, instead, he makes vague objections to the entire Report and Recommendation. After a careful and independent review of the record, the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation, and Petitioner's objection, this Court finds that the Petitioner has failed to establish the state court's disposition of his claims were contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Therefore, this Court will deny the Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus petition. For the reasons stated above, I will overrule Petitioner's objections and approve and adopt the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of February 2004, upon consideration of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and after review of the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 14), and Petitioner's Objections thereto (Doc. 17), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. Petitioner's Objections are OVERRULED.
2. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED.
3. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED.
4. There is no basis for the issuance of a certificate of appealability.