Opinion
Case No. 11-cv-02144 BEN (JMA)
06-01-2012
ELVIS JONES, JR., CDCR#G-41716, Plaintiff, v. DR. ANTHONY VAIL; M. GLYNN; L.D. ZAMARA; CLIFF ALLENBY, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVILPROCEDURE 12(b)(6)
(ECF No. 9)
Elvis Jones, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California, is proceeding in pro se and in forma pauperis ("IFP") in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 15, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Complaint, naming Defendants Dr. Anthony Vail, M. Glynn, L.D. Zamara, and Cliff Allenby. (ECF No. 1). On November 22, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") and directed the United States Marshal's Service to effect service of the Complaint on the named Defendants. (ECF No. 3.) On February 6, 2012, Defendants Vail and Glynn filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff filed a request for extension of time to file an Opposition to Defendants' Motion. (ECF No. 12.)
The Court granted Plaintiff's request and informed him that he must file his Opposition by May 21, 2012. (ECF No. 13.) That time has since passed, and Plaintiff has failed to file an Opposition to Defendants' Motion. The Court has determined that Defendants' Motion is suitable for disposition upon the papers without oral argument and that no Report and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler is necessary. See S.D. CAL. CIV. L.R. 7.1(d)(1), 72.3(e). II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The allegations are those that are set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint.
Plaintiff has been incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") since December 4, 2008. (See Compl. at 1.) Upon arrival, Plaintiff was identified as a patient in the mental health program. (Id.) Prior to his incarceration, Plaintiff had been diagnosed with bipolar and post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). (Id.) When Plaintiff began treatment on April 26, 2010, he was informed by "Dr. Fijem" that the "state would not provide him treatment for PTSD due to the state experiencing a budget shortage." (Id.) After filing a grievance, Plaintiff claims he was told by Defendant Vail that the EOP program did not have adequate staff to provide Plaintiff with this treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff asked for a transfer to Atascadero State Hospital, and he claims Defendants refused because this would be seen as "an admission of failure on their part." (Id.)
Dr. Fijem is not a named defendant in this action.
EOP is an acronym for "Enhanced Outpatient."
Plaintiff was under the care of Dr. Graham who acted as Plaintiff's "case manager." (Id.) However, Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Graham had no experience in treating PTSD. (Id.) Plaintiff was given the opportunity to switch case managers but was informed that the other case manager also lacked training in the treatment of PTSD. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Dr. Graham was "rotated out" of the treatment program. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff only received treatment in the form of group sessions dealing with inmates who had drug addictions. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the lack of adequate or appropriate treatment caused him to have reoccurring dreams of "death and anxiety." (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff claims his cellmates found his behavior disturbing as he would sleep with the cell lights on and screamed "throughout the night." (Id.) Plaintiff was also unable to cope when there were incidences of violence, and he was unable to follow correctional officers directions due to his PTSD. (Id. at 5.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges he began to suffer from extreme paranoia. (Id.)
Dr. Graham is not a named defendant in this action.
III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6)
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are precluded as a member of the Coleman class; and (2) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review
A plaintiff's complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief." Id. (citing FED.R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant[s] fair notice of what... the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a '"lack of a cognizable legal theory' or 'the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'" Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that are conclusory, legal conclusions, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (on motion to dismiss court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."). "The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, a complaint will not suffice "if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); Valadez-Lopez v. United States, 656 F.3d 851, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2011).
However, claims asserted by pro se petitioners, "however inartfully pleaded," are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972); Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Because "Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts' treatment of pro se filings, [courts] continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.'" Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 113 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that courts "have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt")).
Nonetheless, in giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id.
B. Application to Plaintiffs Complaint
1. Coleman Class Action
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on the ground that his request for injunctive relief is barred by the class action found in Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995). The Court will take judicial notice of the Coleman matter. A court "may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue." United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief, which is the only form of relief sought in this action, fall under the purview of the Coleman class action and thus, he cannot maintain a separate lawsuit for injunctive relief. (See Defs.' Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 3.) The Coleman class action arose from a statewide concern by prisoners within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") that the CDCR "did not have a systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates for mental illness," as well as a concern that the CDCR mental health staff was "constitutionally inadequate." Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1305, 1307.
The class in Coleman was certified in 1991 and consists of "all inmates with serious mental disorders who are now or will in the future be confined within the California Department of Corrections." Coleman v. Brown, E.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 90-cv-0520 LKK (JFM)(Nov. 14,1991 Order, at 4-5.) The class was later amended to include "all inmates with serious mental disorders who are now, or will in the future, be confined within the California Department of Corrections." Id. (July 23, 1999 Order Granting Stip. & Order Amending Plaintiff Class and Application of Remedy.) The court in Coleman ultimately entered an order for injunctive relief under the supervision of a special master. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1323-24. Here, Plaintiff alleges that he is not receiving proper mental health treatment for his serious mental disorder which would make him a member of the Coleman class.
"Individual suits for injunctive and equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional prison conditions that are the subject of an existing class action 'must be made through the class representative until the class action is over or the consent decree is modified."' Valdez v. Forte, 2010 WL 4861459, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010) (citing McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 1991)). Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain his claims for injunctive relief in this action until he seeks relief as a member of the class in Coleman. Because Plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief in this action, and not money damages, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the entire action for the reasons set forth above.
2. Eighth Amendment Claims
Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims on the ground that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve "the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) "the prison official deprived the prisoner of the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,'" and (2) "the prison official 'acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.'" Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732,744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). Before it can be said that a prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, "the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere 'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)). "[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested "when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment," or in the manner "in which prison physicians provide medical care." McGuckin v. Smith, 974F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
Defendants argue that the claims by Plaintiff "portray nothing more than a difference of opinion between him and his treating physicians." (Defs.' Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 5.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiff, in fact, alleges that he received no treatment for his bipolar disorder or his PTSD. (See Compl. at 4-5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acknowledged their inability to have trained mental health staff provide the appropriate treatment for Plaintiff's mental health disorders. (Id.) At this stage, which requires the Court to accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations of denial of appropriate treatment has stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious mental health need. Thus, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED. However, because Plaintiff does not seek monetary damages in this case and seeks only injunctive relief, the entire action must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby:
GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 9) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall close the file.
__________________
HON. ROGER T. BENITEZ
United States District Judge