Jones v. Union Pacific Railroad

14 Citing cases

  1. City of Corona v. State of Cal. Dept. of Transportation

    No. E032176 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2003)

    Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86. Jones v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1053. a. Greater Westchester

  2. Today's IV, Inc. v. L. A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth.

    83 Cal.App.5th 1137 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 6 times

    (See, e.g., Friends of H Street, supra , 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 162, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 ; Orpheum, supra , 80 Cal.App.3d at pp. 875–876, 146 Cal.Rptr. 5.) This is not like Jones v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1053, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 661 ( Jones ), where railroad employees allegedly were "needlessly blowing train horns and whistles and idling train engines in front of property owners’ homes for hours on end, at all hours of the day and night, for no legitimate purpose." ( Id . at pp. 1066–1067, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 661, italics omitted.) The reviewing court found section 3482 did not apply because the activity in question was not expressly authorized by statute; the conduct described constituted "allegedly unnecessary activity, serving no legitimate purpose, and/or activity allegedly committed for the sole purpose of harassing plaintiffs."

  3. Chase v. Wizmann

    71 Cal.App.5th 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 23 times

    Moreover, "[e]ven though acts authorized by statute cannot give rise to nuisance liability, ‘the manner in which those acts are performed may constitute a nuisance.’ " ( Jones v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1067, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 661.) In Jones, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code section 3482 precluded railway adjacent homeowners’ nuisance action for frequent loud train noise throughout the day and night, including train horns blowing in front of their home for no apparent reason and train engines idling in front of their home for hours and days.

  4. City of Norwalk v. City of Cerritos

    317 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024)

    (Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 116, 129, 99 Cal.Rptr. 350; Greater Westchester, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 101, 160 Cal.Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329; Today’s IV, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 1189, 300 Cal.Rptr.3d 61; Jones v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1067, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 661 (Jones); Friends of H Street, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 160, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 607; Chase v. Wizmann (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 244, 259-260, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 183.) A second line of cases draws a distinction between "the act" authorized by the statute, and "the consequences of [that] act"; under this line of cases, section 3482’s immunity applies to the former, but may not apply to the latter.

  5. Smith v. CSX Transp., Inc.

    247 F. Supp. 3d 952 (N.D. Ill. 2017)   Cited 2 times

    As a result, the ICCTA preempts the Smiths' claims regarding property damage and personal injury caused by exposure to the idling locomotives. SeeGuckenberg v. Wis. Cent. Ltd. , 178 F.Supp.2d 954, 956, 958–59 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (on a motion for summary judgment, finding nuisance claim for, among other things, "idling locomotive diesel engines" that lasted "as long as several hours per episode" preempted because it "would interfere directly with day-to-day railway operations" and "seeks to proscribe activity undertaken by [railway] employees while conducting and facilitating traffic on their side track"); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Goldthwaite , 176 So.3d 1209, 1211–12, 1214 (Ala. 2015) (finding plaintiff's nuisance claims preempted by ICCTA where railroad presented evidence explaining reasons for storing and idling trains on tracks of its choosing); Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 79 Cal.App.4th 1053, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 661, 666 (2000) ("If the tooting of train horns and idling of train engines for long periods of time in front of plaintiffs' house was necessary to reduce congestion and operate Union Pacific's railroad business safely and efficiently, then plaintiffs' claim is federally preempted."). The Court thus grants summary judgment for CSX on the Smiths' idling claims.

  6. Smith v. CSX Transp., Inc.

    No. 14 C 5704 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2015)

    Id. at *4 (quoting Emerson v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 503 F.3d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir. 2007). In a case with facts similar to those alleged here, plaintiffs filed nuisance and negligence claims, among others, alleging that railroad employees parked idling trains and blew horns in front of their property for no other reason than to harass them. Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court refused to find that the claim was preempted by the ICCTA, as plaintiffs had provided evidence that the idling of the train engines was not in furtherance of the railroad's operations.

  7. Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co.

    914 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 2018)   Cited 11 times
    Explaining that the FRSA's savings clause does not protect state-law claims from preemption by the ICCTA

    One is a tort claim that challenges a railroad’s activities other than the maintenance and operation of its rail lines. See Guild v. Kan. City S. Ry. , 541 F. App’x 362, 368 (5th Cir. 2013) (declining to find that a state-law tort claim that the defendant damaged plaintiff’s private spur track by temporarily parking train cars of excessive weight on that private track was preempted); Emerson v. Kan. City S. Ry. , 503 F.3d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that § 10501(b) does not preempt a claim relating to a railroad "discarding old railroad ties into a wastewater drainage ditch adjacent to the tracks and otherwise failing to maintain that ditch"); Rushing v. Kan. City S. Ry. , 194 F.Supp.2d 493, 499–501 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (finding that § 10501(b) preempted tort claims relating to the railroad’s operation of its switch yard but not relating to its erection of an earthen berm outside the switch yard); Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. , 79 Cal.App.4th 1053, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 661, 666–67 (2000) (finding no preemption where there was a triable issue whether the railroad ran its engines and sound "solely to harass plaintiffs" rather than for safety reasons or "in furtherance of [defendant’s] railroad operations"). A second category of claims are those relating to rail safety, where a separate, narrower preemption provision in the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) applies.

  8. Friends River v. N. Coast R.R. Auth.

    3 Cal.5th 677 (Cal. 2017)   Cited 46 times   10 Legal Analyses
    In Eel River, we conducted traditional preemption analysis to determine that the state's use of CEQA in particular circumstances was not preempted, while carefully delineating the circumstances in which it was preempted.

    state action enjoining railroad from removing privately owned railroad crossings not preempted]; PCS Phosphate , supra , 559 F.3d at pp. 218-220 [ICCTA preemption does not displace ordinary voluntary agreements between private parties]; Adrian & Blissfield , supra , 550 F.3d at pp. 540-541 [state track maintenance statute that would require the railroad to pay for pedestrian crossings across its tracks was not preempted; imposing increased costs on railroad is not by itself enough to establish unreasonable interference]; Susquehanna , supra , 500 F.3d at pp. 252-255 [fines may be imposed under state law on railroad for environmental hazards at transloading facility; the ICCTA would not preempt, for example, rules fining the railroad for dumping debris or harmful substances]; Green Mountain , supra , 404 F.3d at p. 643 ; Florida East Coast Ry. , supra , 266 F.3d at pp. 1328, 1331 [ICCTA preemption does not extend to traditional police power of zoning and health and safety regulation]; Jones v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1060, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 661 [state nuisance action based on train noise and fumes not necessarily preempted if the plaintiffs can demonstrate the challenged nuisance did not further the railroad's operations]; In re Vermont Ry. (2000) 171 Vt. 496, 769 A.2d 648, 655 [zoning conditions imposed not on rail line but on truck traffic and environmental conditions at railroad's salt shed not preempted]; City of Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co. (2012) 134 Ohio St.3d 79, 979 N.E.2d 1273, 1283 [eminent domain action not categorically preempted]; Home of Economy v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. (N.D. 2005) 694 N.W.2d 840, 845-846 [state injunctive relief requiring reopening of grade crossing not preempted].) This conclusion is confirmed in the legislative history.

  9. Friends of River v. North Coast Railroad Authority

    220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812 (Cal. 2017)

    state action enjoining railroad from removing privately owned railroad crossings not preempted]; PCS Phosphate , supra , 559 F.3d at pp. 218-220 [ICCTA preemption does not displace ordinary voluntary agreements between private parties]; Adrian & Blissfield , supra , 550 F.3d at pp. 540-541 [state track maintenance statute that would require the railroad to pay for pedestrian crossings across its tracks was not preempted; imposing increased costs on railroad is not by itself enough to establish unreasonable interference]; Susquehanna , supra , 500 F.3d at pp. 252-255 [fines may be imposed under state law on railroad for environmental hazards at transloading facility; the ICCTA would not preempt, for example, rules fining the railroad for dumping debris or harmful substances]; Green Mountain , supra , 404 F.3d at p. 643 ; Florida East Coast Ry. , supra , 266 F.3d at pp. 1328, 1331 [ICCTA preemption does not extend to traditional police power of zoning and health and safety regulation]; Jones v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1060, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 661 [state nuisance action based on train noise and fumes not necessarily preempted if the plaintiffs can demonstrate the challenged nuisance did not further the railroad's operations]; In re Vermont Ry. (2000) 171 Vt. 496, 769 A.2d 648, 655 [zoning conditions imposed not on rail line but on truck traffic and environmental conditions at railroad's salt shed not preempted]; City of Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co. (2012) 134 Ohio St.3d 79, 979 N.E.2d 1273, 1283 [eminent domain action not categorically preempted]; Home of Economy v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. (N.D. 2005) 694 N.W.2d 840, 845-846 [state injunctive relief requiring reopening of grade crossing not preempted].) This conclusion is confirmed in the legislative history.

  10. In re Appeal of Vermont Railway

    769 A.2d 648 (Vt. 2000)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that the ICCTA did not preempt several regulations related to traffic issues and environmental contamination at an intermodal facility on the grounds that "these conditions do not interfere with railway operations . . ."

    In a case more closely analogous to this one, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, citing the STB, that the question of preemption of local regulations was necessarily a fact-bound determination. Village of Ridgefield Park v. New York, Susquehanna W. Ry. Corp., 750 A.2d 57, 63 (N.J. 2000) (citing Borough of Riverdale, S.T.B. Finance Docket No. 33466, 1999 WL 715272 at *8); see also Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 661, 666-67 (Cal.Ct.App. 2000) (reversing summary judgment entered by trial court, noting that triable issues of fact existed with respect to the extent to which individuals' state claims for nuisance were preempted by the ICCTA and noting "[s]tate and local regulation of Union Pacific's trains is permissible if it does not interfere with Union Pacific's interstate rail operations . . . if Union Pacific's activity in question did not further rail operations or was committed solely to harass plaintiffs, then plaintiffs' action is not federally preempted"). In Village of Ridgefield Park, the court determined with respect to the construction of a train maintenance facility used for such purposes as refueling and adding oil and coolant to trains, that the municipality within which the facility was located could not have required the railroad to comply with the local permitting process prior to building the facility because of the delay it would occasion in the operation of the railway.