Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BC404782 Ernest Hiroshige, Judge.
Ray Jones, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Ray Jones filed a complaint against defendant Pat Tompkins (Tompkins), generally alleging numerous state law and municipal code violations associated with Tompkins’ operation of a rental property where appellant resided. After appellant failed to serve Tompkins within 60 days, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his ex parte motion asking for a “declaratory ruling” on the law applicable to his dispute with Tompkins; (2) denying his peremptory challenge to the trial judge; and (3) dismissing his case for failure to serve Tompkins within 60 days. We dismiss this appeal because none of the orders from which appellant purports to appeal are appealable orders, and therefore we lack jurisdiction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant filed his complaint against Tompkins on December 30, 2008. The trial court scheduled a Case Management Conference (CMC) for April 29, 2009, but on that date declined to conduct the CMC because Tompkins had not been served with the complaint and was not represented at that hearing. Instead, the court issued an “Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions/Dismissal Against Plaintiff” with a hearing set for June 9, 2009, based on appellant’s failure to timely serve Tompkins.
Given the minimal record on appeal, we have taken judicial notice of the superior court file. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
Appellant subsequently filed an “Ex Parte Motion for Declaratory Ruling – Bench Ruling on Points of Law” in which he sought to have the court declare the statutes and regulations that were applicable to his dispute against Tompkins. The trial court denied the ex parte motion on May 28, 2009, on the grounds that the relief sought was unintelligible and improper.
Unhappy with the court’s decision on his motion, appellant filed a peremptory challenge to the trial judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. On June 10, 2009, the trial court issued a minute order denying appellant’s challenge as untimely because it was not brought within 15 days of appellant’s first appearance, as required by Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 7.5. In the same minute order, the trial court also dismissed the case for lack of prosecution because appellant had failed to serve the complaint on the defendant, and failed to file the proof of service within 60 days after the date of filing of the complaint, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b). The minute order was not signed by the trial court, and the record otherwise contains no order of dismissal or judgment signed by the court.
After the court had ordered the case dismissed, appellant filed an “Ex Parte Motion for Order Setting Aside, Vacate [sic] and Revoking Dismissal; Renewed Preemptory Challenge CCP 170.3.” In a minute order dated June 30, 2009, the court denied the application on the grounds that it was procedurally improper and without merit.
This appeal followed, with appellant purporting to appeal from three separate orders: (1) the May 28, 2009 minute order denying his ex parte motion seeking a declaratory ruling on the applicable law; (2) the June 10, 2009 minute order dismissing his claims for failure to prosecute and denying his motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 to disqualify the trial judge; and (3) the June 30, 2009 minute order denying his ex parte motion to set aside the order dismissing his claim and renewing his peremptory challenge to the trial judge.
DISCUSSION
None of the Orders From Which Appellant Purports to Appeal Are Appealable
No judgment or order is appealable unless expressly permitted by a statute. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696 (Griset); Caruso v. Snap-Tite, Inc. (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 211, 213.) Unless a particular statutory exception applies, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment that terminates a case and completely disposes of the matter in controversy. (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 697; see Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.) Because none of the orders from which appellant purports to appeal constitute appealable orders under California’s statutory scheme, we must dismiss appellant’s appeal in its entirety. (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 696.)
First, the trial court’s May 28, 2009 order denying appellant’s “Ex Parte Motion for Declaratory Ruling – Bench Ruling on Points of Law” did not resolve or terminate any of the claims appellant purports to bring against Tompkins in his complaint. Because it did not dispose of the case, but is merely an interlocutory order that no statutory provision designates as appealable, it is not an appealable order.
Second, the trial court’s June 10, 2009 minute order denying appellant’s peremptory challenge to the trial judge also is not appealable. “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d); see Swift v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 878, 882.) Nor is the portion of the June 10, 2009 minute order dismissing the case for lack of prosecution appealable. While an order of dismissal can constitute a judgment from which an appeal can be taken (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); see Etheridge v. Reins Intern. California, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 908, 913), an unsigned minute order dismissing a case does not qualify as such a judgment. (Palazzi v. Air Cargo Terminals, Inc. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 190, 192; Code Civ. Proc., § 581d.) Because the trial court’s June 10, 2009 minute order is not signed by the court, it is not an appealable order.
Finally, the trial court’s June 30, 2009 minute order denying appellant’s motion to vacate or set aside the order of dismissal is not appealable. (Scognamillo v. Herrick (2003)106 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1146.) “‘As a general rule, orders denying a motion to vacate are not appealable, because any assertions of error can be reviewed on appeal from the judgment itself.... [Citation.]’” (Ibid.) And just as the court’s initial denial of appellant’s peremptory challenge to the trial judge is not an appealable order, neither is the court’s June 30, 2009 denial of appellant’s renewed peremptory challenge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d).)
Because we lack jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from any of these orders, appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: MANELLA, J., SUZUKAWA, J.