Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-2182 (NHP).
March 19, 1999.
Lennox S. Hinds, Esq., STEVENS, HINDS WHITE, P.C., New York, NY., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
James L. Plosia, Jr., Esq., APRUZZESE, M.C. DERMOTT, MASTRO MURPHY, Liberty Corner, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant, Borough of Tinton Falls.
LETTER OPINION ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court has decided the motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons explained below, defendants' motion is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
This civil rights action arises out of plaintiff's employment as a probationary police officer in the Borough of Tinton Falls. She was terminated by her employer in December of 1996. On September 29, 1997, plaintiff filed a civil action in the New Jersey Superior Court, Monmouth County, asserting both statutory and constitutional claims arising under both federal and state law. Her complaint sought reinstatement, backpay and seniority, and attorneys' fees. On January 9, 1998, the Superior Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint "with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Jones v. Borough of Tinton Falls, No. Mon-L-5133-97, attached as Exhibit C to Brief in Support of defendants' Motion to Dismiss.DISCUSSION
This Court will dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In this case, defendants contend that plaintiff cannot prevail because New Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine bars her claims.
The Entire Controversy Doctrine requires a party to:
bring in one action all affirmative claims that [it] might have against another party, including counterclaims and cross-claims, and to join in that action all parties with a material interest in the controversy, or be forever barred from bringing a subsequent action involving the same underlying facts.Rycoline Products v. C W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, failure to join all claims and parties in an earlier state-court action will preclude a subsequent federal action arising out of the same facts. See Kozyra v. Allen, 973 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1992).
In this case, plaintiff challenged defendants' employment decision in a state-court action. She asserted state and Federal constitutional claims, alleging a deprivation of due process and equal protection of the laws. That complaint was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Jones v. Borough of Tinton Falls, No. Mon-L-5133-97, attached as Exhibit C to Brief in Support of defendants' Motion to Dismiss; see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (holding that "the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits"). Plaintiff's state and federal complaints arise out of the same nucleus of facts. Therefore, plaintiff's federal Complaint is barred by principles of res judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
To the extent that plaintiff's Title VII claim could not have been brought until the EEOC issued its "right to sue" letter on February 9, 1998, plaintiff's claims are nonetheless barred because the instant Complaint was not filed until May 28, 1998. See Hornsby v. United States Postal Service, 787 F.2d 87, 89-90 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding dismissal of Title VII complaint filed 91 days after plaintiff's receipt of right to sue letter).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.