Jones v. the New York City Housing Authority

Full title: HANSON JONES, Plaintiff, v. THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al.…

Court: United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Apr 20, 2001

99 Civ. 4728 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2001)

Opinion

99 Civ. 4728 (LAK).

April 20, 2001

ORDER

LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, brought this action against his former employer and others pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, claiming that his former employer discriminated against him on the basis of his race (African American) and color (black). The New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA") and William Russo have moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In a report and recommendation dated February 5, 2001 (the "RR"), Magistrate Judge Eaton recommended that the motion be granted, essentially on the ground that plaintiff had come forward with no evidence that his various grievances were the product of racial animus as opposed to being standard civil service complaints. RR at 3, 12. In addition, the RR recommends dismissal of the action as against defendant Locascio, who never was served, on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim against him upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff objected to the RR. By order dated March 27, 2001, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal on the ground that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the plaintiff had been advised adequately of what would be required to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

NYCHA and Russo move for reconsideration on the ground that plaintiff did receive adequate notice of what would be required to oppose the motion. It has submitted a transcript of a conference before Magistrate Judge Eaton, held on December 14, 1999, which first was transcribed after the Court decided the motion for summary judgment. The transcript quite plainly shows, although the Court previously had no way of knowing it, that Magistrate Judge Eaton painstakingly explained to the plaintiff exactly what would be required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and Local Civ.R. 56.1 to oppose the anticipated motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is granted and, on reconsideration, the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted for the reasons set forth in the RR.