Corpus Juris Secundum credits the Kentucky case of Jones v. Sutton for the definition. 388 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Ky. 1965). In fact, the definition of promiscuity in Corpus Juris Secundum is virtually identical to the definition found in Jones.

There are several cases in which we have upheld judgments awarding custody to the mother even though she has been guilty of immoral conduct. Kelien v. Kelien, Ky., 273 S.W.2d 360 (1954); Wilcox v. Wilcox, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 622 (1955); Jones v. Sutton, Ky., 388 S.W.2d 596 (1965); Morris v. Morris, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 317 (1969). We have recently reviewed those cases and the governing principles in Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 159. Therein we said (page 160):

The question remains, however: On balance what result will promote the best interest of the children concerned regardless of the human shortcomings or strengths of the adults involved? In Jones v. Sutton, Ky., 388 S.W.2d 596 (1965), we said in a case involving the custody of two infant children that where a woman had been indiscreet with a man, in order to brand her as so morally depraved and unfit as to be disentitled to the custody of infant children on that ground alone there must be evidence of promiscuity. Promiscuity is defined in that case not to be an isolated incident of sexual relations with one particular person but denotes an indiscriminate grant of physical favors to persons of the opposite sex without any requirement of love.

Appellant attacks the order on the theory that the boys being of tender years and the mother not being unfit she must be granted custody. She relies on Chastain v. Chastain, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 758 (1966); Jones v. Sutton, Ky., 388 S.W.2d 596 (1965), and Nicol v. Conlan, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 779 (1964). She points out, and we concede, that an agreed custody arrangement approved by the court may be modified.