Opinion
(June Term, 1846.)
A conveyance of slaves is made to a trustee in trust for the sole and separate use of a married woman. The husband of this woman died, and she then by deed conveyed the slaves to A. Held, that A. acquired only an equitablt [equitable] title, and could not support an action at law to recover possession of the slaves.
Detinue for slaves. Plea, non detinet. On 14 February, 1824, John Sneed and Alexander Sneed conveyed the slaves in controversy to John C. Mingas, to hold them in trust for the sole and separate use of Elizabeth Sneed, the wife of Alexander Sneed. On 14 August, 1826, Elizabeth Sneed, then being a widow, made a deed of gift of the said slaves to the plaintiff, reserving a life estate in the same to (368) herself. The donor thereafter married the defendant, who took possession of the slaves. And notwithstanding the subsequent death of his wife, he now refuses to surrender them. The deed of gift to the plaintiffs, reserving a life estate to the donor in the slaves, was executed subsequent to the passage of our act of Assembly, declaring such conveyances to be good and valid. The judge was of opinion that the donor of the plaintiffs had only a trust estate in the said slaves, and that her deed of gift operated only as an assignment to them of her equitable interest in the slaves, to take effect after her death; that the legal title to the slaves was in Mingas, the trustee, and that he was he person to sue at law for the recovery of them. The plaintiff suffered a nonsuit, and, a new trial being refused, he appealed.
Kerr for plaintiff.
Morehead for defendant.
The opinion of the judge, given on the point of law appealed from, was certainly correct. This Court decided a similar question in the same way in Merritt v. Windley, 14 N.C. 399.
PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed.
(369)