A motion in limine is a procedural device by which a litigant seeks to exclude the introduction of certain evidence at trial. Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Luce, 834 F.3d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983)). In response to such a motion, a court may, in its discretion, provide an advance ruling as to the challenged evidence to avoid lengthy and disruptive evidentiary challenges during the trial proceedings.
Perhaps the district court took the motion at its title and reasonably assumed that the motion purely involved trial issues. See Motion in Limine , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining a “motion in limine” as “[a] pretrial request that certain inadmissible evidence not be referred to or offered at trial ” (emphasis added)); Jones v. Stotts , 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995) (“A motion in limine is a request for guidance by the court regarding an evidentiary question, which the court may provide at its discretion to aid the parties in formulating trial strategy.” (quotation marks omitted)).
"The state may not use a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent to obtain his conviction." Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Supreme Court cases). This court must, therefore, determine whether there has been an impermissible comment on a defendant's right to remain silent . . . by determining whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant's right to remain silent.
It “is a request for guidance by the court regarding an evidentiary question, which the court may provide at its discretion to aid the parties in formulating trial strategy.” Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995). A court's in limine rulings are preliminary and “subject to change as the case unfolds.”
” Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). It is a “pretrial request that certain inadmissible evidence not be referred to or offered at trial.
A motion in limine is a pretrial request to exclude the introduction of certain evidence at trial. Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Luce, 834 F.3d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Functionally, a motion in limine is a "'request for guidance by the court regarding an evidentiary question.'" Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Luce, 713 F.2d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983)). In limine motions may be "made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered."
Although motions in limine are not formally recognized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have long recognized their utility under the courts' inherent power to manage the course of trial proceedings. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4 (1984); Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995). "A motion in limine presents the trial court with the opportunity 'to rule in advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely set for trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial.'"
Although motions in limine are not formally recognized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have long recognized their utility under the courts' inherent power to manage the course of trial proceedings. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4 (1984); Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995). "A motion in limine presents the trial court with the opportunity 'to rule in advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely set for trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial.'"
We have said that the "mere mention of a defendant's request for counsel is not per se prohibited; rather, it is the prosecutor's exploitation of a defendant's exercise of his right to silence which is prohibited." Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995). But because the government does not dispute Mr. Phillips' claim that the comment constituted constitutional error, we focus our inquiry on whether any such error was harmless.