Opinion
CV176038627
03-01-2018
Juma Jones v. State of Connecticut, Department of Emergency Services
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Tanzer, Lois, J.T.R.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Tanzer, J.T.R.
On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff, Juma Jones, filed this administrative appeal against Defendant State of Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. Plaintiff alleges the following: " He has been employed by the Town of East Hartford Police Department since December 22, 2003. In his role as an East Hartford Police Officer, Plaintiff had been certified to use the COLLECT system. The COLLECT system is the police department computer system by which department personnel may access a database that provides information on criminal arrests and warrants on individuals. Plaintiff regularly used the COLLECT system in the course of his work as a police officer investigating possible criminal cases. Since on or about February 22, 2013, when he was terminated as a police officer by the Town of East Hartford, Plaintiff’s access to use the COLLECT system has been denied and required recertification to Plaintiff that would permit him to use the COLLECT system in the performance of his duties as an East Hartford Police Officer. On March 2, 2017, Plaintiff participated in a hearing seeking reinstatement of his certification for usage of the Connecticut COLLECT system. On June 1, 2017, Defendant denied re-certification to Plaintiff that would permit him to use the COLLECT system in the performance of his duties as an East Hartford Police Officer. Plaintiff is aggrieved by the decision of Defendant because an inability to use the COLLECT system means he will be unable to perform an essential function of his job as a law enforcement officer."
The acronym COLLECT refers to the Connecticut On-Line Law Enforcement Communications Teleprocessing (COLLECT) System.
But see East Hartford v. East Hartford Police Officers’ Assn., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CV-14-6055713-S (March 2, 2016, Robaina, J.) (upholding an arbitration panel decision that found that the Town of East Hartford did not establish just cause to terminate Jones, and that it should have proposed a lesser penalty which was a suspension without pay).
On July 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed Motion to Amend Return Date and attached a proposed summons dated July 26, 2017 with a new return date of August 29, 2017, because the appeal was not returned to the Superior Court at least six days before the return day, as required by General Statutes § 52-46a. The initial return date was Tuesday, July 11, 2017; Defendant was served on July 6, 2017; the appeal was returned to court on July 10, 2017.
General Statutes § 52-46a provides in relevant part, that Process in civil actions ... shall be returned to its clerk ... if returnable to the Superior Court, ... at least six days before the return day."
On September 1, 2017, Defendant filed " Objection to Motion to Amend Return Date and Motion to Dismiss." The grounds of the motion to dismiss are 1) the court lacks personal jurisdiction because of the defective summons and return date and 2) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the underlying matter does not constitute a final decision in a contested case.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-166 currently defines a " final decision" and a " contested case" as follows:
" A motion to dismiss is the appropriate vehicle for challenging the jurisdiction of the court." Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531-32, 46 A.3d 102 (2012). When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, it must be found before the court may consider any other issue between the pertinent parties in the case. See Batte-Holingren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 283, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). While it is the burden of the party who seeks the court to exercise jurisdiction in his favor to clearly allege facts demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction, every appropriate presumption favors finding such jurisdiction. Keller v. Beckenstein, supra, 305 Conn. 531.
" It is well established that [t]here is no absolute right of appeal to the courts from a decision of an administrative agency ... The UAPA grants the Superior Court jurisdiction over appeals of agency decisions only in certain limited and well delineated circumstances ... Judicial review of an administrative decision is governed by ... § 4-183(a) of the UAPA, which provides that [a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies ... and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the [S]uperior [C]ourt ... A final decision is defined in § 4-166(3)(A) as the agency determination in a contested case ... Not every matter or issue determined by an agency qualifies for contested case status ... [W]e have determined that even in a case where a hearing is in fact held, in order to constitute a contested case, a party to that hearing must have enjoyed a statutory right to have his legal rights, duties or privileges determined by that agency holding the hearing ... In the instance where no party to a hearing enjoys such a right, the Superior Court is without jurisdiction over any appeal from that agency’s determination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Earl B. v. Commissioner of Children and Families, 288 Conn. 163, 180-81, 952 A.2d 32 (2008).
Plaintiff has not alleged and does not argue that there is an underlying right to a hearing at the agency level mandated by state statute or regulation. Defendant argues there is no such right; Plaintiff does not demur. Rather, Plaintiff maintains he has a right to judicial review by virtue of the clear language of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act itself: " A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision [in a contested case is entitled to judicial review]." General Statutes § 4-183(a). He argues the Department of Emergency Services & Public Protection is a state board which is authorized to determine contested cases; he has exhausted all administrative remedies available in the agency; and he is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case. Plaintiff’s reliance on similar language and reasoning used by the court in Wagner v. Connecticut Personnel Appeal Board, 170 Conn. 668, 671, 368 A.2d 20 (1976), is misplaced. In Wagner, the issue was whether there was a statutory right to appeal from the State Personnel Appeal Board to the Court of Common Pleas, not whether, as in the this case, the appeal was taken from a final decision in a contested case.
Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, as the court must, the plaintiff has not sustained his burden to prove that his right, duty or privilege to use the COLLECT system was required, by statute or by regulation, to be determined by the defendant agency. Plaintiff has not appealed from a final decision in a contested case. The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The appeal is dismissed.
(4) " Contested case" means a proceeding, including but not restricted to rate-making, price fixing and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by state statute or regulation to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held, but does not include proceedings on a petition for a declaratory ruling under section 4-176, hearings referred to in section 4-168 or hearings conducted by the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles. (5) " Final decision" means (A) the agency determination in a contested case, (B) a declaratory ruling issued by an agency pursuant to section 4-176, or (C) an agency decision made after reconsideration. The term does not include a preliminary or intermediate ruling or order of an agency, or a ruling of an agency granting or denying a petition for reconsideration.