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determining that the appellant had waived her argument that the sentence imposed was disproportionate and was unreasonable under the eighth amendment by failing to object
Summary of this case from Gadomski v. StateOpinion
No. 09-10-00397-CR
Submitted on March 10, 2011.
Opinion Delivered March 30, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court, Jefferson County, Texas, Trial Cause No. 97542.
Before McKEITHEN, C.J., KREGER and HORTON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tatesha Kennetta Jones appeals from the trial court's revocation of her community supervision. Jones contends that her sentence is disproportionate and unreasonable and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment of the Unites States Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellant was indicted for felony theft, and pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, she pled guilty to the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03 (West Supp. 2010). The trial court found sufficient evidence of guilt, found her guilty and sentenced her to two years confinement in a state jail facility, but suspended the imposition of her sentence and placed her on community supervision for a period of five years. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke, alleging Jones violated terms of her community supervision. After Jones pled "true" to three violations of the conditions of her community supervision, the trial court revoked her community supervision, and assessed punishment at two years of confinement in the state jail. Jones did not object when the trial court pronounced sentence and did not file a motion for new trial. In Jones's first and second issues, she complains that the trial court's punishment was constitutionally disproportionate and unreasonable under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. The State contends that Jones waived these issues by failing to timely object. Sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Jones's sentence falls within the statutory range of punishment for felony theft. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.35 (West Supp. 2010). Furthermore, to preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must present a timely and specific objection to the trial court, and obtain a ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). A party's failure to specifically object to an alleged disproportionate or cruel and unusual sentence in the trial court or in a post-trial motion waives any error for the purposes of appellate review. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd). Because Jones did not raise any objections when the trial court sentenced her, and because she subsequently did not file any post-sentence motions complaining about the alleged excessive sentence, we hold that she has waived her complaints regarding the length of her sentence. We overrule both issues and affirm the trial court's judgment. AFFIRMED.
Jones is also known as Tyesha Kennette Jones.
Because amended section 31.03 contains no material changes applicable to this case, we cite to the current version of the statute.
Jones does not argue that the Texas Constitution provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Baldridge v. State, 77 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) ("Neither by argument nor authority has appellant established that the provisions of the Texas Constitution offer broader or greater protection than the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution[;] [a]ccordingly nothing is presented for review."); Puga v. State, 916 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Jones further does not provide any argument regarding Article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h); Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding it is insufficient for appellant to raise only a general constitutional doctrine in support of his request for relief without citing specific legal authorities or arguments to support same).