Opinion
No. 319, 1998.
February 4, 1999.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County, Cr.A. Nos. PK94-06-0359 and VK94-06-03-5901.
REMANDED.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
KEITH L. JONES, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 319, 1998. In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: November 10, 1998. Decided: February 4, 1999.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County, Cr.A. Nos. PK94-06-0359 and VK94-06-03-5901.
Before HOLLAND, HARTNETT, and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 4th day of February, 1999, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that:
1) In 1995, Keith L. Jones pled guilty to one count of delivery of cocaine and was sentenced to 4 years incarceration at Level V, suspended after 2 years for 6 months probation at Level III, followed by 18 months probation at Level II.
2) Jones completed his 2 years of incarceration at Level V and was serving his Level III probation when, in February 1997, he was arrested for several motor vehicle violations. On December 16, 1997, the Superior Court found Jones guilty of violating probation and resentenced him to 4 years at Level V, "including credit for any time previously served."
3) In February 1998, Jones filed a pro se motion for correction of his sentence. That motion was denied in March 1998, and Jones did not file an appeal. Instead, in June 1998, Jones filed another pro se motion for correction of his sentence. In the second motion, Jones asked the trial court to clarify that he had served 2 years at Level V before his violation of probation and that those 2 years should be credited against his new sentence. The Superior Court denied Jones's second motion, but the court's order included credit for 91 days Jones apparently served before he pled guilty in 1995.
4) Jones argues that he has been sentenced illegally because his second sentence did not properly credit his prior time served. The State contends that Jones misunderstands his current sentence, and that it does give Jones credit for time served. The Department of Correction, however, does not appear to have included Jones's 2 years at Level 5, served from 1995-1997, in its calculations. As a result, the State has no objection to an order remanding this case for resentencing. The purpose of such resentencing would be to clarify the fact that Jones's sentence after violating probation is limited to 2 years at Level V (since 2 years had already been served) with credit for the 91 days served between January 25, 1995 and April 26, 1995, if those 91 days were not previously credited against Jones's incarceration from 1995 — 1997.
5) After consideration, this Court finds that a remand for resentencing, as suggested by the State, would eliminate any remaining confusion as to the term of Jones's sentence.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this matter be REMANDED to the Superior Court for resentencing in accordance with this Order. Jurisdiction is not retained.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger, Justice