Opinion
No. 11-02-00105-CR.
March 27, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
Appeal from Collin County.
Before ARNOT, C.J., and WRIGHT, J., and McCALL, J.
Opinion
The jury convicted Samuel Edward Jones of the offense of robbery. The trial court found the enhancement allegations to be true and assessed appellant's punishment at confinement for 35 years. We affirm. Appellant presents two issues on appeal. In the first issue, he challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence. In the second issue, he challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he threatened the complainant or placed her in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. In order to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000). In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence supporting guilt is so weak as to render the conviction clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the evidence supporting guilt, although adequate when taken alone, is so greatly outweighed by the overwhelming weight of contrary evidence as to render the conviction clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996). The record shows that appellant entered the E-Z Stop convenience store shortly after 6 a.m. on June 25, 2001. The complainant, Crystal Nehl, had opened the store at about 5:30 a.m. and was alone in the store when appellant entered. Appellant walked to the back of the store and looked in the stock room. Appellant then walked up to the cash register where the complainant was standing and told her that he was going to make it easy for her and that he wanted all of the money from the cash register. The complainant testified that appellant kept one hand in his right pocket, which scared the complainant. She thought appellant had something in his pocket, but she did not know what. Appellant told the complainant that, if she did not give him the money, "something's going to happen to you." The complainant understood appellant's statement to be a threat, so she opened the register. Appellant reached over and took the money out of the register. Before leaving, appellant said, "[Y]ou can call the police or whatever, but I'll be back." The complainant immediately called 9-1-1. She gave police officers a description of the robber. Later that morning approximately 1.6 miles from the store, officers located and arrested a man matching the robber's description. It was appellant. Appellant made a voluntary, written statement, which was admitted into evidence. In his statement, appellant admitted that he walked in the store, saw "the lady all by her self," and told her he wanted all the money in the cash register. Appellant stated that the complainant said "ok" and handed him the money. Appellant said that he told her he "didn't want to hurt her or nothing." We hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to show that appellant committed the offense of robbery by intentionally or knowingly threatening or placing the complainant in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (Vernon 2003); Welch v. State, 880 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no pet'n); see also Patterson v. State, 639 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982); Rose v. State, 672 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1984, pet'n ref'd). Appellant's issues are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.