Opinion
24A-CR-110
12-10-2024
Arthur Lee Jones, IV, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Matthew J. McGovern Fishers, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court The Honorable Leslie C. Shively, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 82D01-2112-MR-6827
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Matthew J. McGovern Fishers, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ROBB, SENIOR JUDGE.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] A jury determined Arthur Lee Jones, IV ambushed Derek Johnson and Johnson's partner, Samantha Robbins, as they lay sleeping, fatally shooting them both. The jury further determined Jones is an habitual offender.
[¶2] Jones appeals his two murder convictions and his 145-year sentence, challenging the admission of certain evidence. He also claims his sentence is inappropriate. Concluding that the trial court did not err and that Jones' sentence does not require revision, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Samantha Robbins had two children: eleven-year-old Ke.R. and three-year-old Ky.R. They lived in a home in Evansville. Derek Johnson had three children: five-year-old Z.J., and two sons who were not present for the events at issue. Robbins and Johnson were in a relationship, and he often visited her house.
[¶4] Johnson and Jones had been close childhood friends. They reconnected in the fall of 2021 when Jones moved back to Evansville. Johnson and Z.J. socialized with Jones and Jones' daughter, and Johnson told Z.J. to call Jones "Uncle Art." Tr. Vol. 3, p. 91. Jones was struggling financially despite working two jobs, and Johnson told his mother that he had given Jones some clothes. Later, when Jones was incarcerated, he told another inmate that he had seen Johnson display a large quantity of cash and that this made him angry because "he didn't have that type of money." Tr. Vol. 4, p. 146.
[¶5] In December 2021, Johnson took Z.J. and Jones to his mother's house for a visit. Around this time, Johnson's mother gave Johnson $400 to buy Christmas gifts for his children and younger siblings.
[¶6] On the evening of December 18, Johnson's mother gave him an additional $300. That same night, Robbins and her sons put up a Christmas tree and made cookies. Johnson and Z.J. arrived at the home to spend the night. Z.J. and Ky.R. fell asleep on the couch in the living room, and Johnson and Robbins slept in her bedroom. Ke.R. played video games in his bedroom.
[¶7] An officer later located a security camera recording from an ATM in Evansville from the night of December 18. The recording, in conjunction with Jones' bank records, showed that Jones unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw money from his account at 11:47 p.m. His request was denied due to insufficient funds.
[¶8] In the middle of the night, Ke.R. was still awake in his bedroom when he heard a knock at the front door. He ignored it, but the knocking continued. Next, Ke.R. heard someone walk through the house, and a man entered his bedroom. He was dressed in black and wore a ski mask. Ke.R. did not recognize the man, who said "he was going to check [Ke.R.'s] room" and asked, "is Derek here[?]" Tr. Vol. 3, p. 77. The man left the room, closing the door as he went, and Ke.R. heard the door to Robbins' room open. He then heard "five or four" gunshots. Id. When Ke.R. opened his bedroom door, he saw the man again. The man told him it was "just a pop gun" and said he should not enter his mother's room. Id.
[¶9] Meanwhile, Z.J. woke up when she heard the gunshots. A man in black clothes and a mask entered the living room. She recognized the man as "Uncle Art." Id. at 102. Z.J. asked what caused the noise, and he replied, "they were shooting dice." Id. at 96. After he left, Z.J. went into the bedroom with Ke.R., and they saw their parents' bodies in bed. Both parents had head wounds, and blood was spattered on a wall. In addition, Johnson was naked, and Robbins was in her underwear. Ke.R. grabbed Ky.R. and left the house to ask a neighbor for help.
[¶10] In the early morning hours of December 19, several officers with the Evansville Police Department were dispatched to investigate a report that a little boy had come to a caller's house "saying that his mom had been shot." Id. at 55. Detective Zachary Oxford found Ke.R. outside of what they later learned was Robbins' house. Ke.R. said "his parents were dead inside of a house." Id. at 129.
[¶11] Detective Oxford and other officers heard children screaming inside the house. He kicked open the front door and entered with his gun drawn, followed by several other officers. They walked into the living room, which was illuminated by a television and the Christmas tree. The officers moved toward the sound of screams, and Z.J. and Ky.R. came out of a bedroom. Z.J., who was crying, said "Somebody killed my dad." Tr. Vol. 17, State's Exhibit 39, at 1:10. Detective Oxford entered the room and found Robbins' and Johnson's bodies.
[¶12] Meanwhile, other officers took Z.J. and Ky.R. to Officer Jonathan VanCleave's car. Z.J. told Officer VanCleave, "my Uncle killed them." Tr. Ex. Vol. 17, State's Ex. 94, at 00:33. She clarified that she was referring to her Uncle Art. Another officer put Ke.R. in a separate vehicle. A protective sweep revealed no one else was in the house.
[¶13] The officers took the children to the police station and offered them snacks and stuffed animals to help quell their anxiety. An officer observing the children noted they "would go from being okay to suddenly saying . . . my mom's dead or my dad's dead." Tr. Vol. 3, p. 154. Ke.R. appeared to be in shock but responded to questions. Z.J. blurted out that "Uncle Art" "hurt our parents." Tr. Vol. 17, State's Ex. 40, at 00:40. She also said, "I was in the living room and he said he was playing shoot [sic] dice but he was actually shooting our parents." Id. at 00:58. A detective pulled up Robbins' Facebook page on his computer and showed Z.J. photos of Robbins' Facebook friends. Z.J. identified a photo of Jones as the man who she had seen in the living room.
[¶14] Meanwhile, a crime scene investigator searched Robbins' house. He found three round yellow prescription pills on the floor in Robbins' bedroom. The investigator also found spent shell casings and an intact bullet. Later, investigators learned the intruder had likely entered the home through a window, noting that an outside chair had been moved under the window, and a piece of Styrofoam insulation that had covered the lower pane of the window had been broken and removed.
[¶15] Later in the day on December 19, police officers located Jones at the apartment complex where he lived. He got into a car, and the driver (Jones' stepfather) took him to a different apartment complex. The officers followed and watched as Jones got out of the car, retrieved trash bags from the car's trunk, and threw them in a dumpster. Jones returned to the car, which drove away. Officers arrested Jones during a subsequent traffic stop.
[¶16] Later, other officers retrieved two trash bags from the dumpster. Inside the bags they found a black sweatshirt, a black t-shirt, a protective sleeve similar to those worn at the factory where Jones worked, several watches, a jeweled bracelet, and a prescription medication bottle. The portion of the label displaying the prescription recipient's name had been torn off, but the remaining portion of the label described the contents as blue pills.
[¶17] An analyst performed DNA testing on profiles generated from the watches and bracelets and compared those profiles with known DNA profiles from Robbins, Johnson, and Jones. The testing supported a conclusion that Jones' and Robbins' DNA profiles contributed to the profile generated for the bracelet. The analyst also found strong support for a conclusion that Robbins' DNA profile contributed to the DNA profile from one of the watches. The police subsequently obtained a photograph Robbins had taken while wearing a watch that resembled one of the watches the officers found in the trash bags.
[¶18] When the officers arrested Jones, they searched him and found a yellow pill, a blue pill, and $400. The yellow pill resembled the pills officers found on the floor of Robbins' bedroom. The blue pill appeared to match the description on the partial label the officers found on the prescription bottle. The officers took him to the police station and put him in an interview room. During a break, Jones pulled another pill out of his clothing and dropped it on the floor. Among other statements, Jones told the officers Johnson had never allowed him to enter Robbins' home. Jones also said he suspected Johnson dealt in controlled substances.
[¶19] An officer obtained a security camera recording from a gun shop located near Robbins' home. The recording showed a bicyclist riding by at 2:33 a.m. on December 19. Tr. Vol. 17, State's Ex. 44, at 2:33:34. On the morning of December 20, a trash collector was walking behind a shopping center, near where the security camera had recorded a person riding a bike. The collector found a wallet on the ground. The wallet contained Jones' employee identification card and an uncashed check.
[¶20] A firearms examiner later determined the shell casings found in the bedroom were all of the same type, 9 millimeters. And a forensic pathologist performed autopsies on Robbins and Johnson's bodies. The pathologist determined Johnson had been shot in the face three times and Robbins had been shot in the head four times.
[¶21] In December 2021, the State charged Jones with two counts of murder. The State also filed: (1) a request for a sentence of life without parole; and (2) a notice of intent to seek a habitual offender sentencing enhancement.
[¶22] While Jones was incarcerated, he asked another inmate if "two little kids could testify against him or would they need their parent's permission." Tr. Vol. 4, p. 144. Jones also said that if the State "can't use the two kids to testify against him, the only way that, the only way that they could get to him is if the Feds is [sic] watching [Johnson][.]" Id. at 145.
[¶23] At trial, Z.J. identified Jones as the man she saw on the night of the murders. The State also introduced officers' testimony relating what Z.J. had told them, as well as the officers' body camera recordings from Robbins' house and the police station.
[¶24] The jury determined Jones was guilty of murder, recommended a sentence of a term of years rather than life without parole, and determined he is an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Jones to 145 years, and this appeal followed.
Issues
[¶25] Jones raises three issues, which we restate as: I. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Z.J.'s out-of-court statements.
II. Whether the trial court fundamentally erred in allowing the jury to hear that officers found controlled substances on Jones' person.
III. Whether Jones' sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender.
Discussion and Decision
I. Z.J.'s Statements to Officers
[¶26] Jones argues the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear Z.J.'s out-of-court statements identifying him as the murderer. He claims those statements were inadmissible hearsay.
[¶27] "Our standard of reviewing claims of alleged evidentiary error is well settled: the decision to admit or exclude evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion." McMillen v. State, 169 N.E.3d 437, 440-41 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). "An abuse occurs only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances." Chambless v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 188 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied. A trial court's evidentiary ruling is presumptively correct, and "a challenger bears the burden on appeal of persuading us that the trial court erred in its exercise of discretion." Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021).
[¶28] "Hearsay-an out-of-court statement admitted for the truth of the matter asserted-is generally inadmissible unless it falls under an exception." Jones v. State, 159 N.E.3d 55, 60 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (citing Ind. Evid. Rules 801(c), 802), trans. denied. The State argues that Z.J.'s out-of-court statements were admissible under the "Excited Utterance" exception set forth in Indiana Evidence Rule 803(2). An excited utterance is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of the excitement that it caused." Id. "'The heart of the inquiry is whether the declarant was incapable of thoughtful reflection.'" Stinson v. State, 126 N.E.3d 915, 921 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (quoting Teague v. State, 978 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012)).
[¶29] Jones does not dispute that Z.J. experienced startling events and that her out-ofcourt statements were related to the startling events. He instead argues Z.J. was no longer under the stress of the murders when she identified him as the intruder. But Z.J. was clearly upset when the officers burst into the house and she came out of Robbins' bedroom screaming. Within minutes, the officers took her to Officer VanCleave's vehicle, where she said her Uncle Art had killed her mother and Johnson. The trial court did not err in determining Z.J. was still under stress and incapable of thoughtful reflection at this point. See Davenport v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. 2001) (trial court properly admitted recording of 911 call as excited utterance; five-year-old child had found mother's body just before placing call).
The State also argues Z.J.'s statement to Officer VanCleave was admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(1) as a present sense impression. We need not address this argument.
[¶30] Z.J.'s statements at the police station, including identifying Jones on Robbins' Facebook page, present a closer question. The State concedes that forty-five minutes may have elapsed between when Z.J. was removed from the house and when she spoke at the station. Appellee's Br. p. 14. But the children still showed signs of being under the stress of the murders. An officer observing the children noted they "would go from being okay to suddenly saying . . . my mom's dead or my dad's dead." Tr. Vol. 3, p. 154.
[¶31] In any event, any error in the admission of Z.J.'s statements at the station was harmless. Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A) provides:
No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.
[¶32] Z.J. testified at trial, identifying the intruder as Uncle Art. Her statements at the police station were merely cumulative of her testimony and her statement in Officer VanCleave's car. Presenting Z.J.'s police station remarks to the jury did not impact Jones' fundamental rights. See Davenport, 749 N.E.2d at 1149 (admission of child's statement to social worker was harmless error; even if not an excited utterance, statement was cumulative of child's other statements). In addition, other evidence placed Jones at or near Robbins' house at the time of the murders, and he was later observed discarding Robbins' property in a dumpster. Further, earlier on December 18, Jones had insufficient funds to withdraw money from his account, but he possessed $400 when he was arrested, thus demonstrating motive to commit the offenses. Jones has failed to demonstrate reversible error on this issue.
Jones further argues a body camera recording from Officer Fair was inadmissible because it contained hearsay within hearsay. In particular, an officer stated in the recording that Z.J. had identified Uncle Art as the perpetrator. But Jones did not timely object at trial to the recording on grounds of double hearsay. Instead, he generally objected, stating "a continuing objection prophylactically in the event that there is discussion as to what, what objectionable testimony has already been ruled upon." Tr. Vol. 3, p. 191. "[A] party may not object on one ground at trial and raise a different ground on appeal." Benjamin v. State, 233 N.E.3d 506, 512 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024).
II. Controlled Substances on Jones' Person
[¶33] Jones argues the trial court should not have allowed the State to present evidence that he possessed controlled substances (the pills) when he was arrested and later questioned at the police station. He concedes that he failed to timely object at trial to the admission of this evidence.
[¶34] In an attempt to avoid waiver of appellate review, Jones argues that the admission of evidence about the pills amounted to fundamental error.
"Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant's rights as to 'make a fair trial impossible.'" Hughes v. State, 153 N.E.3d 354, 360 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied. "This is a formidable standard that applies only where the error is so flagrant that the trial judge should have corrected the error on [his] own, without prompting by defense counsel." Tate v. State, 161 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2021).
[¶35] Jones first argues evidence of his possession of the pills was irrelevant. Evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and . . . the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Ind. Evid. R. 401.
[¶36] The State argues the evidence that Jones possessed the yellow and blue pills tends to show Jones was in Robbins' house on the night of the murders because similar yellow pills were found in Robbins' bedroom and the police found a partially-labeled prescription bottle for blue pills in a dumpster along with Robbins' watches and jewelry. We agree that proving Jones' presence at the scene of the offenses meets the bar for relevance. See Bennett v. State, 883 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (evidence of fleeing from state before start of trial relevant to show consciousness of guilt), trans. denied.
[¶37] Jones further argues the State did not present evidence conclusively establishing the pills in his pocket were identical to the pills on Robbins' bedroom floor or the description on the bottle label. But whether the pills matched goes "to the weight of this evidence and not the admissibility of it." Williamson v. State, 436 N.E.2d 90, 93-94 (Ind. 1982) (no error in admitting footprint images; images were similar to footwear worn by defendant and comparing two was for jury).
[¶38] Jones also argues that even if the pills are relevant, their relevance is outweighed by the undue prejudice to him resulting from the jury learning he had committed another crime (possession of a controlled substance). Indiana Evidence Rule 403 provides: "The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." "The trial court has wide latitude in weighing the probative value of evidence against the potentially prejudicial effects of its admission." Julian v. State, 811 N.E.2d 392, 399 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), trans. denied.
[¶39] In this case, the pills were highly probative because they placed Jones in Robbins' house. By contrast, the offense of possession of a controlled substance is significantly weaker than the two murder charges. And during detectives' questioning of Jones, which was recorded and played for the jury, he asked them about the pills. One of the detectives dismissed the pills' importance, saying "we're going to recover that and just destroy it, okay?" Tr. Vol. 5, p. 123. Thus, the jury heard that the officers placed little to no importance on the criminal consequences of Jones' possessing the pills. Under these circumstances, admitting information about the pills into evidence did not violate Evidence Rule 403. See Schnitzmeyer, 168 N.E.3d at 1045 (no error in showing jury old texting conversation; conversation showed defendant dealt in controlled substances in past, but any prejudice was outweighed by probative value).
[¶40] Jones next claims the repeated evidence about his possession of the pills was inadmissible character evidence. Indiana Evidence Rule 404(a)(1) provides: "Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait." This rule is intended to deter a finder of fact from concluding "a defendant is guilty of the alleged crime because the defendant possesses a bad character trait." Maffett v. State, 113 N.E.3d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App 2018). "Rule 404(a)(1) does not prohibit all references to an accused's character; it prohibits only references used to show the accused acted according to his propensity for bad character on a specific occasion." Tate, 161 N.E.3d at 1230.
[¶41] Here, the State did not use Jones' possession of pills to show that he has a bad character that led him to commit murder. Instead, the State argued the possession of the pills placed him in Robbins' house, at the crime scene. The State's use of the evidence did not violate Rule 404(a)(1). Cf. Price v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Ind. 2002) (trial court erred in admitting photos of defendant flashing what appeared to be gang signs; only purpose of photos was to show defendant's bad character and propensity for criminal conduct).
[¶42] Finally, in a related argument, Jones claims admission of evidence related to his possession of the pills violated Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)(1), which provides: "Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." But evidence of another crime "may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Ind. Evid. R. 404(b)(2). "The purpose of the rule is to protect against the 'forbidden inference-that the defendant acted badly in the past, and that the defendant's present, charged actions conform with those past bad acts[.]'" Erickson v. State, 72 N.E.3d 965, 973-74 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (quoting Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1099-100 (Ind. 2012)), trans. denied. We must "(1) determine whether the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403." Id. at 974. We have already determined the admission of evidence related to the pills did not violate Rule 403.
[¶43] At Jones' trial, Jones denied that he murdered Robbins and Johnson, placing the identity of the offender into issue. The pills and related evidence, which linked Jones to the crime scene, are relevant to prove identity, not merely to show that Jones has a propensity to possess controlled substances. As a result, admission of that evidence did not violate Rule 404(b). See Erickson, 72 N.E.3d at 974-75 (no abuse of discretion in admitting recorded phone calls despite being proof of a separate crime; calls were necessary to prove identity of person who committed charged offense). In summary, Jones has failed to demonstrate that admission of evidence related to his possession of pills was erroneous, let alone fundamentally erroneous. There are no grounds for reversal.
III. Sentencing Review - Appellate Rule 7(B)
[¶44] For his final claim of error, Jones asks the Court to revise his sentence so that he serves his murder sentences concurrently. He further asks the Court to reduce the habitual offender sentencing enhancement by an unspecified amount.
[¶45] Article 7, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes the Court to review and revise sentences. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) implements this authority, stating the Court may revise a sentence "if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender."
[¶46] Sentencing review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is deferential to the trial court's decision, and "we avoid merely substituting our judgment" for that of the trial court. Nicholson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 680, 684 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), trans. denied. Instead, the main purpose of review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is to "leaven the outliers." Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018). "[W]e may look to any factors appearing in the record" in our review. Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). Jones bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Nicholson, 221 N.E.3d at 684. "[W]e reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases." Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019).
[¶47] At the time Jones murdered Robbins and Johnson, the advisory sentence for murder was fifty-five years, the maximum sentence was sixty-five years, and the minimum sentence was forty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2015). In addition, a defendant who was convicted of murder and determined to be an habitual offender could be sentenced to an additional fixed term of between six years and twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1) (2017). The trial court sentenced Jones to sixty-five years for each murder conviction, to be served consecutively, plus a fifteen-year sentencing enhancement. His total sentence of 145 years is less than the maximum.
[¶48] "Our analysis of the 'nature of the offense' requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense." Pritcherv. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023). Jones argues that the nature of his crimes is "no more egregious than is already inherent in the nature of murder offenses." Appellant's Br. p. 39. We disagree. Jones broke into Robbins' residence in the middle of the night while armed, intending to take property at the very least. Once inside, he knew that his victims' children were present and otherwise alone. But he chose to murder Robbins and Johnson as they slept and then stole from them. Jones left the terrified children to find their parents' mutilated bodies. As the trial court noted, the effects of Jones' heinous crimes will remain with the children for the rest of their lives.
[¶49] "Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse." Pritcher, 208 N.E.3d at 668. Jones was thirty-one years old at sentencing. He has three prior felony convictions: Class C battery resulting in bodily injury, Class C possession of a handgun without a license, and Class C carrying a handgun without a license. He also has misdemeanor convictions for Class A resisting law enforcement and Class A carrying a handgun without a license. And Jones was on parole when he committed the murders. Jones has failed to live a law-abiding life and has not been dissuaded from criminal conduct by prior extensive contacts with the criminal justice system. To the contrary, he escalated his wrongdoing, killing two people while their children were steps away.
[¶50] Jones argues that he had a traumatic childhood, pointing to a thorough presentence memorandum he submitted to the trial court. It appears that his mother, stepfather, and other close relatives were involved in criminal misconduct, including violent offenses and dealing in controlled substances, resulting in stints of incarceration. As a child, Jones was shuffled from relative to relative, with meager support. Even so, our Supreme Court has repeatedly "'held that evidence of a difficult childhood is entitled to little, if any, mitigating weight.'" Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 269 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (Ind. 2013)). And Jones was well into adulthood when he murdered Robbins and Johnson. He has failed to persuade us that this is an exceptional case in which the Court should use its sentence revision authority.
Conclusion
[¶51] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[¶52] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.