Opinion
24A-CR-986
11-13-2024
Craig Matthew Jones, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Steven J. Hosler Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Decatur Superior Court The Honorable Matthew D. Bailey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 16D01-2111-F2-1136
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Madison, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Steven J. Hosler Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Tavitas and DeBoer concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
May, Judge.
[¶1] Craig Matthew Jones appeals the sentence imposed after he was convicted of Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon. Jones's guilty plea called for a six-year sentence, but gave the trial court discretion to determine how the sentence would be served. The trial court ordered Jones to serve four years in the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC") and two years on probation. Jones argues that sentence is inappropriate for the nature of his offense and his character. We disagree and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In 2021, Jones lived with his wife Renee Jones ("Renee"), Renee's fourteen-year-old daughter J.J., and their five-year-old son C.J. On November 21, 2021, Jones and Renee allowed J.J. to go out with friends. J.J. was in a car driven by eighteen-year-old Anthony Fields. J.J. rode in the back seat of Fields's car with sixteen-year-old A.B. and sixteen-year-old W.D. A.F., who was fifteen years old, was in the front passenger seat.
[¶3] J.J. had an 8:00 p.m. curfew and texted Renee to report that she would be late. Renee opened an application on her phone that allowed her to determine J.J.'s location, and the application informed Renee that J.J.'s phone was traveling toward home at eighty-two miles per hour. Renee became concerned because the evening was dark and foggy. Renee and Jones went outside to await J.J.'s arrival.
[¶4] When Fields's car arrived, J.J. exited the car and went into the house. Renee leaned in the front passenger window and began yelling at Fields about the speed he had been travelling. Fields eventually asked if they could leave, and Renee said yes. As she turned to walk away from the car, Fields called Renee "the B word." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29.) Renee turned back toward the car to ask what had been said and, in the process, she lost her footing and began to fall. Renee grabbed the car door to catch herself. However, Fields had already started driving and, as a result, Renee was dragged about ten feet before she let go of the car. After Renee released her grip on the car, which continued its forward movement, Jones ran into the street and fired a single shot from his 9 mm handgun toward the car. Jones helped Renee up, went inside to put his handgun in the closet, and then told his friend Levi Weakley, who witnessed the incident, that Weakley should not report that Jones fired his gun. (Ex. 1.)
[¶5] The bullet fired by Jones came through the back window of Fields's car and grazed the head of W.D., who began bleeding profusely. W.D. took his shirt off to hold to his head to try to stop the bleeding, but his blood ended up "all over me, all over the car." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 23.) Fields took W.D. home. When W.D. and A.B. entered W.D.'s house, W.D.'s mother thought both of them had been shot because both were covered in blood. W.D. was holding his blood-soaked shirt to his head, but "he had blood still just dripping down the side of him." (Id. at 32.) His little brother tried to help and got blood on himself. W.D. was leaving "a deer trail [of] blood . . . everywhere." (Id. at 24.) W.D.'s parents called emergency services to take W.D. to the hospital. W.D. had to go in the ambulance alone because of his blood pressure and injuries. At the hospital, doctors irrigated W.D.'s wound with saline to try to get all the metal out of his head, but they were unable to remove all of the bullet fragments. They sutured the deepest parts of W.D.'s wound and then stapled his scalp closed.
[¶6] On November 23, 2021, the State charged Jones with Level 2 felony attempted voluntary manslaughter, Level 3 felony aggravated battery, and Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon. On December 27, 2023, Jones and the State entered an agreement whereby Jones would plead guilty to Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, the State would dismiss the other two counts, Jones would receive a six-year sentence, and the court would determine how Jones would serve that sentence. The court ordered preparation of a presentence investigation report.
[¶7] The court held a change of plea hearing and a sentencing hearing on March 26, 2024. The State presented testimony from W.D., W.D.'s mother, A.F., and A.F.'s mother, and a deposition and drawing from Weakley. W.D. testified that, about one year after the shooting, he again had surgery to remove more bullet fragments and to repair his scalp to the extent possible, but he still has bullet fragments in his head. When the weather gets cold, W.D. experiences headaches in the area where he was shot. At the time of sentencing, he was attending therapy twice a week to deal with his emotions about being shot. W.D.'s little sister, who was eight years old when W.D. was shot, has been "diagnosed with PTSD stemming from the incidents of that night." (Id. at 36.) She has anxiety, struggles to sleep alone, and experiences "extreme fear" when W.D. leaves the house. (Id.) A.F., who had been in the front passenger seat, also has now been diagnosed with PTSD and has been prescribed antidepressants. Fields died shortly before Jones's guilty plea and sentencing, and results of the autopsy investigating his cause of death were pending at the time of sentencing.
A.F. described herself and Fields as "best friends" at the time of the shooting, (Tr. Vol. 2 at 13), and she testified, "we don't even know what has happened to [Fields]. But this even could have even caused [Fields] to die. We have no idea. They just did an autopsy yesterday." (Id. at 15-16.)
[¶8] Jones presented testimony from himself and Renee and submitted numerous letters of support from friends and family. His counsel argued Jones's behavior was "reckless" (id. at 82) and that Jones "was trying to shoot at the car" rather than the people in the car. (Id. at 81.) He also argued there was an explanation for Jones's behavior, even though it did not amount to a defense, because Jones was worried about his wife. Counsel offered evidence to support a number of mitigators and argued putting Jones in prison "creates more problems than it solves." (Id. at 87.) Accordingly, Jones's counsel asked the court to order any executed time served through Community Corrections.
[¶9] Before finding aggravators and mitigators, the trial court entered specific findings that Jones acted from anger and that he "fired a shot while running at the car 20 yards after [Renee] had been detached from the car." (Id. at 89.) The court then found two aggravators: (1) the crime of violence was knowingly committed in the presence of an individual under the age of eighteen; and (2) the impact on W.D. and his family, both physically and mentally, was greater than required for the elements of the offense. The court found Jones's guilty plea a mitigating factor, but it did not deserve much weight as it demonstrated a pragmatic decision, rather than an acceptance of responsibility, because two years had passed prior to the plea and because Jones received the benefit of the dismissal of counts carrying much longer sentences. The court found Jones's lack of criminal history a "significant mitigating circumstance." (Id. at 90.) The court found Jones had remorse, but it was a "not significant" mitigating circumstance. (Id.) The trial court explicitly rejected the following proffered mitigating circumstances: likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment, unlikely to commit another crime, cooperation with authorities, imprisonment will result in undue hardship, the crime occurred under strong provocation, and there was an excuse or justification for the crime that did not establish a defense. Regarding those last two, the trial court explicitly found:
And 20 yards after [Renee fell off the car], Mr. Jones is running out, and he then chooses to fire his gun into an occupied vehicle. He tells me it's to defend his wife out of his fear. I think his fear was unreasonable given that she was no longer on the car. He tells me he didn't mean to hurt anybody, but he fired a gun at a vehicle that was occupied. And I think the consequences of your actions in that necessarily expect somebody's going to get injured. I don't think that's unreasonable. So I don't believe what Mr. Jones is telling me is reasonable. I think he's minimizing his conduct here.(Id. at 92.) The trial court ordered four years executed in the IDOC and two years suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision
[¶10] Jones argues his sentence is inappropriate because the trial court ordered him to serve four of his six years incarcerated. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence "if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Our determination "turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
Our review is deferential to the trial court's decision, and our goal is to determine whether the appellant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors
appearing in the record. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating his sentence [is] inappropriate.George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. We conduct a "holistic" review that takes into consideration "the whole picture before us." Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024). Appellants need not prove their sentence is inappropriate for both their character and offense, but "to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief." Id.
[¶11] "Our analysis of the nature of the offense requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense." Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023). As our Indiana Supreme Court has explained, "compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality)" may lead to a downward revision of the defendant's sentence. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). "When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence for the crime." McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). When a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, "we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence." Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021).
[¶12] Jones was convicted of Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. Jones's plea agreement called for him to receive a six-year sentence but left to the trial court's discretion the manner in which Jones would serve those six years. The court ordered four of the six years served in the IDOC.
[¶13] A.F., W.D., and Weakley testified that Jones shot at the car after Renee let go. Thus, contrary to Jones's assertion, he fired at the car out of anger rather than as an attempt to protect his wife from injury. This fact is also supported by Weakley's testimony that Jones was running toward the car as he fired, which was taking him away from Renee, according to the diagram drawn by Weakley. Moreover, Jones fired a handgun at a car carrying four teenagers who were his daughter's friends. He committed this crime in the presence of the three minors in the car and at least one of the two minors who lived in his house. The impact on W.D., who was the victim physically touched by Jones's battery, has been significant both physically and emotionally - W.D. continues to have metal fragments in his head, which causes headaches during cold weather, and he has struggled emotionally since the shooting. His family also has been impacted significantly, as his sister now experiences "extreme fear" every time W.D. leaves the house. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 36.) Because of the shooting, A.F. has PTSD and needs antidepressant medications. We find the nature of Jones's offense, including the impact it has had on the teens in the car and their families, much more egregious than necessary to demonstrate Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon.
[¶14] As for Jones's character, while he has no criminal history and pled guilty, we do not find ourselves so "overcome by compelling evidence" of good character that we would shorten the executed portion of Jones's sentence. Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1271 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). Immediately after the shooting, Jones went into the house to put his gun away, and then he told Weakley not to report that Jones had fired a gun. Jones - who was upset because his teenager was being endangered by a car being driven too quickly - endangered the other four teenagers in the car by shooting a gun at them after J.J. had exited. Jones pled guilty, but it took him two years to do so and he pled guilty to the lowest level crime that had been charged. While Jones submitted numerous supportive character letters from friends and family at sentencing, it is unclear how many of those character witnesses understood that Jones had run out into the road to shoot in anger at a car occupied by four teenagers. We cannot say four years of incarceration is inappropriate for a man who would do that.
Conclusion
[¶15] Contrary to Jones's argument, four years of incarceration and two years of probation is not an inappropriate way for Jones to serve the six-year sentence that he agreed to receive for Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶16] Affirmed.
Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.