Opinion
24A-CR-133
09-20-2024
Ivan Juhan Jones, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Owen Circuit Court The Honorable Donald R. VanDerMoere, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 60C01-2308-F5-387
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana, Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Robb, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Ivan Juhan Jones appeals the trial court's sentencing order, claiming the court needs to clarify whether it imposed fines, fees, and costs for his conviction of Class A misdemeanor fraud. The State does not oppose Jones's claim. We reverse and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] The State charged Jones with Level 5 felony fraud in connection with his attempt to cash a fake check at a bank. The jury determined Jones was guilty of Class A misdemeanor fraud as a lesser included offense. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a sentence of 300 days. The court further determined that Jones's public defender would continue to represent him for purposes of an appeal, if any. The trial court did not discuss fines, fees, or costs during the hearing. But the court's sentencing order states, "All fines, fees, and costs were reduced to a judgment against the Defendant after an indigency finding[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 124. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[¶3] Jones argues there is a discrepancy between the trial court's statements at the sentencing hearing and the terms of the sentencing order, and remand is needed to resolve the discrepancy. The State acknowledges there is a conflict and "does not oppose remand for the trial court to clarify its intent with respect to the fines, fees, and costs imposed." Appellee's Br. p. 7.
[¶4] "A trial court's sentencing decisions are discretionary and entitled to 'considerable deference' by the appellate courts." Vaughn v. State, 13 N.E.3d 873, 889 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (quoting Edsall v. State, 983 N.E.2d 200, 205 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013)), trans. denied. "When oral and written sentencing statements conflict, we examine them together to discern the intent of the sentencing court." Id. at 890. We may credit the statement that accurately pronounces the sentence or remand for resentencing. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007).
[¶5] In Jones's case, despite the terms of the sentencing order, the court and the parties did not discuss fines, fees, and costs at the sentencing hearing. It is necessary to remand so that the court and parties may address that issue in the context of Jones's status as an indigent person.
Conclusion
[¶6] For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the trial court to clarify the amount of fines, fees, and costs which are due.
[¶7] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.